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SHOULD WE CALL AHEAD?
PROPERTY, DEMOCRACY, & THE RULE OF LAW†
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER*
Some in my band are gay & we have 2 gigs in your state next
month. Should we call ahead to make sure the hotel accepts us
all? Or maybe I should fire my gay band members just to be on
the safe side.1
Audra McDonald
Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment
that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unac-
ceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color.2
Justice Arthur Goldberg
Americans hate regulation. We don’t like being told what to do.
We value our freedom, and regulations stop us from doing things we
want to do. When you are subject to a regulation, you feel anything
but free. But if we hate regulation so much, why do we have so many
of them? Why don’t we just get rid of them all? That is a puzzle.
Maybe we don’t hate regulation as much as it seems. Maybe we have
regulations because we want them. How crazy is that? But when you
† © 2016 Joseph William Singer.
* Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This Article is a revised version of the
Kormendy Lecture delivered on April 27, 2015 at Claude W. Pettit College of Law at Ohio
Northern University. That lecture explained the path that led me to write the accompanying
article that will be published in the ONU Law Review: Joseph William Singer, Justifying
Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601 (2015). I want to thank Harvard Law School
for supporting the research that went into this Article. Thanks and affection go to Martha
Minow, Mira Singer, and Lila Singer for their comments and suggestions and unflagging sup-
port. Finally, I want to express my deep gratitude to the William & Mary Property Rights Proj-
ect for honoring me with the twelfth Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize and for the panel
participants at the 2015 conference that commented on this Article and on my other work.
1. Michael Paulson, Audra McDonald Takes to Twitter to Criticize Indiana Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2015, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/audra-mcdonald-takes-to
-twitter-to-criticize-indiana-law/?_r=0.
2. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
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think about it, regulations are just laws, aren’t they? Do we really
hate law?
There’s the rub. Americans may claim to hate regulation, but we
seem to like the rule of law. But if regulation is just another word
for law, then what do we want, really? Do we have some sophisti-
cated distinction between regulation and law, or are we just really,
really confused?
We are a free and democratic society that aspires to treat each
person with equal concern and respect. Doing that requires us to
have law. Legal rules make everyday life possible. Law is necessary
to make our lives comfortable and safe. More than that, law is what
allows us to exercise our liberties in a manner compatible with a like
liberty for others. Regulation may limit our options, but it also en-
larges them. John Locke tells that “where there is no Law, there is
no Freedom.”3 Locke is a libertarian hero, but he was a big fan of
law. And if regulation is just another word for law, then according
to Locke, regulation is what makes us free.4
Here is another puzzle. Americans value free markets and private
property—and I am not talking only about conservatives or libertar-
ians. Contrary to popular belief, liberals are not enemies of free mar-
kets; we just want them to be fair. Nor are liberals enemies of private
property. During the McCarthy era, liberal economist Robert Mont-
gomery was called before the Texas legislature and asked if he fa-
vored private property. He replied, “I do—so strongly that I want
everyone in Texas to have some.”5
If Americans like both markets and private property, what does that
mean for regulation? We tend to think that regulations interfere with
both the free market and private property rights. But if we remem-
ber that regulations are just laws, things look a bit different. Back
in 1990, after splitting from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia’s for-
eign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, noted: “It was easier to make a revolu-
tion than to write 600 to 800 laws to create a market economy.”6 This
3. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed. 1988) (1689).
4. On this theme, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION: THE
HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (Yale U. Press 2015).
5. CLIFTON FADIMAN, THE LITTLE BROWN BOOK OF ANECDOTES 395 (1985) (recounted by
John Kenneth Galbraith).
6. William Echikson, Euphoria Dies down in Czechoslovakia, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1990,
at A26, (quoting Jiri Dienstbier, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1990).
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is a truth that lawyers know better than anyone else. Neither the free
market nor private property can exist without a legal infrastructure.
Consider the law of contracts. We are free to decide how to live
our lives, and part of that freedom includes the liberty to shape the
terms of our relationships with others. But freedom of contract is not
a law-free zone. We need legal rules to determine when we have com-
mitted ourselves to a contract and what we have promised to do. We
need legal rules to interpret ambiguous terms in our agreements and
to protect us from fraud. We need consumer protection law to pro-
tect us from unfair or deceptive practices. Sellers are not legally free
to mislead consumers or to sell us products that are not safe or effec-
tive. Consumer protection laws are regulations, but they do not in-
terfere with freedom of contract; rather, they ensure that we get
what we want when we enter the marketplace.7 Those laws may be
regulations, but they promote contractual freedom.
We need legal rules to distinguish when the courts will force us
to abide by our promises and when we are free to change our minds.
Sometimes the courts force us to do what we promised to do, some-
times they let us off the hook if we pay damages, and sometimes they
let us break our promises because our contracting partners can ob-
tain the same services elsewhere. The law determines when we must
honor our commitments and when we are at liberty to move on.
All these rules entail choices. Think about mortgage agreements—
they contain technical language no ordinary person can understand,
and they are too long to read unless you are a real estate geek like
myself. If a mortgage broker tells you that the interest rate is 3%
but page twenty-four of the document uses nine-point font to explain
that the rate rises from 3% to 9% after two years, then what amount
did you agree to pay? We tend to privilege the written documents
over oral communications. But why is that? Real estate law some-
times goes the other way; courts have created exceptions to the
statute of frauds using doctrines of estoppel and unclean hands to
enforce oral promises intended to induce others to rely on verbal
7. For explanations of this function of consumer protection laws, see Joseph William
Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and
How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 532–36 (2013); Joseph William Singer, Subprime:
Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 155–60 (2012).
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representations. Contract law makes choices about whose under-
standing of the deal should govern the arrangement when the parties
have differing expectations.
Contract law seeks to promote contractual freedom, but what
exactly does that mean? A year ago, one of my students tried to enter
a club in downtown Boston. The bouncer refused to let him in, com-
menting on his Asian appearance and that of his two friends. “We
don’t want your kind here,” he said. They were shocked. They asked
to see the manager, but they found no relief there. The manager
agreed with the bouncer—go someplace where they want you.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 grants every citizen the same right
to purchase property as is enjoyed by white citizens.8 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 grants “full and equal enjoyment” to places of entertain-
ment without regard to race.9 Justice Potter Stewart explained the
goal of these laws in 1968. They ensure that “a dollar in the hands”
of an African American will “purchase the same thing as a dollar in
the hands of a white [person].”10
The right to contract does not only mean that the courts will
enforce a contract if you can find someone willing to contract with
you. It means that places of entertainment cannot refuse to contract
with you because of your race or national origin.11 We all have the
right to participate in the free market to get what we need to live and
to thrive. But we cannot exercise our liberty to engage in market
transactions if businesses are entitled to shun us because of things
about ourselves we cannot change. That is why businesses have to
let us in. The freedom of contract norm places obligations on busi-
nesses to ensure that we can exercise our rights to contract without
discrimination. To promote freedom of contract we must limit free-
dom of contract.
That may seem like a paradox, but human beings are nothing if not
paradoxes. Markets are complicated, and they need rules. And rules
come from law. If we want freedom of contract, if we want the security
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
10. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. See also Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle
in American Property Law, 1 ALA. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2011); Joseph William Singer, We
Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV.
929 (2015).
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that comes from enforceable promises, if we want free markets, if we
want the freedom to participate in the market without being excluded
because of our race or religion, then we want regulation.
Consider private property. Whether you believe in natural rights
or not, Jeremy Bentham was correct when he said, “Property and law
are born together, and die together. Before laws were made, there was
no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”12 This does not
mean that there were no property norms prior to formal government.
It means that in a complex society, legal institutions and processes
are needed to settle disputes and to fix rules of the road. Predictabil-
ity is important in property systems, and that comes from legal sys-
tems that combine clear rules with flexible, norm-based standards.13
We need legal rules to allocate and define the rights of owners. We
need legal rules to define the powers that owners have over their
property. We need legal rules to ensure that the use of property does
not unreasonably interfere with the personal or property rights
of others.
Property rights are not absolute. They are not absolute, because
we live in a free and democratic society. Owners are not lords with
the power of life and death over those who enter their castles. Land-
lords have the right to receive rent, but they do not have the right
to tell tenants who they can be friends with or who they can marry.
Businesses have the power to build factories, but zoning law, envi-
ronmental law, and workplace safety law tell them where they can do
so and what safety precautions they must take to protect the prop-
erty and health of others. Restaurants have the power to exclude
patrons who are drunk or disorderly, but they do not have the power
to exclude people because their parents were born in South Korea.
People have the power to write a will determining who owns their
property after they die, but they do not have the power to create a fee
tail. Downton Abbey makes great entertainment, but that is partly
because it shows us a kind of society that we Americans have rejected.
We don’t want a lord owning and ruling a town; we don’t want ten-
ants beholden to a lord and dependent on his will. We want to be a
nation of free and equal persons, not a nation of lords and servants.
12. JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 THEORY OF LEGISLATION 139 (1840).
13. Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369 (2013).
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We like to say that owners are lords of their own castles. But that
is wrong—we have no lords in America. In a free and democratic so-
ciety, property rights must be limited—they must be regulated—to
make them consistent with our commitment to live in a nation of free
and equal persons.
We hate regulation, but we like the rule of law, the free market,
and private property. It turns out that we cannot get what we want
without regulation, much as we like to hate it. Regulation may limit
our freedom of action, but without it we would not have liberty.
That brings me to the topic of regulatory takings law.14 Those who
chafe under government regulation sometimes argue that regula-
tions are fine as long as the government compensates owners when
regulations interfere with property rights. Ever since 1922, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause to require compen-
sation when any regulation “goes too far.”15 But those who hope to
find solace in regulatory takings law will find only disappointment
and perplexity. For one thing, takings doctrine does not protect own-
ers very much. In practice, it is rare for a regulation of property to
be deemed an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation. The
Supreme Court is very reluctant to find regulatory laws unconstitu-
tional unless owners whose property values are affected are compen-
sated for those losses. Regulatory takings doctrine has a reputation
for being one of the most confusing, incoherent, and disordered doc-
trines in the legal system.16 It is very hard to find a law review arti-
cle on regulatory takings law that does not denounce it for promoting
ad hoc adjudication without clear standards or guidelines.
From time to time, judges have sought to develop clear rules that
define certain types of regulations as takings that cannot be enforced
against owners without compensation. Justice Thurgood Marshall
wrote the 1982 opinion in Loretto that held that a permanent physi-
cal occupation of property by a stranger is a categorical taking.17 Ten
14. This Kormendy Lecture explains the background concerns that led me to write
Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601 (2015).
15. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
16. For a recent, well-argued example, see Steven J. Eagle, The Four Factor Penn Central
Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 602 (2014) (arguing that the Penn Central
doctrine “has become a compilation of moving parts that are neither individually coherent nor
collectively compatible”).
17. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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years later, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Lucas that held that
a taking occurs when a regulation deprives an owner of any econom-
ically beneficial use of the property unless the regulation stops the
owner from causing harm to others.18
But the effort to create rigid rules to govern regulatory takings
law has failed. The rules created in Loretto and Lucas almost never
apply. Justice Scalia’s love of rules has lost out to Justice O’Connor’s
contextual, case-by-case approach.19
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it “has been unable
to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fair-
ness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.”20 Rather, the Court looks at the
“particular circumstances” of each case, “engaging in . . . essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries” focusing on several relevant factors.21 De-
termining whether a legal obligation placed on an owner is unfair
or unjust “necessarily requires a weighing of private and public
interests”22 and a judgment about whether the burden on the owner
is a “public” one that should be shared by the taxpayers.23
Yet the longing for certainty never dies. In 2010, in the case of
Stop the Beach Renourishment,24 a majority of the Justices asserted
that the rights of property owners are violated whenever a regula-
tion deprives an owner of an “established right of private property.”25
Two Justices would have considered enjoining such laws under the
due process clause while four others would have required just com-
pensation for owners affected by such deprivations. The idea that
18. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
19. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The temptation to adopt what amount to per
se rules in either direction must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.”).
20. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
21. Id.
22. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). Accord, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002) (“we have ‘generally eschewed’
any set formula for determining” when a regulation goes “too far” and becomes a taking).
23. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
24. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
25. Id. at 715.
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established property rights should be protected sounds good. But hold
onto your hat—this idea makes sense only if you say it fast.
The idea that established property rights should be protected
seems simple and clear. But human life is not simple or clear. Human
life is messy, and human values are nuanced and contextual; law
that does not reflect those facts comes to be perceived as unjust and
gives way in the end.26 Of course the law should protect established
property rights. But that presents a question rather than a solution.
What does it mean to say that a property right is “established”? How
can we tell when property rights are established and when they are
not? And how can we tell whether property has been “taken” rather
than merely “regulated”?
In some cases, we can answer these questions easily. Or at least
we have a fair amount of agreement on how to tell when a right is
established and when it deserves constitutional protection from legal
changes. For example, the law protects “vested rights” either through
application of zoning-enabling statutes or through constitutional
protection under the takings or due process clauses.27 If you build a
five-story apartment building that is consistent with existing zoning
law and you have obtained the necessary building permits and envi-
ronmental permits, the city cannot turn around after you built it,
rezone the property for one-story single-family house use, and re-
quire you to tear the structure down. Every state has laws that pro-
tect your vested right in the apartment building. A law requiring
you to tear down the building would be found to be a taking of an
established property right that cannot be accomplished without just
compensation to the owner. Conversely, if you let your building be-
come dilapidated and a dangerous nuisance, the city can order you
to fix it or tear it down. If you fail to comply, the city can demolish
26. See Marc Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
93 (2002) (arguing that vagueness is a virtue rather than a vice in takings doctrine); Singer,
supra note 11.
27. Note that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to the United
States while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. There is no Takings Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment has been
interpreted to incorporate the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment, making that clause
applicable to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). That means that, as applied to the state, a taking
of property without just compensation is defined as a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
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the building without any compensation to you. No court will find this
to be a taking of an established right of private property requiring
compensation, because owners have no right to commit a nuisance.
The deprivation is not of a private right that the state is obligated
to recognize; it is not an “established property right.”
But that means we must make judgments about which rights are
“established” and which are not. We must also make judgments about
when a right has been taken or an owner has been deprived of an
entire property right versus when a property right has been merely
limited or regulated. Making such judgments requires us to inter-
pret the rights that go along with ownership of different types of prop-
erty in our society. If every limitation on property use is thought to
take an established use right, then no regulatory laws can be passed
without compensating owners whose property values go down because
of those laws. If any property right recognized by law is “established,”
then the law can never change unless we pay off everyone who is
worse off under the new rule. Would that make life better? A couple
of states have adopted legislation that provides compensation for any
new laws that lower the market value of real property by even a
penny. Those laws have not worked out so well.
Oregon adopted one of those laws and then substantially repealed
it when people realized that regulations not only stop you from doing
things on your own land, but they protect your property by stopping
your neighbors from doing horrible things next door.28 After the law
was put in place, people realized that zoning law may limit what
they can do with their property, but it also limits what neighbors can
do with their property. Deregulating neighbors can lower your prop-
erty values as easily as regulating your use of your own land. Regu-
lations often protect owners by limiting use in ways that provide
what Justice Holmes called an “average reciprocity of advantage.”29
We are entitled to the maximum liberty compatible with a like lib-
erty for others. Similarly, we are entitled to property rights compati-
ble with like property rights in others. Regulations are how we tell
the difference.
28. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, BETHANY R. BERGER, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & EDUARDO
MOISÉS PEÑALVER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, & PRACTICES 1197–98 (6th ed. 2014).
29. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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The idea that established property rights are completely immune
from deprivation, limitation, revision, or regulation with or without
compensation alarmed many scholars as well as some of the Justices
on the Supreme Court.30 It placed in doubt the ability of both courts
and legislatures to modernize the law of property or to regulate harm-
ful activity on the land.31 Consider what our world would be like if
established property rights could never be regulated or abolished.
Many regulatory laws we take for granted would never have been
passed if they could not be enforced unless owners were compensated
for any losses they entailed.
Would we still be plagued with the fee tail? Would we be beset
by children stuck on the family homestead, unable to sell the land,
unable to move to take a job in another state? Would the Van
Rensselaer feudal estates still persist in New York State? Would our
eastern states be filled with little Downton Abbeys, populated by
tenant populations who cannot move and who owe inherited obliga-
tions to the lord of the land? Would the South be filled with slaves?
The laws that abrogated feudal relations, like the 1787 Statute of
Tenures in New York and the Thirteenth Amendment, took away
established rights of private property. They did so because the prop-
erty rights in question were no longer deemed worthy of recognition
in a free and democratic society that ensures the liberty of its inhab-
itants and their equal right to pursue happiness.
I grew up in the state of New Jersey. Beginning in the 1660s, it was
owned and ruled by two lords appointed by the Duke of York under
authority granted to him by his brother, King Charles II.32 At that
time, property and dominion were closely tied. The owner ruled his
30. John D. Echeverria, Green Light for Beach Renourishment, Red Light for Judicial
Takings, 62 PLANNING & ENVT. REV. 3 (Sept. 2010) (arguing that the case of Stop the Beach
Renourishment “has a frightening near-miss quality to it” and almost adopted a “radical judi-
cial takings theory, and wreaked other far-reaching damage to established takings doctrine”);
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 742 (Breyer, J. concurring).
31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 715 (suggesting that the Takings Clause
was adopted at a time when courts had no power to change the common law and that even if
such changes are allowed they cannot “eliminat[e] established private property rights.”).
32. Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1309
(2014); Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy, Fourth Wolf
Lecture at the University of Florida Levin College of Law (2011), in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROP-
ERTY WFL11-1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013); Singer, supra note 5, at 147–49. See BRENDAN
MCCONVILLE, THESE DARING DISTURBERS OF THE PUBLIC PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR PROPERTY
AND POWER IN EARLY NEW JERSEY 12–27 (1999).
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property. If you are in my house, you follow my rules. If established
property rights could never change without compensation, would
New Jersey still have two lords, and would my childhood have been
filled with treks to the lord’s manor to tend his crops? Would I still
be there because my lord refused to release me from my feudal obli-
gations? Would East Jersey still be ruled by a descendant of Sir
George Carteret or of John Berkeley rather than by Governor Chris
Christie and an elected legislature?
If established property rights could never be changed without
compensation, would we still have no warranties of habitability in
residential leases? Would landlords still be entitled to evict tenants
because they called the housing inspector to seek help getting the
landlord to comply with the state housing code? Would we have to
say goodbye to environmental law, zoning law, antidiscrimination
law, building codes, and workplace safety regulations? Would we be
powerless to regulate subprime mortgages, banking, food, and drugs?
Would wheelchair access to housing and public accommodations
go away?
It sounds good to say that the Constitution should protect all
established property rights or that any economic losses to property
owners caused by regulation should be compensated. In practice,
however, that means that many laws we take for granted would not
exist. The Village of Euclid case, for example, upheld a zoning law
that lowered the owner’s property value by 75%.33 If all municipali-
ties had had to compensate owners for all reductions in value of their
property, zoning would not have gotten off the ground. Yet zoning
law is immensely popular and exists throughout the United States.
If property cannot be regulated and property rights can never be
changed by law, then we are in big trouble. Much of what we value
in our property exists because regulation makes it so.
If you are in the market for an incoherent idea, then protecting
established property rights from regulation (or regulation without
compensation) has got to be a top candidate. Regulation is just
another word for law, and we have neither freedom nor democracy,
nor free markets, nor private property if we don’t have law. If laws
that regulate property cannot be passed unless we compensate for
33. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (value reduced from
$10,000 per acre to $2500 per acre).
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every decrease in property value caused by such laws, then we will be
stuck with the regulations that were in place in the eighteenth or
nineteenth centuries or even the feudal regimes of the 1600s. But
democracy is premised on the notion that the people govern—not the
people who lived in 1664, not the people who lived in 1789, but us,
the people who live here today.
Of course, democracy also entails limits on majority rule to protect
fundamental rights. And when the state actually takes property away
from an owner to build a highway or school, there is no question that
it must compensate the owner. But if property owners had the right
to veto any regulatory law that displeases them, then our democratic
system would be a mirage. Of course, regulatory takings law does
not prevent laws from being passed; it just requires compensation for
regulations that amount to takings. But requiring compensation for
all reduction in value would have the effect of making new regula-
tions impossible. In the very case that created the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine in 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes conceded that
“government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.”34
If you want a society where owners do as they please, without
regulation, find a time travel machine and go back to the time of
William the Conqueror. Witness him declare himself the owner of all
England. Watch as he installs his friends and family as lords of the
land, displacing the old English lords. Watch as he creates the feudal
system, makes the English nobles learn French, and impresses the
entire country into his personal service. The only person who truly
had property rights in William’s England was King William himself.
The rest of the population was in service to him or to his cronies.
If established property rights were immune from regulation,
revision, or regulation without compensation, we would be stuck with
feudalism and slavery. We did not get from the feudalism of the
eleventh century to our free and democratic society by deregulation.
We got here by regulation. We got here because the state of New York
passed the Statute of Tenures in 1787 abolishing all feudal property
rights and all feudal relationships. We got here because the United
34. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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States Constitution abolished all titles of nobility. We got here be-
cause we redistributed property rights from lords to commoners. We
got here by regulating future interests to promote the alienability
of land, freedom of movement, and real estate markets.
We got to the private property system we have by laws abolishing
the fee tail, by laws granting married women the right to control their
own property, by laws freeing slaves and abolishing the property
rights of slave owners, by laws abolishing segregation and discrimina-
tion in access to employment, housing, and public accommodations.
We got here by homestead laws and mortgage insurance laws and
banking laws that spread home ownership across the population. We
got here by minimum wage laws and maximum hours laws. We got
here by consumer protection laws and workplace safety laws.
We got here, in short, by laws setting minimum standards for
market relationships and for property rights.35 These laws—these
regulations—brought us the freedoms we cherish. All too often, we
take their benefits for granted. We have abolished many established
rights of private property, and we did so without compensation. We
did so because social values, conditions, and norms changed, and we
used democratic means to determine the appropriate contours of prop-
erty rights. We have defined and redefined what uses of property are
legitimate, what contexts must be managed by reciprocal limits on
use, and what obligations are reasonable to impose on owners.
Last year was the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Title II of that law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race
in public accommodations like restaurants, hotels, and places of
entertainment.36 It grants members of the public a right of access to
someone else’s property. And by ensuring “full and equal” service,
it also prohibits posting a “Whites Only” sign, insulting customers,
providing second-class service, or otherwise making customers feel
unwelcome because of their race.
One might think therefore that the Civil Rights Act limits both
property rights and free speech. Indeed, Senator Rand Paul said as
much in an interview with Rachel Maddow in 2008.37 Senator Paul
35. SINGER, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 5.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
37. Jeff Jacoby, Tough Stand: Freedom to Be Odious, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2010, at 15;
Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Tea Party Pick Causes Uproar on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2010, at A1.
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expressed doubts about the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As a libertarian,
he was concerned that it limited an owner’s right to control his prop-
erty as well as the owner’s free speech. He explained that he was
against discrimination, but he still found the law to be a potential
overreach. Later on, after widespread criticism, Senator Paul did an
about-face and has voiced support for the Civil Rights Act. Should
hotels and restaurants in the South have been compensated if they
could show that the value of their establishments had plummeted
after discrimination was outlawed?
Civil rights law teaches us something about the meaning of prop-
erty rights in a free and democratic society. In one sense, Senator
Paul was right that the Civil Rights Act limits the property and
speech of certain owners. Although owners generally have the right
to exclude nonowners from their property, public accommodation
law creates an exception to that principle. In effect, it gives the pub-
lic an easement of access to public accommodations; we all own the
right to enter restaurants even if the owner does not consent to our
entry—if the only reason for the exclusion is our race or our religion.
And it is true that civil rights law limits the words one is allowed to
speak in the conduct of a business open to the public.
But while it is correct to say that civil rights law regulates both
property and speech, Senator Paul was wrong to suggest that it in-
fringes on either speech or property rights. He assumed that prop-
erty rights are absolute and that any limitations are infringements
on them. But that is not the case. Property rights are not absolute,
because we live in a free and democratic society that aspires to treat
each person with equal concern and respect. Because we believe
each person is free and equal, and because each person is irreplace-
able, property rights that are incompatible with those commitments
are banned.
The Thirteenth Amendment tells us that slavery is a form of
property that cannot be recognized in a free and democratic society.
We have abolished feudalism; citizens are not servants subject to the
arbitrary power of others. Landlords today receive rent from tenants;
they do not receive fealty or homage or service or obedience. Tenants
do not “take a knee” and become the lord’s man as they did in King
William’s time. We have abolished racial segregation in public accom-
modations because the right to exclude a patron from a restaurant
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based on that person’s race is no longer a right that a free and demo-
cratic society can recognize. No compensation is due for the loss of
the right to discriminate on the basis of race in a hotel or restaurant
or place of entertainment, because we have engaged in democratic
lawmaking and decided that such a property right is not consistent
with the liberties of people who are entitled to equal protection of
the law.
We have recently witnessed a remarkable outcry against the
Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it seemed de-
signed to enable businesses to deny services to gay and lesbian pa-
trons. The outcry was intense even though neither the statutory law
of Indiana nor that of the United States prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Why was the reaction so intense?
Singer Audra McDonald explained this better than anyone. “Some
in my band are gay,” she wrote, “and we have 2 gigs in your state
next month. Should we call ahead to make sure the hotel accepts us
all? Or maybe I should fire my gay band members just to be on the
safe side.”38
But what about claims of religious freedom? I realize this is a
highly sensitive issue and that there are intense feelings on both
sides of this issue. I also strongly support the First Amendment’s
guarantee of a space for exercising religious liberties. At the same
time, we must remember that such liberties do not give each citizen
a personal veto power over laws they find to be immoral. I also feel
obligated to note that a citizen of this state (Ohio) had his case heard
in the Supreme Court in 2015 in an historic argument.39 The ques-
tion of same-sex marriage demonstrates the possible tension that
may exist between one person’s claim of religious liberty and that of
another. It also highlights the difference between being free to do
something oneself and being empowered to stop others from doing
likewise. The reason the clash between property and religion has
come to light is because public accommodations occupy an ambiguous
38. Michael Paulson, Audra McDonald Takes to Twitter to Criticize Indiana Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2015, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/27/audra-mcdonald-takes-to
-twitter-to-criticize-indiana-law/?_r=0.
39. I am referring to Jim Obergefell from the state of Ohio whose case was argued in the
Supreme Court of the United States the day after this lecture was delivered at the Claude W.
Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern University on April 27, 2015. See Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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space in the world midway between the “private” space of the home
and the “public” space of the public park. We tend to think of the
“market” as in the “private” sphere, but antidiscrimination law is
designed to ensure that that sphere is open to all members of the
“public.” For that to happen private property owners must be forced
to open their doors to persons they might wish to exclude. That means
we have an inevitable clash between one property right (the right to
exclude) and another property right (the right of reasonable access).
The florists and pizza parlor owners that want freedom from being
forced to participate in same-sex weddings have sincere religious
beliefs. As it happens, I am a religious person, and I also have sin-
cere religious beliefs. Businesses that refuse service to gay and les-
bian customers mistake the sale of goods with endorsement of the
buyer’s use of those goods. If store owners were complicit in all the
wrongs committed by their customers, we would have to dramati-
cally increase penalties for aiding and abetting wrongful acts. From
a more practical side, we need to understand that if religious free-
dom justified exemption from public accommodation laws, then the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have changed little or nothing in the
South. Many owners at the time had strong religious views about
separation of the races. If they could have simply raised religious
objections to admitting African Americans to restaurants or hotels,
racial segregation in public accommodations would have persisted.
It might even still exist today.
Recall that the Supreme Court allowed an interracial couple to
get married in the 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia.40 Could a hotel
owner who opposes interracial marriage for religious reasons refuse
to rent the wedding suite to an interracial couple? The answer is
no—public accommodation law trumps the religious beliefs of the
hotel owner. Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race
in public accommodations,41 and any religious objections by the hotel
or restaurant owner are trumped by the compelling government in-
terest in abolishing the “badges and incidents of slavery.”42
40. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000a.
42. Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
28 (1883)).
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Of course, in states like Indiana, Ohio, and Virginia, public accom-
modations are free to refuse service to gay customers for religious or
other reasons. A federal bill designed to prohibit such discrimina-
tion has long stalled in the House of Representatives.43 And the
recently passed Utah antidiscrimination law prohibits sexual orien-
tation discrimination in housing and employment but not in public
accommodations.44 If sexual orientation were added to a state or the
federal public accommodations statute, that freedom would vanish;
it would be replaced by the freedom of gay customers to obtain ser-
vice without “calling ahead,” as Audra McDonald put it. If the law
were changed in that way, one freedom would give way to another,
and one property right would give way to another. Civil rights reg-
ulations in fact require owners to suffer an invasion of their prop-
erty by persons they wish to exclude.
We would then face the question whether public accommodation
laws take established rights of private property and thus cannot be
enforced without compensation. The Supreme Court summarily re-
jected that claim in a single sentence in the case of Heart of Atlanta
Motel in 1964.45 Here is the full extent of the Court’s analysis of the
question: “Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is
a taking of property without just compensation.”46 That’s all the
opinion says on the matter. Why does the Court say so little? Civil
rights laws arguably infringe on property rights. They force owners
to suffer physical invasions of their property by strangers. That
would seem to put them squarely in the rule of law adopted in Loretto
for categorical takings of property. I think the reason the Court dis-
missed the takings claim is because the change in social values rep-
resented by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 meant that property owners
have no constitutionally protected right to be free from civil rights
43. The Senate passed the Employment Non-Discrimination Act in 2013. One-Year
Anniversary of Senate ENDA Passage, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www
.hrc.org/blog/entry/one-year-anniversary-of-senate-enda-passage.
44. Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments Act, 2015 Utah Laws ch. 13
(S.B. 296) (signed by Governor on Mar. 12, 2015), http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/SB0296
.html; Kelly Catalfamo & Michelle L. Price, Utah governor signs Mormon church backed LGBT
anti-discrimination bill, LGBTQNATION, Mar. 12, 2015, http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2015
/03/utah-governor-signs-mormon-church-backed-lgbt-anti-discrimination-bill/.
45. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
46. Id. at 261.
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laws.47 Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Heart of
Atlanta Motel explains why. He wrote:
Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment
that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unaccept-
able as a member of the public because of his race or color.48
Democratically enacted laws shape social relationships, and anti-
discrimination laws promote access to property on an equal basis.
One way we exercise freedom is by choosing how to use our own prop-
erty. But another way we exercise freedom is by entering the mar-
ketplace to buy goods and services, to get a job, to open a business,
to buy real estate, or to get insurance. If public accommodations had
the power to exclude customers based on characteristics they cannot
change, then access to the market and the property system would be
based on social caste rather than individual merit.
It may seem that we exercise freedom only by individual actions.
But we also exercise freedom collectively and democratically by using
political means to pass laws that define the environment within
which our property is situated. We adopt laws to shape the contexts
within which we exercise our liberties. Zoning law, for example, en-
sures that we can own a house in a neighborhood of other houses.
Environmental law ensures that our property is not subject to pollu-
tion coming from other owners.
But why not compensate owners harmed by changes in environ-
mental law or zoning law or even antidiscrimination law? If people
are ends in themselves, as Kant taught us, we should not use them
as a means to promote public goals.49
The answer to this complaint is that owners are ordinarily not
victims of legislation; they are part of the body politic that enacts
laws. Property owners are both authors and beneficiaries of demo-
cratically enacted legislation. They are neither politically powerless
nor a suspect class. More to the point, zoning and other regulatory
47. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (not a taking to require
shopping centers to allow individuals to hand out leaflets at the shopping center because that
activity does not affect the use or value of the property).
48. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
49. See FIRST PHILOSOPHY: FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS AND READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY 666
(Andrew Bailey & Robert M. Martin, eds., 2nd ed. 2011).
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laws usually help owners by regulating what happens next door. In
other words, laws may limit what you can do with your property, but
they also limit your neighbors and therefore protect your property
rights as much as they limit them. Property laws usually do have an
average reciprocity of advantage.
Conservatives are absolutely correct that the Takings Clause
provides little protection from regulation. They are wrong, however,
to lament that fact. Compensation is ordinarily required when the
state actually takes your land away from you. But when it merely
regulates what you can do on your own land, it is a different story.50
Legislatures are empowered to pass laws to regulate social, economic,
and family life. They cannot do those things without regulating the
uses of property. We grant lawmakers the power to regulate because
we value government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
And we (generally) have the right to expect those laws to be enforced
without compensating owners for the burdens the laws impose.
But like every principle, this one has exceptions.51 The Constitution
may require compensation if a regulation destroys property, subjects
the owner to physical occupation, or deprives property of all value.52
In general, the state may not authorize strangers to invade or de-
stroy your land. It must pay compensation if it floods your land, takes
over your factory, or requires you to allow strangers into your home.
Compensation is generally due if the law requires you to tear down
an existing building. For example, if you build a convenience store
compatible with the zoning law, and the town rezones your land
for residential use, the law allows you to continue the prior non-
conforming use.
But compensation is not due if there is an adequate justification
for limiting the owner’s property rights.53 The government is free to
50. For a similar argument, see PETER GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY
274–90 (2013).
51. For a full treatment of these issues, see Singer, supra note *.
52. I say “may well” because there are well-recognized exceptions to each of these
presumptive rules. As noted above, the state can demolish a dilapidated house that is a public
nuisance, and it can do so without compensation; the state has the power to protect its citi-
zens from harm, and we do not recognize a property right to commit a nuisance. Physical occu-
pation may be a taking if it concerns a private home, but restaurants are subject to a public
easement of access by persons who have a right to service without discrimination.
53. By “adequate justification” I do not mean to adopt the test under the due process clause
or the equal protection clause that refers to regulations that have a rational relationship to
a legitimate government interest. I mean that we must address the normative question of
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demolish a dilapidated structure both to protect residents and to
protect neighbors. Owners are subject to antidiscrimination laws
that limit the owner’s right to exclude by requiring restaurants and
hotels and movie theaters to let patrons in regardless of race or reli-
gion, and perhaps their sexual orientation. Laws may protect tenants
from eviction without just cause, or they may regulate rents. Such
laws effect a forced occupation of property by another. Laws may
regulate the foreclosure process and temporarily protect homeown-
ers from loss of their homes. Such laws deprive mortgagees from ob-
taining property their contracts said they were entitled to get. We
may constitutionally require landlords to evict tenants through court
proceedings rather than relying on self-help. Such laws increase the
time when the tenant can stay on the premises even if they are hold-
over tenants whose leases are over. Courts may constitutionally grant
temporary restraining orders that evict individuals from their own
homes if they engage in domestic violence. People in New Orleans
who entered their neighbors’ homes after Hurricane Katrina in order
to escape rising waters were not trespassing. They had a right to
enter a stranger’s land in order to save their lives. Laws may stop
owners from causing harm. Environmental laws are constitutional
because they ensure that property is used in ways that do not harm
the environment within which all of us live.
In all these cases, legally mandated occupation, destruction, or
devaluation of property are justified and do not count as unconstitu-
tional takings requiring compensation for any lost property value.
In these cases, there is an adequate justification for the regulation
despite the uncompensated loss of property value. Our democratic
system allows elected representatives to pass laws that regulate prop-
erty use, and it is not the case that every such law can be viewed as
a taking of a constitutionally protected property right. While it is
important that we consider the impact that laws have on owners,
regulations of use ordinarily limit what some owners can do to pro-
tect the ability of other owners to do what they want to do. Laws ad-
justing the benefits and burdens of social life can be supported by
whether the government can give an adequate justification for exemption from the presumptive
obligation to pay just compensation in these cases. The burden is on the government to pro-
vide such a justification, and it may sometimes prevail, as with civil rights laws and public
nuisance laws.
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reasons that owners could accept as legitimate burdens for a citizen
in a free and democratic society.
Regulatory takings law requires compensation in certain cases of
physical occupation or destruction and when necessary to protect
owners from unreasonable, retroactive deprivation of prior invest-
ments. And our constitutional principles rightly ask us if we can jus-
tify the burden of a regulatory law on particular owners as just and
fair in the absence of compensation. But the Constitution generally
allows new regulations to be enforced without compensation when
those laws promote legitimate public interests. We the people have
the power to pass laws that set ground rules for social life and mini-
mum standards for economic activity. Democracy—government by
the people—ordinarily provides an adequate justification for subject-
ing property owners to regulation without compensation. Only when
a regulatory burden is one that an owner should not have to bear as
a citizen in a democracy is compensation required. The question, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, is whether a law “forc[es] some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole[?]”54 Fairness and justice require
legislatures to compensate owners for undue and unjustified bur-
dens, but they do not require compensation for most regulatory laws.
Let me end with two final examples. In the Loretto case in 1982,
the Supreme Court held that it was a taking of property to force a
landlord to allow a cable television company to install cable lines
and equipment on the owner’s rental property.55 In the 1955 case of
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,56 the Supreme Court held that
it was not a taking of property for the United States to seize timber
from land owned by a band of Tlingit Indians in Alaska. In my view,
both cases were wrongly decided.
The Loretto case found it to be a special burden on an owner to be
required to bear a forced physical invasion of property by a stranger.
I would agree if the law had ousted the owner and transferred the
property to someone else. I would agree if the owner were required
to quarter troops in her living room. I would agree if the owner were
required to participate in Airbnb.
54. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
55. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
56. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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But that is not what the law did. The law simply required landlords
to make cable television available to their tenants. It did so by giving
the cable company the right to install lines rather than giving the
owner the duty to call the cable company to ask it to install the lines.
The cable lines and boxes did not impair the use or value of the prop-
erty. Indeed, it did not even diminish the market value of the prop-
erty; on the contrary, cable television access undoubtedly increased
the market value of the property.
That means that no compensation should have been due even if
there was a limitation on the right to exclude. That, after all, was the
holding of the PruneYard decision that enabled California to require
shopping centers to allow people to distribute leaflets.57 Just compen-
sation is measured by the harm to the land’s use or value. In Loretto,
there was neither. Moreover, the reason for the law was adequate to
justify the nature of the intrusion.
It is true that the Court distinguishes between finding a taking
and measuring the remedy for the taking. It is not irrational to say
that Loretto found the law to effect a taking but that in this case,
no compensation was due. But I am a legal realist, and I am of the
view that rights are defined by remedies. The Constitution does not
prohibit the taking of property for public use; it only provides com-
pensation. We call it the Takings Clause, but it really is the “just
compensation clause.” Thus the constitutional right is a right to com-
pensation. If no compensation is due, then no constitutional right is
implicated. Loretto involved a forced physical invasion of property
by a stranger, but there was no interference with the use or enjoy-
ment of the property, and the regulation was designed as a con-
sumer protection measure to make cable television access available
to tenants. And it effected no reduction in the fair market value of
the property. It would have made no difference to the owner if the
law had required the landlord to install the cable lines rather than
authorizing the cable company to do so. That suggests that no fun-
damental constitutional rights were at issue in the case.
The same cannot be said about the case of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States.58 In 1955, the Supreme Court held that the Native
Alaskan owners of Wrangell Island did not have any property rights
57. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
58. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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recognized by the Constitution. They owned the island pursuant to
federal common law and under tribal law, but their rights had not
been recognized by the United States through treaty or statute.
Without such recognition, the Supreme Court held that their
common law property rights did not constitute “property” within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment that would be protected from taking
without compensation. Moreover, the Court argued, there were only
sixty-five Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, and they obviously had not fully occu-
pied the tens of thousands of acres they claimed to own. The Court
argued that the United States needed their land and that the United
States could not have spread west as it did if it had had to compen-
sate Indian nations for all the land the United States took from them.
The opinion by Justice Reed was written the year after Brown v.
Bd. of Education, and it has never been overruled. It still has the
force of law, and it still shapes the rights to tribes living on reserva-
tions established by executive order, of which there are a fair num-
ber. Yet the reasoning in the case cannot withstand scrutiny. The
land occupied by the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians was recognized as their
property under federal common law and Tee-Hit-Ton law. Why then
was it not “property”?
My property rights in my house are recognized only by common
law. There is no Massachusetts statute conferring title to me. Yet I
am protected by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any principle of
U.S. law that prevents sixty-five people from owning thousands of
acres of land. One of the islands in Hawaii is owned by one guy, and
there are many multinational corporations that own more land than
the tribe did. History teaches us that the United States claimed pos-
session of the vast Louisiana Purchase in 1803 not by occupying it
but by signing a piece of paper with France. Moreover, the idea that
the tribe had not used the property intensively enough to establish
property rights is too far-fetched to take seriously. All they had done
was live there, hunt and fish there, establish villages there, bury
their dead there, and worship the spirits there.
Nor was the Court correct that the United States could not have
developed if it had compensated Indian nations for all the lands it
seized from them. In fact, the United States did pay for most of the
land it took from Indian nations although often with inadequate
compensation. Congress recognized this in 1946. Less than ten years
before the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, Congress passed a statute creating
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an agency whose purpose was to compensate tribes for property taken
in the nineteenth century without adequate compensation.59
The cable television law in Loretto was justified by the goal of en-
suring that tenants could have access to cable television, and it had
no impact on the use or value of the property at all. The law had an
adequate justification, and the owner had no reasonable claim to
compensation. But the uncompensated timber seizure in Tee-Hit-Ton
could not be justified by adequate reasons. Indeed, the reasons given
by the Supreme Court were discriminatory. If the land had been
owned by a business corporation rather than by a band of Alaskan
Natives, compensation would have been paid, and it would have been
constitutionally owed. Nor did the special nature of Indian title or
the federal policies underlying federal Indian law justify treating
tribal property as subject to confiscation without compensation.
Property owners are normally subject to regulation without com-
pensation. They are entitled to just compensation only when their
property is taken for public purposes. Regulations rarely amount to
unconstitutional takings. This does not mean that the Constitution
does not protect property rights or that property owners are second-
class citizens. It means that property owners, like everyone else, are
part of “the people,” and they have a duty to obey duly enacted laws
promulgated by the people and for the people. Owners are obligated
to respect the rights of others. Regulations of what we can do with
our own land may impose duties on us, but they also protect the
rights of our neighbors, as their duties protect our rights.
The rule of law is a good thing and so is democracy. The Constitu-
tion requires just compensation when the burdens that laws impose
on owners cannot be adequately justified by the norms and values
embraced by a free and democratic society that treats each person
with equal concern and respect. Thankfully, regulations like that
are unusual. Regulations ordinarily do not deprive people of property
rights in a manner that requires compensation for those laws to take
effect. Quite the contrary. Regulations are just laws in disguise.
Laws are passed to ensure that our uses of our property are compat-
ible with the rights of others and to ensure that we can enjoy both
our freedoms and our property rights without undue interference by
other owners.
59. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.06(3), at 438–40 (Nell Newton et al.
eds. 2012 ed.).
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Legislatures adopt laws not because they are evil but because we
the public demand that they do so. We want laws because they pro-
mote our freedom. We want laws because they protect our property
rights. We want laws because they ensure our safety and our well-
being. We want laws because they set minimum standards for mar-
ket and social relationships in a free and democratic society that
treats each person with equal concern and respect. Laws ordinarily
impose legitimate obligations on citizens, and they impose legitimate
obligations on property owners. That is why the Constitution rarely
requires compensation when regulations affect property rights even
when those laws reduce the market value of an owner’s property.
We have no obligation to compensate owners just to get them to obey
the law.

GOOD GOVERNMENT, CORE LIBERTIES, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: AN ESSAY FOR JOE SINGER
FRANK I. MICHELMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Joseph Singer’s recent writings on regulation and takings1 turn
my mind once again to questions I have broached previously in this
Journal about the point of American constitutional protections for
property.2 Immediately, then, my topic has to narrow down. Some
constitutions elsewhere include clauses of so-called “institutional
guarantee,” positively committing the state to the upkeep by its legal
system of forms of institutional order we would recognize as private
property, along with full and fair access by all to that order and its
benefits.3 “Elsewhere,” I said, but not here.4 By widely accepted Amer-
ican legal wisdom, one does not look for such material in American
constitutions.5 Rather, what we have in the property department, and
all we typically have are what jurists call “negative” or “defensive”
clauses, meaning protections for established asset titles against loss
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Emeritus, Harvard University. This Essay stems
from my panel remarks on the occasion of the award of the 2015 Brigham-Kanner Property
Rights Prize to Professor Joseph William Singer, Twelfth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property
Rights Conference, Williamsburg, Va., Oct. 2, 2015.
1. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION (2015) [hereinafter
SINGER, FREEDOM]; Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L.
REV 601 (2015) [hereinafter Singer, Justifying].
2. See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Protection for Property and the Reasons Why:
Distrust Revisited, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 217 (2012) [hereinafter Michelman,
Reasons Why]; Frank I. Michelman, The Property Clause Question, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 152
(2012) [hereinafter Michelman, Question]; Frank I. Michelman, Liberal Constitutionalism,
Property Rights, and the Assault on Poverty, 22 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 706 (2011) [hereinafter
Michelman, Property Rights].
3. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 99–100, 114–15, 123–24 (2006) (describing
and discussing German constitutional law). See Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 615 (“A
system of private property in a free and democratic society rests on legal, political, economic,
and social structures that enable property ownership to be widely distributed.”).
4. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 99–100 (remarking on the difference in this respect
between the constitutional laws of the United States and Germany).
5. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A]
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . .”); Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“the Constitution is a charter of
negative . . . liberties.”).
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to restrictions and controls imposed by legislation, legal rulings, and
other state actions.6
Narrowing my topic still further, I deal here not with questions
about correct applications of our constitutional defensive property
clauses to doubtful or borderline cases, about which Professor Singer’s
work has much of importance to say. Our topic is about why the pro-
tections are—or should be there—in the Constitution at all.
Why, after all, are they needed? To be sure, lawyers across America,
within and without the Brigham-Kanner circuit, disagree plenty over
the extent and application of the constitutional clauses on property
that in fact we have.7 But we all know, too, that the general back-
ground institutions of private property and market economy are
deeply entrenched in the life and the mind and the everyday laws
of this country (and surely for the general good, most of us would
freely add8), quite regardless of anything in our constitutions. None
of us seriously thinks that a main cause or necessary condition for
the persistence of private property in the United States is the pres-
ence in this country’s fifty-one constitutions of their clauses on de-
fensive property protection (any more than we conceivably could
think the same for countries like Canada and Israel where no such
constitutional clauses have ever been in force). But if we do not
believe that American attachment to the general background insti-
tutions of private property flows from or depends on those constitu-
tional clauses—as I feel quite sure Joseph Singer does not—then on
what basis do we explain the presence of these clauses in our federal
and state constitutions?
6. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
7. Compare, e.g., Michelman, Reasons Why, supra note 2, at 220–26 (applauding the
Supreme Court’s decision in the Lingle case cited infra note 15 and accompanying text), with
Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Decisions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: When
Pragmatic Balancing Is Not Enough, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 177, 208–09
(2012) (disapproving the same decision).
8. See SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 8 (“Both liberals and conservatives believe in
free markets and private property . . . .”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD
5 (2000) (“The law should enable the free market . . . but there is no single framework for a
market system.”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 204
(2000) (“The ability to control one’s property can promote human dignity, individual fulfill-
ment, and social welfare.”) [hereinafter SINGER, ENTITLEMENT].
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A constitution, writes William Galston—in a key that chimes nicely
in my mind’s ear with Joseph Singer’s writings on property law—
represents “a partial authoritative ordering of public values.” Con-
stitutional law, Galston says, selects and “foregrounds” a “subset” of
values from the mix of ideas of the good that circulate in a free soci-
ety, and those foregrounded values then become “benchmarks for
shaping and assessing legislation [and] public policy.”9 For reasons
to appear below, I have thought it fitting in Professor Singer’s honor
to think a bit, with his scholarly works in view, about how the value
orderings detectible in American constitutional law would (or should)
differ from what they are now if our constitutions lacked their defen-
sive property clauses but otherwise stood just as we know them
today, complete with their defensive clauses on life, liberty, equality,
privacy, and due process.
You can think of my question as one about the ways in which the
presence of the property clauses, in particular, is expected to contrib-
ute toward fulfillment, in theory or in practice, of a conception of good
and right American government. And here permit me to say again
that the question is not that of the good of the general system of
property law we see every day at work in American life. Professor
Singer has plenty to say about the moral and practical benefits that
can flow from a market-based economy and the broadly speaking
liberal forms of life that the system is meant to sustain and assist,
and has plenty, moreover, to say—as in his contribution to this
collection10—about choices to be made within that body of law in
order to realize those benefits as fully as possible for all. Those con-
tributions are not, however, addressed to my question about a con-
stitutionalization of property law. We can have our general system
of property law, fine-tuned in Professor Singer’s ways or in other
ways,11 with no need whatever for constitutional property law. So why
have the latter? What work does it do that we really need or want?
9. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 3–4 (2005); see SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 18 (“Defining the legal structure of property requires hard
choices to be made about alternative forms of social life.”); SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1,
at 13 (“What liberals and conservatives disagree about is how to define our core liberties; doing
so requires value-laden choices about the contours of our way of life.”).
10. See Joseph William Singer, Should We Call Ahead? Property, Democracy, & the Rule
of Law, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2016).
11. For a comprehensive sweep of Singer’s approach to issues of fine-tuning the general
law of property, see generally SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8.
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Parallel questions, I know, can be raised about any single one of
the protective clauses to be found in American constitutional bills
of rights,12 but let us focus for now on the property clauses. In prior
work, I have looked into various possible lines of explanation for their
presence, including two I have labeled as the lines of “collective good”
and of “fundamental personal right.”13
I. COLLECTIVE GOOD: DEFENSIVE PROPERTY CLAUSES AS ECONOMIC
POLICY SCREENS
Consider a strictly policy-screening function for constitutional
property clauses. By “policy screening,” I mean the idea that the
clauses are meant to set up a legal and judicial barrier against reg-
ulatory laws we’d be better off without, laws that are so weakly or
factitiously connected to the pursuit of properly public goals or con-
cerns as to raise suspicions of legislative incompetence, if not cor-
ruption. Owing to some incautious dicta in the Supreme Court’s Agins
decision, that idea achieved some short-term circulation in United
States courts,14 but the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron15 has
now retired that idea from the field of American constitutional
argument. The Court in Lingle lays it down that any general policy-
screening aim in our constitutional law belongs exclusively to the
due process clauses—not the Takings Clause—and furthermore is
to be exercised by judges only to the extent of highly restrained, so-
called “rational basis” scrutiny of the questioned state action. That
is the level of judicial general policy inspection that the Court deems
normal for a functioning democracy, and the bare fact that a regula-
tory burden falls immediately on property value or property use—as
12. See Michelman, Reasons Why, supra note 2, at 227–33 (showing the wider relevance
of my question to other constitutional protections and surveying possible answers).
13. See id. at 227–28 (listing possible explanations); Michelman, Property Rights, supra
note 2, at 715–16 (same).
14. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Court wrote that “the application
of a [regulatory law] to particular property effects a taking if the [law] does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”
Id. at 260 (citations omitted). See Chevron U.S.A. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (2002);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (1998) (on the authority of Agins, ap-
plying the Takings Clause to require states to compensate property holders for economic losses
occasioned by regulations found by courts to be economically wrongheaded).
15. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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distinct from other dimensions of liberty and flourishing such as
health or education or recreation or professional fulfillment—does
not change it. Economic policy choice is by and large the domain of
the legislature, not the judiciary.16
Some may think the Court’s adoption of this stance to be a very
serious error. They might join Professor Epstein in the view that
achievement of a truly just and productively efficient regime of law
requires a much more robust sort of policy screening of the outputs
from legislative majorities and, furthermore, that a strict rule of com-
pensation for property losses suffered from state regulation would
impose just the sort of discipline we need.17 Here, we are not directly
concerned with the merits of such views. It suffices for present pur-
poses that the Supreme Court denies them recognition as American
constitutional law, Professor Singer most surely concurring.
II. SYSTEMIC GENERAL FAIRNESS
Economic policy is one thing; basic fairness is another. Where
policy choice might not be a primary concern or a suitable pursuit
for constitutional law, fairness most certainly is both.18 And that,
then, is where our constitutions’ defensive property clauses can very
well fit in. We read them as aimed at prevention of unfair loadings
of the costs and burdens of public policy pursuits onto owners whose
property takes the regulatory hit but who no more deserve to bear
these burdens than does anyone else. That indeed is what the Su-
preme Court over and over says the Takings Clause is for: to “bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens,
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole.”19 Professor Singer agrees. “Constitutional limits on regula-
tion are reached,” he writes by way of summation of his view, “only
16. Id. at 539–43; Michelman, Reasons Why, supra note 2, at 222–23 n.16.
17. See Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional
Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1987); Epstein, supra note 7, at 209.
18. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1245–58 (1967) (positing
fairness as a central pursuit for constitutional law and reviewing challenges thus raised for
constitutional design).
19. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Lingle strongly and clearly reaffirms
the message. See Michelman, Reasons Why, supra note 2, at 220–23 (providing the details).
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when a law imposes a ‘public burden’” that a person “should not have
to bear alone in a free and democratic society that treats each person
with equal concern and respect.”20
My question, though, is whether we need “property” clauses to
shoulder this vital constitutional work. As shown by Willowbrook
v. Olech21 and by concurring and dissenting opinions in Eastern
Enterprises,22 constitutional protection against regulations of prop-
erty found seriously oppressive or unfair—as substantively or pro-
cedurally arbitrary, groundless, discriminatory, or retroactive—can
apparently be handled by apt applications of the due process and
equal protection guarantees without need for resort to separately
dedicated clauses on takings of property. The U.S. Constitution’s
equal protection clause makes no mention of “property,” but the
Supreme Court in Willowbrook found no problem applying that clause
to a property-regulation case. And given that every legal cutback on
a property title or restriction on property use is ipso facto also a curb
on the owner’s liberty, the same should hold as well for due process
clauses shorn of mentions of “property.” Maybe it is equal protection
we should think as the lead partner here, or maybe it is due process.23
Either way, it seems that the two clauses between them could ade-
quately and aptly carry the load of ensuring basic general fairness
in the operations of a regulatory state.
20. Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 602.
21. 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that allegations of a “wholly arbitrary
and irrational” imposition of greater regulatory burdens on some landowners than on others
similarly situated “state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis,” re-
gardless of the regulators’ “subjective motivation” and regardless also of the number of badly
treated owners).
22. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539, 549 (1998) (separate opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (finding that “the . . . remedy created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation
to the interest which the Government asserts in support of the statute [and it] has a retroac-
tive effect of unprecedented scope,” and accordingly “represents one of the rare instances where
[economic legislation exceeds] the limits imposed by due process.”); id. at 553, 558 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“To find that the Due Process Clause protects against this kind of fundamental
unfairness—that it protects against an unfair allocation of public burdens through this kind
of specially arbitrary retroactive means—is to read the Clause in light of a basic purpose: the
fair application of law . . . . It is not to resurrect long-discredited substantive notions of
‘freedom of contract.’”).
23. See Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2008) (opting for due process).
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III. CONSTITUTIONS AND BASIC RIGHTS
A. Core Liberties and Special Justification
This doesn’t yet settle that our constitutions’ defensive property
clauses are pointless or redundant. As Singer points out, it is only
the Takings Clause that authorizes a judicial order of compensation
as a remedy for unacceptably unfair or oppressive regulation.24 On a
deeper level, though, consider that the point of the property-protective
clauses could be to set up a class apart for cases where regulations
“hit on” (so to speak) the set of advantages specifically connected
to property titles—the standard package of rights and powers to use,
to exclude, to control, to choose the next owner, to cash out at the
market—as distinct from cases where the “hit” is on just plain lib-
erty or freedom of action. The reason for setting up this separate
class could be to demand for the “property” hits a kind or level of jus-
tification beyond the default levels demanded for incursions on just
plain liberty. The comparison then would be to constitutional men-
tions of “freedom of speech,” “free exercise of religion,” “secur[ity of]
persons, houses, papers, and effects” (and so on), understood to name
especially valued dimensions of civil liberty, for the infringement of
which we demand special kinds and levels of justification.25
It would not, then, be merely a lookout for basic general fairness
that explains the presence of the property-protective clauses in our
constitutions. We would have an additional sort of explanation, the
sort I had previously labeled as a “fundamental personal right.” The
proposition simply would be that “property” points to an American
basic personal right or—in a phrase of Professor Singer’s we conve-
niently can use here—to an American “core liberty.”26 Our bills of con-
stitutional rights, we might say, serve first and foremost as publicly
24. See Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 660 (observing that the Takings Clause thus
is not merely “a shadow of ” the equal protection clause.). See First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[W]here a gov-
ernment’s activities have already worked a taking of . . . property, no subsequent action . . .
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation . . . .”).
25. See Michelman, Reasons Why, supra note 2, at 225–26 (illustrating and discussing this
possible design for the property clauses).
26. See SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 11 (maintaining that disagreements over
acceptable forms of market regulation stem from disagreements over “how to define our
core liberties”).
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binding memorials of basic human interests and needs to which, by
common consent, our governments are bound to pay full and appro-
priate heed. If that is a key part of what bills of rights are there to do,
and if property is among those interests, then property merits inclu-
sion. My question will be about how in that light we can best under-
stand constitutional clauses on property. How—in other words—do
we best understand the idea of property in relation to the idea of
fundamental rights or core liberties?
Our constitutions, remember, are already replete with defensive
guarantees respecting “life,” “equality,” “due process,” and, of course,
“liberty”; and “liberty,” as we have come to know, includes among its
components, along with items having their own “enumerations” like
“speech” and “religion,” others lacking them like “autonomy,” “dignity,”
and “privacy.”27 Now, sometimes, as Singer reminds us, enjoyment of
property is “linked to” one or more of these other core liberties.28
When and insofar as it is, we can protect it without need for a sep-
arate constitutional clause on property.29 Perhaps, though, what we
do need is timely reminders of the “sometimes” connection between
hits on property and hits on those other core liberties, and maybe
that could be the sole and total story about why the property clauses
are there.30 If so, then the clauses would amount to calls for esca-
lated protective responses whenever—but only when—a regulatory
hit on property is found also to be a substantial hit on some other
core liberty. That would be one way to construe the idea—familiar,
I expect, to most readers of this Journal—of property as a “guardian
of other rights.”31
My question, though, to Professor Singer and to us all would still
be the following: Is that all there is to it? Is there no additional
human-rights contribution expected from defensive protections spe-
cifically for property titles and their attendant special benefits and
27. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015), slip op. at 11–14; Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 562, 564–65, 567, 574 (2003).
28. See SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 23 (“Some property uses . . . provide a
setting [for the exercise of] liberties that liberals care about, such as free speech, religious
activity, and private family life.”) (emphasis added).
29. See Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 629.
30. See Michelman, Property Rights, supra note 2, at 713–14 (advancing this suggestion);
Michelman, Question, supra note 2, at 157–58 (same).
31. See JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008).
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advantages? Is there not some dimension of basic human interest or
need, some core liberty, that the notion “property” distinctively in-
jects and which those other guarantees do not fully catch? Jeremy
Waldron, in a passage favored by Singer, writes that “people need
private property for the development and exercise of their liberty,”
and “that is why it is wrong to take all of a person’s property away
from him . . . .”32 Is Waldron overlooking something? Is there some
other further reason of core human interest or need why it would be
wrong? If so, what might be that further reason?
B. An American Basic Right to Keep?
So there we have the question: Is there some “core liberty” or
comparably fundamental interest or need infringed by legal hits on
property that wouldn’t already be covered by the array of autonomy,
privacy, dignity, expression, and religion? If so, how should we name
and describe that interest and its corresponding right? To that ques-
tion I can find only one sort of answer to fit the case. It seems to me,
as I have written elsewhere, that it would have to be what I will here
call by the name of a “right to keep.”33
At any given time, you and I are legally recognized holders of
portfolios of asset titles lawfully acquired, perhaps by our own labors
or perhaps not. Retention of the proprietary prerogatives of command
and other benefits composing an asset portfolio comprises in itself,
we might think, a basic human interest meriting constitutional pro-
tection. (Does that perhaps ring bells with phrases like “investment-
backed expectation”34 and “established rights of property”?35) And
32. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 329 (1988); see SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 167.
33. See Michelman, Question, supra note 2, at 157–60. See also Donald J. Kochan,
Keepings, 53 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 355, 356, 369 (2010) (suggesting that constitutional “taking”
clauses are meant to vindicate a “right to keep,” corresponding to a “natural” desire and feel-
ing of entitlement by owners to keep assets they have taken into ownership).
34. Michelman, supra note 18, at 1233; but see Margaret Jane Radin, Government Inter-
ests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of Property and the Role of Political Theory, in REIN-
TERPRETING PROPERTY 166 (1993) (pointing out tensions between investor aims and hopes and
a constant evolution in cultural standards for allowable or expected private appropriation of
common goods).
35. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep’t of Env. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010)
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then the special office of the defensive property clauses could be to
give recognition and protection to that supposed core personal inter-
est in sheer retention of lawfully gotten ownership, which “liberty”
and its cognates may not quite comfortably cover. The property
clauses then would give constitutional standing to the idea that a
regulatory curtailment of my property is a special kind of hurt to
me—which calls for special justification—in and of itself and with-
out regard to ramification to any other core liberty.
I cannot here try to delve into philosophical pros and cons of such
a view. It may, in our tradition, have some connection to a sense that
intentional acquisitions and possessions are material embodiments
of our very own powers and choices and thus extensions into the so-
cial world of our very selves and identities—thus making a hit on
my property already a hit on me.36 It’s true, of course, that any prop-
osition of that kind would be controversial within liberal political
philosophy.37 Historians and theorists might or might not finally con-
clude that the proposition is rightly attributed to the framers writing
the Constitution.38 Constitutional lawyers today might or might not
find the Supreme Court affirmatively drawn in its direction. What
would seem hard to deny, though, is that intuitions of a special immu-
nity against invasions of proprietary entitlement do have some pur-
chase and some following in our country’s intellectual heritage and
cultural drinking water.39 I will simply ask each reader to consider
(plurality opinion). See Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 605 (“There is something appealing
about the idea of protecting ‘established property rights’ . . . .”).
36. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 32, at 194–95 (setting forth a view quite plausibly
ascribed to John Locke, that lawful acquirers identify with their titles in such a way that
respect for the person demands respect for the entitlement); C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLIT-
ICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962) (a widely known source
presenting an account of these strains from the standpoint of one who does not like them).
37. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
(2002); Michelman, Property Rights, supra note 2, at 718–20 (examining views of John Rawls).
38. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 9–18 (1985).
39. Singer calls such intuitions “the hidden work of the property idea” in American legal
argument. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 83. A case in point would be Singer’s sup-
posed Texas judge for whom “infringements on property rights are as oppressive as infringe-
ments on liberty interests such as free speech or privacy.” SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8,
at 20. Professor Singer wasn’t saying such judges are American freaks but rather that they
represent a widespread strain in American popular philosophy that deserves to be reckoned
with by makers and critics of our laws.
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whether it makes up a part of your own sense of the matter and
point of our constitutional protections for property or your sense of
the senses of others. If so, then some further questions should follow
for Professor Singer, as I explain soon below.
Of course the right to keep might not in anyone’s view be an abso-
lute right, any more than freedom of speech is or others protected by
our constitutional bills of rights are. The retention right would log-
ically have to yield something to laws protective of the parallel rights
of others, such as laws against trespassory force, fraud, and breach
of contract or trust.40 It could yield to other regulatory restric-
tions for which “implicit in-kind compensation” can convincingly be
claimed.41 It might even yield to equitably apportioned taxation for
a limited set of public purposes, perhaps even including relief of desti-
tution in our midst.42 But still the point would be that decisions about
the permissibility of uncompensated incursions on values and prerog-
atives of lawfully established asset titles are to reflect a special moral
priority we assign to a person’s interest, just as such, in retaining all
lawfully gotten asset titles with attendant benefits and advantages.
A new or revised law’s effect of withdrawing asset-related advantages
previously lawfully held would serve—just in and of itself and without
regard to any further impacts on liberty, dignity, or privacy—as the
basis of a demand for inspection of that law—for procedural regu-
larity, for an equitable distribution of burdens and benefits, and for
substantive justification including a due regard for legal stability—
all at escalated levels of rigor over what we accept in other cases
where people are subjected to laws restricting freedom in ways that
are quite unequally burdensome or disruptive of prior pursuits.
C. What Does Singer Say?
What does Professor Singer say in response to the proposition of
proprietary keeping as a core liberty? Nothing quite direct that I
have so far been able to find.
40. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 111.
41. Id. at 195.
42. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (affirming that
such taxes are permitted by the Takings Clause).
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I can imagine my friend Joe feeling real surprise when I say that.
Does not his work drive home over and over the lesson that owner-
ship and regulation cannot be intelligibly positioned as opposites or
adversaries—first because ownership is from the start a creature of
a private-property system that is itself through and through a con-
trivance of regulation43 but then also because that system cannot
coherently, much less with any pretense to a liberal-democratic polit-
ical morality, envisage ownership as “absolute”?44 Well, yes, the work
to its everlasting honor and credit does most trenchantly, astutely,
and unforgettably drive home those lessons. Those lessons do not,
however, quite meet the point at issue.
Their powerful payload for current debates is the following: banish
the thought of a general systemic hostility to regulation. Without the
least misunderstanding or rejection of that lesson, we can still—and
Singer would—demand especially persuasive showings of public need
for regulatory infringements on core liberties. We do not thus dis-
play hostility to regulation; we simply pay due respect to all of the
values at stake in the case. Now, if that holds, say, for freedom of
speech, then it holds no less for the right to keep, if that is indeed
a core liberty. The issue then is not attitude toward regulation. It is
rather the level of persuasiveness or proof of regulatory need we
ought to be demanding in the case before us.
But doesn’t Singer at any rate answer by pleas of impatience with
the idea that anyone in a democracy should need or deserve to be paid
for complying with duly enacted laws?45 Again those pleas only beg
the question of keeping as a core liberty. Suppose the case truly were
that keeping is a core liberty, or at any rate must be allowed to count
as such in American constitutional law. Then citizens for whom com-
pliance with certain new or changed regulations would amount to
a negation of asset retention would “deserve” either to be paid for that
compliance (so as to reverse at least in part the negation) or else to
43. See, e.g., SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 61 (“[M]ost of law of property could
be alternatively characterized as regulatory or deregulatory, depending on how we look at
it.”); id. at 72 (“property may be threatened by regulation, but it also seems to require it.”).
44. See, e.g., id. at 86 (pointing out how perfect stability for ownership rights renders core
liberties of others insecure and dependent on the grace of owners).
45. See, e.g., Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 601.
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be presented with a sufficiently compelling justification for why they
should in this exceptional instance be made to suffer the negation.
D. Justifying Regulatory Takings
These points can be generalized to Singer’s great work of redemp-
tion for our much-maligned constitutional-legal doctrine of “taking by
regulation.”46 Singer’s redemptive model for a regulatory-taking doc-
trinal framework is all and only a model of justification.47 Justification
here means proportionality. Every regulatory law (that is not strictly
redundant of law already in force) imposes some “burden”48 on some
class of persons affected by it. That imposition of burden is what has
to be justified by reasons deemed “adequate”49 or “sufficient.”50 But
burdens are not all of equal moral or constitutional concern, and so
the measures of adequacy or sufficiency of reasons must vary by case
or class of case.51 In what we may call the general class, where the
regulatory hit is not on ownership and does not infringe on any
(other) core liberty, a strong presumption for democracy prevails,
and the test is the “low” one of the regulation’s bearing “some relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental objective.”52 A finding of infringe-
ment on a core liberty begets intensified scrutiny in search of some
special or “overriding” public interest to justify the infringement.53
But suppose the hit is on ownership. If it also reaches through to
some other recognized core liberty (say, a tax on newsprint54 or an
exclusion of “adult” bookstores and cinemas from desirable urban
46. See Singer, Justifying, supra note 1.
47. See, e.g., id. at 611 (“The principle of adequate justification is the best way to understand
both taking law and its normative force.”) (emphasis in original), 634 (“The central question
is one of justification.”).
48. E.g., id. at 606–07, 634.
49. See id. at 611.
50. See id. at 634.
51. Id. at 612 (“To determine what justifications are adequate in which contexts, we should
focus on the core values property institutions promote in a free and democratic society that
treats each person with equal concern and respect.”).
52. Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 659. See id. at 660 (“The principle of democracy . . .
is usually a sufficient justification for subjecting property owners to regulatory laws with-
out compensation.”).
53. Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 633.
54. See Minneapolis Star Tribune v. Comm’r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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locations55), then of course we get heightened scrutiny. But what if
it does not? If keeping is a core human interest, then the test for
whether the regulation may justifiably be enforced without buying
out the owner’s adversely impacted entitlement must be elevated
beyond rational basis. What does Singer say?
I have thus worked into a somewhat convoluted form my question
to Singer and to all of us about “property keeping” as a core liberty.
I have had a purpose in doing so, and that is to let you see at last how
Singer’s texts do indeed convey his answer to my question. A basic
premise for Singer is that “democratic law making is usually an ade-
quate justification for requiring owners to obey the law without
compensation.”56 That amounts to a negation of any general claim
for special justification of regulatory hits on property, beyond what’s
required for regulatory hits on general freedom of action. And that,
in turn, amounts to a rejection of any thought that keeping could be
on its own a core liberty, because every regulatory hit on property
is ipso facto a hit on asset retention and every hit on a core liberty
requires special justification. The same chain of inference flows from
Singer’s flat-out rejection of any idea that “regulations necessarily
impair the rights of owners.”57
So, there, I have had to do some work of logical inference in order
to extract from Singer’s texts his rejection of property keeping as a
core liberty. But the labor was not really very taxing, and it did not
take long to complete. So why make such a fuss about it all as I have
been making? I have two reasons for doing so, with which I will draw
this Essay to a close.
E. Security, Stability, and the Return to Fairness
Both my answers start from the point that, while Singer does
convey his rejection of retention as a core liberty, he does so only in-
ferentially, not frontally and expressly. He implies this rejection,
but he does not state grounds for it. I don’t mean thus to suggest that
good grounds might be hard to come by, only that knowing Singer’s
55. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
56. Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 619.
57. SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 6.
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grounds would help us to draw the maximum wisdom from his (to me)
very attractive pictures of property law and related constitutional
law at their best.
I will start this again with a question. Singer repeatedly pays his
respects to property law’s contribution toward the important ends
of stability and security in social life.58 Indeed we can fairly say he
regards the provision of security and stability as core expectations
we hold for the performances of our governments. But then why isn’t
property keeping a core liberty?
Here is what we can tell from Singer’s texts. The relevant, “central
normative goal” for property law is not stability at any cost; it is the
protection of “justified expectations.”59 An expectation by property
investors of perfect stability in the law could not be justified or even
reasonable,60 because every reasonable member of a democratic soci-
ety knows that property law undergoes change in response to develop-
ments in a democratic society’s prevailing views about “the legitimate
scope of ownership rights” and about “the kinds of harms that should
be recognized and regulated in society.”61
“Stability above all” cannot therefore be our watchword. Rather
we must say that “sometimes” it is wrong to subject owners to the
burdens of legal change without compensation.62 A keyword then is
“retroactive.” “We do not think it fair in general to tell citizens an act
is lawful and then change our minds and apply a rule retroactively.”63
Compensation, then, is required in special cases of “unfair surprise,”64
typified by cases of frustration of “investments made in reliance on
[site-specific] regulatory permissions.”65 And then finally the clincher:
constitutional protection against this kind of injustice is not special
to regulatory hits on property, and the demand for it is not special to
property-rights enthusiasts. “Liberals oppose ex post facto laws as
58. See, e.g., SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 85–86; SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1,
at 107–08; Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 630, 658.
59. Singer, Justifying, supra note 1, at 211.
60. See SINGER, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 8, at 46 (“reasonable expectations”).
61. Id. at 623.
62. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 604.
64. Id. at 630, 637–38, 650–51.
65. Id. at 630, 637–38, 650–55, 654 (referring to “an owner who has been led to believe that
his development would be allowed”), 661.
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strongly as conservatives.”66 In sum, when the dust has settled, the
“core liberty” in such cases, for which we demand a “sufficiently
strong” justification,67 is not anything like a property owner’s core
personal right to keep. It is the general right to fair treatment and
to equal concern and respect enjoyed by citizens in a democratic
state. It is, in other words, the interest protected by the general sys-
temic guarantees of equal protection and due process.68
Bravo! says I; with none of this have I any quarrel. I only make
the following two observations. First, while Singer’s discussions pro-
vide illustrations and examples of what he wishes us to understand
by “justified” or “reasonable” expectation, those terms—and along
with them terms like “unfair surprise” and “retroactive”—inevitably
retain some aura of cloudiness. Second, the whole discussion starts
from the premise, the supposition, that perfect stability of property
does not, within the American constitutional value ordering, enjoy
the status of a preferred value69—or, in other words, that property
keeping is not an American core liberty. I daresay some Americans
today sincerely disagree and accordingly would find that every fail-
ure of perfect stability of property is a disappointment of a justified
norm or hope for American government—some of these disappoint-
ments being perhaps justifiable in the circumstance but all of them
always demanding a special justification. According to my own be-
liefs, Singer would have good grounds for rejecting that view. If we
could hear those grounds, we might gain some corresponding clarifi-
cation on how to draw the line between expectations that are justi-
fied and those that are not.
F. Liberals and Conservatives
I, too, have had my premise. Starting above at Part III.B, it
has been that some part—certainly not all, but some part—of the
conservative-side demand for stronger protections for property stems
from a deep and sincere conviction that property keeping is a core
66. Id. at 629.
67. Id. at 634, 652.
68. See supra Part II.
69. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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liberty and that therefore every single substantial, noncompensated,
regulatory hit on property requires special justification. Singer’s re-
jection of this view is clearly extractable from his arguments, but it
is not explained by him in terms that address directly the intuition
apparently held by some American conservatives, of a deep human
interest suffering some measure of special hurt from every inten-
tional incursion on a property portfolio. Could not that topic, too,
become a part of the conciliatory conversation Singer wants to insti-
gate between the liberal and conservative sides in current American
political divisions over property law?70 Even if the result might be
a disclosure that the project of closing the gap must inevitably fall
short, at least as to some fraction of the conservative side? (And no
doubt some fraction of the “liberal,” too, which I will leave for some
other pundit to notice.)
70. See SINGER, FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 8–9, 11, 14.
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Time and again in Takings Clause cases, the Court has heard
the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim would
unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public
interest. . . . [But t]he sky did not fall . . . .1
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other
land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty in order to promote the public good just as effectively as
formal condemnation or physical invasion of property.2
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
For the past half century, the country has been in a turmoil over
what increasing numbers of Americans perceive as excessive gov-
ernment intrusion into the private sphere, notably with regard to
the use of eminent domain and severe land use regulations. Many
defenders of such government intrusions embrace noble motivations,
such as being “for the environment” (if not the entire planet) and
therefore favor severe land use regulations. Sometimes this takes
the form of outright selfishness—for example, in the teeth of state
* Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP; co-chair of the firm’s Appellate Practice
Group; 2014 recipient of the Brigham-Kanner Prize. I have spent nearly a half century
defending the rights of private property owners in court, including arguing four takings cases
in the United States Supreme Court and participating as amicus curiae in many of the other
important takings cases in that Court. I have also taught takings law at the University of
Miami, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of Southern California. My
thanks to Professors Gideon Kanner, David Callies, and Janet Madden for their helpful
comments on this Article as it was being written.
1. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012).
2. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting but expressing the substantive view of five Justices. See 450 U.S. at 633–34;
Rehnquist, J., concurring but noting that he would agree with Justice Brennan’s substantive
views if he thought the case were ripe). Note that Justice Brennan was not urging the use of
regulations for this purpose but the provision of compensation when they were imposed on
property owners.
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and federal legislation favoring low-cost housing, localities do what
they can to “keep ‘em out.”3
On the eminent domain side of the ledger, the Supreme Court’s
5-4 Kelo decision4 approved the taking and razing of an unoffending
lower-middle-class neighborhood to replace it with a (hoped-for) de-
velopment that would stimulate higher taxes and (perhaps not coin-
cidentally) enhance the living standard of well-paid employees of a
nearby high-tech pharmaceutical company. That stimulated a bi-
partisan furor among members of the American public. To the aston-
ishment of professional poll-takers, public opinion has run around
90% against the Court’s decision.5 Currently, the opposition to taking
pipeline easements (the bête noir du jour) has reached a fever pitch
among the populace. One could thus say with confidence that a large
percentage of the American people disapproves of promiscuous use
of government power to wrest private property from its lawful own-
ers. As Justice Stevens, the author of the Kelo majority, confessed
in print, he has (from the day Kelo was published) been approached
by friends and strangers alike who express their disapproval of
his handiwork.6
Yet, defying this unprecedented display of popular disapproval of
the Court’s disregard for constitutionally protected property rights,
Professor Joseph Singer thinks that property rights are somehow
unworthy of full-fledged constitutional protection and should be, to
borrow Chief Justice Rehnquist’s term, deemed to be the law’s “poor
relation.”7 By his lights, any “good reason” articulated by govern-
ment functionaries—even by local amateur zoning officials dabbling
3. E.g., Avenue 6E Investments, LLC et al. v. City of Yuma, 2016 WL 1169080 (9th Cir.
2016) (use of racial “code words”); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (one-acre lots kept out low-cost housing); Dews v. City of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp.
2d 526, 533 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (one-acre zoning designed to keep “niggers out of Sunnyvale”).
4. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See generally ILYA SOMIN, THE
GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015).
5. A compilation of the polling data appears at The Polls Are In, CASTLE COALITION,
http://castlecoalition.org/the-polls-are-in.
6. John Paul Stevens, Kelo, Popularity, and Substantive Due Process, 63 ALA. L. REV. 941
(2012). Indeed, shortly after the decision was published, Justice Stevens spoke to the Clark
County Nev. Bar Association, thanking the group for giving him a “mulligan” on several re-
cent opinions (including Kelo). John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 NEV. L.J. 1 (2005).
If you don’t know what a “mulligan” is, ask one of your golfing buddies.
7. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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in land use governance on a part-time basis8—is deemed “well-nigh
conclusive”9 and thus provides an “adequate justification”10 for re-
ducing the ostensible constitutional protection for those “rights” to
unenforceable “hortatory fluff,” as Justice O’Connor put it in her
Kelo dissent.11
But making sense of the takings issue is not as simple as finding
a “justification” for government action. There are standards that
must be met, including the prime directive that any exercise of the
eminent domain power must be done for a “good reason” and with
“adequate justification.”12 Fundamentally, we are governed by a
Constitution which is “the Supreme law of the land.” The Constitu-
tion not only declares itself to be binding on the states, but its power
is emphasized by the provision that it trumps “anything in the state
Constitutions and laws to the contrary . . . .”13 It was adopted in
1787 and amended sparingly thereafter. The first ten amendments,
adopted as a group to correct what the founders viewed as obvious
omissions from the original constitutional text, are referred to collec-
tively as the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was adopted to protect
individuals against the government, the few against the many—not
the other way round.14 As Justice William O. Douglas put it, “The
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were designed to get Government
off the backs of the people . . . .”15
This year’s Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference honoree
has, in the fashion of academics, produced a prodigious body of work
dealing with property in general and takings law in particular. While
there is much that is useful in his analysis, I believe that some of its
core tenets are mistaken and lead to erroneous conclusions about
8. See generally RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); BERNARD J. FRIEDEN,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979).
9. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
10. Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601,
passim (2015) [hereinafter Singer, Justifying].
11. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O’Connor, J, dissenting).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (“the
Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted pursuant to a valid pub-
lic purpose.”).
13. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
14. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 4 (3d ed. 2008) (Fifth Amendment
“designed to limit the scope of majority rule . . . .”).
15. Quoted in NAT HENTOFF, LIVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1998).
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takings law’s function and direction. Moreover, and without explana-
tion, Professor Singer’s analysis ignores virtually all of the Supreme
Court’s pertinent decisions since 2010, comprising at least half a
dozen important takings opinions.
Although I have taught takings law at several law schools for
many years, my life has primarily been spent as a practicing lawyer,
rather than as an academic. More than that, I have spent the better
part of half a century defending the rights of private property own-
ers in takings litigation—both direct and inverse—in appellate courts.
Hence, while I recognize the value of theoretical analysis, I primar-
ily view the law as a box of tools with which to protect my clients’
interests—usually against governmental incursions. Such incursions
are sometimes inspired by popular clamor and, at other times, by the
demands of politically motivated and result-oriented officials who,
lest we forget, sometimes pursue the demands of influential private
interests, not necessarily the public good—a situation that has be-
come all too common.16
Cutting to the chase, I am troubled by Professor Singer’s view of
takings law. He writes well and in a breezy style, so he is able to
make it sound as though he is simply laying out a rational summary
of takings law as it has been developed. But I don’t think so. I think
that Professor Singer would like to wipe the slate pretty clean and
start anew, establishing what he views as property “norms” that
would retroactively substitute his progressive notions for traditional
property law concepts.17 Rather than accept his thesis at face value,
I suggest we deconstruct and analyze it to see how it actually com-
ports with the property and liberty norms that a free society and the
Supreme Court have already written on this constitutional slate.
Those are the norms that have been deemed essential for a minimal
degree of stability in a society that is governed by persuasion rather
than by governmental fiat. What is essential in our system of private
property, free enterprise, and constitutional protection of individu-
als is that people be able to know what their rights and liabilities
are without years (or even decades, as too many of the regulatory
16. See generally BABCOCK, supra note 8; FRIEDEN, supra note 8.
17. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287
(2014) [hereinafter Singer, Democracy]; Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph
William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 743 (2009).
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takings cases illustrate) of litigation. Given a choice between making
the existing system work as designed or shifting to Professor Singer’s
progressive norms, I have no problem opting for the former.
I. SO WHAT’S WRONG WITH PROFESSOR SINGER’S DEMOCRACY IDEA?
The fundamental problem with Professor Singer’s concept of
“property as the law of democracy”18 is that it seeks to overwrite the
slate on which our Constitution is already written. In doing so, he
overlooks the reality that societies that have evolved reliable prop-
erty rules, protected by the rule of law, are the ones that also enjoy a
high degree of personal and political freedom (while others do not).19
Three prefatory notes. First, I do not think it is correct to speak
of Professor Singer’s theory as “property as the law of democracy” but,
rather, “democracy as the law of property.” The way that Professor
Singer views, describes, and delineates property always has his view
of democracy as the controlling factor—not the other way round.
Thus, democracy—not property—is “the law.” Note, for example, the
number of times that he says that his concept of property is based
on a “society that treats each person with equal concern and respect.”20
That description may have something to do with democracy, but it
has little to do with property, i.e., the idea that it is possible for each
of us to “own” something and to have that ownership interest pro-
tected by law from invasion by others. Aside from some parts of ac-
ademia, that is the interest most people think of as “property.”21
Concern for those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder
is commendable, but it ignores the fact that, in actual operation,
18. Singer, Democracy, supra note 17.
19. ELY, supra note 14, at 174–75; Tom Bethel, The Mother of All Rights, REASON, Apr. 1994,
at 41 (persuasively demonstrating that the lack of freedom and the violence pervasive in the
Middle East are causally connected to an absence of reliably enforced property rules); Gideon
Kanner, Do We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to Fulfill Their Unique
Role?, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 434 n.4 (2009).
20. E.g., Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1287, 1291 (twice), 1299, 1301 (twice), 1302
(twice), 1319, 1328, 1334 (twice); See Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1325, 1326; See also
Joseph William Singer, Should We Call Ahead? Property, Democracy, & the Rule of Law,
5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 1, 2, 14, 24, 25 (2016) [hereinafter Singer,
Call Ahead?].
21. Even state politicians understand this when defining property by statute. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 654: “The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess
and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership
is called property.”
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today’s land use/eminent domain regime frequently abuses the
have-nots while lavishing high economic benefit on the haves.22 That
property consists of many things23 (or sticks in the property rights
bundle24) does not detract from the bedrock concept that those sticks
are “owned” by someone (sometimes by different someones) who has
the primary right to keep, use, and alienate them and who is entitled
to the law’s protection in doing so.
Second, contrary to Professor Singer’s assumption that this country
was founded on democratic precepts, the truth undoubtedly lies else-
where. A recent examination of correspondence among the country’s
founders at the time the Constitution was being drafted and adopted
shows that one of the motivating factors behind the calling of the
Constitutional Convention was a concern about the impact of democ-
racy (as practiced in some of the states—particularly Pennsylvania)
on the rights of our property-owning forbears. Thus, much of the
work of establishing this republic25 was geared toward curbing what
the founders saw as the dangers posed by a pure Athenian-style
democracy,26 particularly to the rights of property owners.27 This is
22. See, e.g., Sonya Bekoff Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire for the
Poor, Welfare for the Rich, 8 PAC. L.J. 627 (1977); George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s
Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HAST. L.J. 991 (2001).
23. Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1288–90; Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 655.
24. The Supreme Court seems incapable of writing a property opinion without referring
to the “bundle of sticks” analogy, even though some contemporary scholars find it passé. See,
e.g., each of the following opinions referred to in this Article: Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015);
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 174 (1979). This is a long-standing practice, as described in BENJAMIN CARDOZO, PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928); see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002).
25. Professor Singer acknowledges that the United States is a republic. See Singer,
Justifying, supra note 10, at 659; Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure
of Democracy, in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Lexis 2011).
26. All clauses of the Fifth Amendment were designed to “limit the power of government,
and particularly the power of majorities.” Tonja Jacobi, Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast,
Creating a Self-Stabilizing Constitution: The Role of the Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
601, 616 (2015).
27. See generally EDWARD J. LARSON, THE RETURN OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (2014), in
which the Pulitzer Prize–winning historian examines the period between Washington’s res-
ignation of his commission at the end of the war through his first inauguration. The concerns
expressed by Washington and his contemporaries about squatters and other threats to prop-
erty rights, along with the excesses of some of the more radical democracies established in
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undoubtedly what Professor Singer had in mind a number of years
ago when he described the United States as “a nation dedicated to
the protection of property . . . .”28
Third, in order to conceptualize his theory, Professor Singer has
to redefine the concept of “constitutional” to mean something other
than what lawyers have traditionally meant by the term. To fit his
theory, he says:
By constitutional I do not mean to refer only to constitutional
law, but to the fact that property institutions are fundamental
to social life, moral norms, political power, and the rule of law.29
Those things may all be relevant subjects for a social or political
science seminar, but it transforms (indeed, adulterates) the concept
of a “constitutional” right to have it blended with social, moral, and
political issues that inherently vary from time to time and from per-
son to person, rather than being rooted in our founding document.
While each has an important role in American society, individual no-
tions of creative professors do not describe other people’s “property.”
Nor are they part of legal “constitutional” analysis. The reason they
are not is that the terms are so malleable that they can mean virtu-
ally anything the speaker wants them to mean. When Keats wrote,
“beauty is truth, truth beauty . . . ,”30 it was a lyrical use of language
but not very explanatory, as each term is too pliant to pin down. The
same can be said of the Singer thesis.
As if to illustrate the pliability problem, Professor Singer notes
that “liberals are not enemies of free markets; we just want them to
be fair.”31 Or, stated otherwise, “[t]he central question of takings law
is whether the obligations imposed on an owner by a property law are
some of the states, surely propelled the adoption of the system of government established by
the Constitution. For example, Professor Singer’s concern that the problem with protecting
“established rights in property” “is the harm this could pose to the democratic idea of giving
sovereign power to the people” (Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 627) seems exactly what
the framers intended.
28. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991).
29. Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1299 (emphasis original). Compare the dictum
of Humpty Dumpty, who explained that “a word means just what I choose it to mean . . . .”
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872).
30. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, POETRY FOUNDATION, http://www.poetryfounda
tion.org/poem/173742.
31. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 2.
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just and fair.”32 “Fair” too is a pliable concept. As citizens confronted
by government regulatory demands often learn to their dismay, “fair”
may have different meanings for regulators and the regulated. Some
will consider it “fair” to preclude development of land they believe
to be necessary habitat for an endangered species of rat, even if it
threatens the land’s owner with bankruptcy or foreclosure.33 For
example, the Supreme Court (through Justice Stevens) invoked the
fairness principle in Tahoe-Sierra,34 holding that “the Takings Clause
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”35 And I am sure that Justice Stevens and the
five others who signed his opinion believed that they were acting out
of fairness when they approved regulations that had precluded any
development of the plaintiffs’ land for twenty years by the time of
oral argument (with no end in sight) in order to further environmen-
tal preservation goals advanced by others.36 The property owners,
I daresay, would not agree. Concepts like “fairness” are not absolute;
they depend on perspective, but, even so, there are some modes of
government behavior that violate the constitutional norms of fair-
ness and, as such, must be limited.37
32. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Taking of Property: Castles,
Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 338 (2006).
33. Gideon Kanner, California Rat Killer Gets Off, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 1995). See
also cases collected in Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on The White River
Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation for Regu-
latory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685, 741 n.255 (1986) [hereinafter Berger &
Kanner, Thoughts].
34. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
35. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
36. Takings litigation consumes vast quantities of time and takes a toll on the participants.
Of the 700 plaintiffs who initiated the Tahoe-Sierra suit, fifty-five died before the Supreme
Court argument. Others simply became exhausted after a decades-long battle and dropped
out, leaving 449 hardy souls at the end. See Petition for Certiorari at 3 n.4, Tahoe-Sierra
(No. 00-1167).
37. In what I (concededly an interested participant) can only describe as either bizarre or
cruel, the Tahoe-Sierra opinion goes on for pages—after ruling against the property owners—
about alternative fairness considerations. See 535 U.S. at 333 et seq. The discussion begins
“Considerations of ‘fairness and justice’ (note how the concept is set off by scare quotes, as
though they are strange words, new to American law) arguably could support the conclusion
that TRPA’s moratoria were takings of petitioners’ property based on any of seven different
theories.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court then set up seven different straw arguments which
it “might” have adopted and used in the owners’ favor (including one that actually had been
presented in the Petition for Certiorari but which the Court declined to have briefed and
argued) only to discard each of them.
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Professor Singer has an interesting theory. But it is written on a
different slate than American Constitutional exegesis. Professor
Singer has acknowledged the difference.38 To analyze his concept of
property, he has staked out an analytical spectrum ranging from the
four Supreme Court Justices who are on record as believing that the
rights of private property owners are violated when a regulation
deprives them of an “established right of private property”39 to cer-
tain “types of property rights that democracies should no longer
recognize.”40 The former seems a rather settled way of examining
rights guaranteed by our Constitution, while the latter shows a de-
sire to erase the slate and start anew. He seems to prefer the latter,
while I opt for the former. Hence, my respectful disagreement.
One final introductory note: perhaps we should all set aside the
panoramic language of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal,41 an
opinion whose text can (and is) read as meaning all things to all peo-
ple. That opinion is known for its global theory that regulations that
go “too far” will be recognized as takings.42 That much is accepted by
all. But once you get past that, Justice Holmes and the Court pro-
vided fodder for both sides. As Professor Singer aptly stresses, the
opinion notes (Singer says “concedes”43) that “government could
hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
38. E.g., Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1330, 1331. Compare Joseph William
Singer, Re-Reading Property, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 720 (1992) (“Compensation is required
if a property right has been invaded, period”) (contrasting Supreme Court treatment of
Indians and non-Indians on property rights).
39. A proposition from which he recoils in horror. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at
9; see also id. at 11 (“If you are in the market for an incoherent idea, then protecting es-
tablished property rights from regulation . . . has got to be a top candidate”) referring to Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 715 (2010) (plurality
opinion). I am not aware of any intellectually respectable person who, speaking within the
context of American constitutional law, has argued that property (like other constitutionally
protected rights) should be “protected from regulation.” When ostensible “regulations” go so
far as to strip the land’s owner of essential attributes of property, notably of most value or rea-
sonable use, they do cross the line, and the owner is left with nothing of value, thus suffering
a taking of the land. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). Then, the
just compensation clause calls for just compensation, because that is no different than a phys-
ical taking. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. Singer, Democracy, supra note 17, at 1330 (emphasis added). See also Singer, Justifying,
supra note 10, at 640.
41. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Id. at 415.
43. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 14.
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law.”44 Setting aside for now that few people (not even I) would urge
the generality that no regulation could ever have any impact on value
without requiring compensation, it is so broad as to have little mean-
ing. Moreover, it was swiftly followed in the opinion by this virtually
polar opposite postulate (which Professor Singer ignores in all his
writings): “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.”45 And it cannot be over-
looked that in this battle of aphorisms, the latter prevailed and the
statute in question was found to be an illegal taking. Thus, frankly,
Pennsylvania Coal adds little to this discussion beyond its conclu-
sion that there are limits to everything and that “too far” is too far
to be constitutional. I suggest we agree simply to set it aside as being
unhelpful to real judges and lawyers trying to decide real cases.
II. A TROUBLING BEGINNING: THE SINGER THESIS IS BUILT ON THE
BACKS OF STRAW MEN
There are a number of straw men at the heart of Professor Singer’s
thesis, and we should unpack them before proceeding further because
they color the way that his thesis is constructed.
—Straw Man #1: It is difficult to recover compensation for a taking
because the Supreme Court is reluctant to enjoin regulations. In
his words:
It is extremely rare for a regulation to be struck down as an
unconstitutional taking of property without compensation.46
Stop right there. Although the conclusion may be right (i.e., the
Court rarely strikes down laws that result in regulatory takings),
the analysis is all wrong. Perhaps this is one of those ideas that
“makes sense only if you say it fast.”47 As a matter of long-standing
44. 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added). As Justice Holmes explained in his contemporaneous
extrajudicial correspondence, he drew a distinction between such minor incursions—that he
called “the petty larceny of the police power”—and grander larceny that calls for different
treatment. See 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 457 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953).
45. 260 U.S. at 416.
46. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 608 (emphasis added).
47. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 8.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, the remedy for a taking has generally
not been to strike down the law but to provide just compensation.
Why? The reason is evident in the words of the Fifth Amendment.
It is not the taking that offends the Constitution but the taking with-
out compensation.48 Taking is an inherent power of the sovereign49
that exists independent of the Constitution. The latter only places
conditions (public use (or what is left of it) and just compensation) on
its exercise.50 The latter is supposed to return the property owner to
“as good a position pecuniarily as if the property had not been taken.”51
I find it fascinating that Professor Singer has written so many
pages about takings and the remedies therefor without once citing
the Supreme Court’s consistent line of remedies cases going back
to the landmark 1932 decision in Hurley v. Kincaid.52 The problem
there was that a proposed federal flood control work would flood
Kincaid’s land. Kincaid sought to enjoin the taking that was certain
to occur. Justice Brandeis, one of the Court’s ranking liberals, wrote
for a unanimous Court that the remedy in governmental taking
cases is not an injunction but compensation after the taking occurs.53
That remains the law today: “[G]overnmental action that works a
taking of property rights necessarily implicates the constitutional
obligation to pay just compensation.”54 Indeed, the Court recently
reaffirmed that the kind of flooding present in Hurley results in a
compensable taking.55
Interestingly, in every case in the Hurley line, the government
argued against specific relief and urged that compensation was the
proper, indeed sole, remedy. There is a reason for that. In the Court’s
view—and in the federal government’s—it would be improvident as a
48. See Williamson Cnty. Reg. Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)
(The Takings Clause “does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without
just compensation”); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 316 (1987) (“the Court has frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking,
the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.” (citing Kirby Forest Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 6 (1984)) (emphasis added)).
49. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
50. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Paterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
51. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923).
52. 285 U.S. 95 (1932). Forgive me if I missed one. I read a lot of his articles but saw
no reference.
53. Id. at 103.
54. First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (quoting with approval; emphasis added; citation omitted).
55. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
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matter of policy to require courts, as a constitutional imperative, to
strike down well-thought-out governmental schemes merely because
they impact one property owner, depriving him of a single—albeit
personally important—“stick” in the property rights bundle. There
are many illustrations. Take the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases.56 Had the injunction remedy been applied there (as it had
been by the trial court, only to be reversed on appeal), the upshot
would have been destruction by the stroke of a judicial pen of a com-
prehensive, urgently needed congressional plan. It would have left
the most densely populated regions of the country without a rail
transportation system, with eight major railroads in fragmented,
individual bankruptcy proceedings, and without a coherent system
whereby to consolidate and make optimally useful all of their com-
bined resources still needed to maintain an indispensable national
rail transportation system. Instead, the Court ordered that compen-
sation be paid to the aggrieved parties, thereby preserving the
congressionally created scheme to preserve railroad operations. In
other words:
Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of
private property for public use, duly authorized by law, when a
suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign sub-
sequent to the taking.57
In a similar vein are cases like Preseault,58 Ruckelshaus,59 and
Dames & Moore.60 In each of them, the Court was faced with the
claim that Congress, in pursuit of legitimate objectives, had taken
private property without just compensation. The governmental goal
in each was plainly valid and appropriate (respectively, the creation
56. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
57. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984).
58. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990). Interestingly, to me fell the task of trying to
persuade the court in Preseault to invalidate the Rails-to-Trails Act as a taking, a scant three
years after I had convinced them to rule in First English that the remedy for a regulatory
taking was compensation rather than invalidation. The Court was unmoved and told the
plaintiffs to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims. Justice O’Connor wrote a strong con-
curring opinion explaining how First English controlled (even though she had dissented in
that case). The Claims Court eventually awarded substantial compensation. See Preseault v.
United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667 (2002).
59. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
60. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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of recreational hiking and biking trails over abandoned railroad
right-of-way easements, obtaining expert input prior to licensing
pesticides, and dealing with the issue of confiscation in the aftermath
of the Carter-era Iranian hostage crisis61). In none did the Court allow
injunctive relief to trump Congress’s ability to legislate in the public
interest, even when private property rights were adversely impacted.
Rather, the constitutional remedy was that compensation must
be paid for private property taken in the process. In each case, the
Court directed the property owners to the Court of Federal Claims
to determine whether those exercises of legislative power, though
substantively legitimate, nonetheless required compensation to pass
constitutional muster.62
Professor Singer is correct that regulatory takings cases can be
hard for property owners to win, but it is not because the Supreme
Court is reluctant to strike down regulatory takings laws. The Court
regularly strikes down all sorts of regulations, including land use
regulations, in situations other than takings claims. If there is a prob-
lem in providing compensation, it is because of a reluctance on the
part of a number of lower courts, including the two largest state court
systems, to implement settled law for clearly demonstrated takings.63
61. Governmental gears grind slowly, but compensation for the surviving hostages (or
their estates) is now being arranged. See David M. Herszenhorn, Americans Held Hostage in
Iran Win Compensation 36 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2015.
62. To this end, the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation guarantee has been held self-
executing. The availability of compensation validates and constitutionalizes the otherwise
wrongful government action of taking without paying. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
526 U.S. 687, 714–15 (1999); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 106 S. Ct. 455, 459–60 (1985). If compensation is provided by the
courts, whether at the government’s or the owner’s behest, the flaw in the governmental action
is cured, and there is no illegality.
63. An acquaintance of mine, a long-time eminent domain lawyer from Detroit, once
observed that the problems faced by property owners in takings cases stem from the fact that
liberal judges don’t believe in private property rights, and conservative judges don’t believe
in making the government pay. There is at least a grain of truth in that sardonic comment.
On a less anecdotal level, it is common for lower federal courts to openly express a distaste for
dealing with land use regulations, claiming to abhor having to act as “zoning muftis.” E.g.,
Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003);
see Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (2014). Why
being a “zoning mufti” in the context of a First Amendment–based land use regulation claim
by proprietors of an “adult entertainment” establishment is OK, but acting similarly on a con-
stitutional claim of confiscatory regulation that impedes construction of housing that is both
badly needed and congressionally endorsed by housing statutes is not OK has never, to the
best of my knowledge, been judicially explained.
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California notoriously refused to acknowledge even the possibility
of compensation for a regulatory taking, at least from its 1979 de-
cision in Agins v. City of Tiburon64 until the U.S. Supreme Court’s
overruling of that decision in 1987’s First English. New York took a
different tack, but one that led to the same result. New York pre-
tended that, when the U.S. Supreme Court said in Pennsylvania Coal
that a regulation could be a taking if it went “too far,” the Court was
speaking metaphorically rather than actually.65
Thus, it is only when courts become complicit in ignoring the
words of the Fifth Amendment and the intent of the Bill of Rights
that “takings doctrine does not protect owners very much.”66 Takings
doctrine is fine. Its application sometimes leaves something to
be desired.
Two notes from the world of legal practice:
First, it is not true, as Professor Singer asserts, that “[l]egitimate
regulatory takings claims are truly exceptional,”67 although there is
an element of truth in his statement that “it is really hard to win a
regulatory takings claim.”68 Although not easy, significant recover-
ies have been made in regulatory taking cases.69 I include here cases
in which substantial compensation was awarded70 and those in which
various appellate courts remanded cases for trial on the amount of
compensation due.71 In all of these cases (and there are others that
64. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), overruled in First English.
65. See Fred F. French Investing Co v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 (1976). For further discussion, see Michael M. Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue,
1 BYU J. PUB. L. 261, 265–66 (1987); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts, supra note 33, at 726–27.
66. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 6.
67. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 634.
68. Id. at 606.
69. Moreover, the law is settled that difficulty in ascertaining the quantum of damages
provides no basis for denying them altogether. Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927); DeVries v. Starr, 393 F.2d 9, 16–19 (10th Cir. 1968) (collecting
numerous cases).
70. E.g., Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
($36,795,000 (plus interest and attorneys’ fees)); State v. Basford, 119 So. 3d 478 (Fla. App.
2013) ($505,000 plus interest); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012)
($5,778,757.90); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013)
($376,000); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) ($1,450,000); Lockaway
Storage v. Cnty. of Alameda, 216 Cal. App. 4th 161 (2013) ($989,640.96 plus $728,015.50 for
attorney’s fees).
71. E.g., Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1256
(2012); Galleon Bay Corp. v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 105 So. 3d 555 (Fla. App. 2012); Bowman
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a little research will unearth for you without taking up excess space
here) government agencies were compelled to pay compensation for
the impact of their regulations.
Second, since 1987, when the Court began taking regulatory
takings law seriously and deciding cases in the property owner’s
favor,72 many cases that might have been filed are, instead, either
settled or otherwise negotiated so that owners are able to make pro-
ductive use of land. With the bargaining table being continuously
leveled, there is less need for actual or protracted litigation. With the
most recent Supreme Court insights into the land use process,73 more
resolutions without litigation can be expected. In short, regulatory
takings law is not only about winning cases that are filed but about
pretermitting cases that need never be.74
—Straw Man #2: If the Constitution provided protection to all
“established property rights,” says Professor Singer, we would be
stuck with feudalism or worse. The old English land tenure systems
of entailment would still rule the country. Women would have no
right to own property. New Jersey might still be owned by the male
descendants of the two noble English families that received title to
large swaths of the new world from the English king.75
Not really. The repetitive use of fanciful and hyperbolic prose76
cannot gainsay that we fought a bloody revolution to resolve those
issues. The point of that revolution was to throw off the English yoke,
along with any of its appurtenances that were found offensive. That
revolution separated us from as much of the English detritus as we
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 230 Cal. App. 4th 1146 (2014); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606 (2001); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Healing v. California Coastal Comm’n, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (1994); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Whitney Benefits v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (settled for $200 mil-
lion after remand); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (settled for
$600,000 after remand).
72. See Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URBAN LAW. 735 (1988).
73. Infra notes 278–306 and accompanying text.
74. For example, once a trial court denies a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment, smart government lawyers settle, if nothing else to avoid the sort of embarrass-
ment that befell the defendants, noted supra note 70 and accompanying text, and having to
pay attorneys’ fees on top of it. Smarter ones settle without the need to go to court at all.
75. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 10–11.
76. Compare Justice Ginsburg’s comment, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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chose to leave behind. Thus, in addition to taxes on tea, we did away
with nobility and its trappings.77 No one “lords” it over others (in
New Jersey or anywhere else)—at least, not as a matter of hered-
itary right.78 No William the Conqueror. No Charles II. No Downton
Abbey. Nor are estates “entailed” or otherwise encumbered by law,
thus inhibiting alienation. We fought a war to rid ourselves of that
stuff, and thus to say that we need “laws” or “regulations” to accom-
plish that is to ignore the blood that was spilled to establish this
country.79 Besides, when actually asked the question, the Supreme
Court held that it was proper to break up large estates in Hawaii so
that individual homeowners could actually own the lots on which
their homes were built.80
—Straw Man #3: If the Constitution provided protection to all
“established property rights,” we would be stuck with the idea that
certain individuals could be owned by others and constituted mere
items of property.81
No. We fought another war. One of the central foci of that war
was the relationship between former masters and slaves, blacks and
77. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Professor Singer once called this “the most important
provision in the Constitution.” Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of
Democracy, in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (2011).
78. When Americans say they are “lords of their own castles” (Singer, Call Ahead?, supra
note 20, at 6), they mean it primarily as metaphor, not something to be taken literally—except
in the criminal law context, where the Fourth Amendment grants well-nigh “lordly” power
to homeowners. E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”);
Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 381 (5th Cir. 2015) (one’s “home” is a “castle of defense
and asylum”); Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (“the ancient concept that
‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the king may enter’ has lost none of its
vitality . . . .”). Nor need the “castle” be of substantial construction to invoke the metaphor.
In words attributed by Justice Brennan to William Pitt:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). See also Joseph William Singer, The
Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30
HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 309 (2006).
79. If New York chose initially to clutter its statute books and clog its commerce with
variants of fee tail titles (see Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 10–11), that was its choice.
The revolution, however, gave it the absolute right to choose otherwise, which apparently it
did at about the same time the country adopted the Constitution. (See id. at 11.).
80. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
81. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 12.
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whites, and the possibility that human beings could be “property.”
The “people as property” side lost. Whatever property rights existed
between the races before 1865 were ended when that war ended and
were capped off by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution. Again, we do not need “laws” or “regula-
tions” to establish that whites and blacks have the same rights; we
have a Constitution that says so. It is not the various Civil Rights
Acts that established those things. To the extent we have laws or
regulations to carry out the intentions of the Constitution, they are
simply implementing the Constitution itself82 and securing the fruits
of the war that preceded those Amendments.83
—Straw Man #4: Professor Singer assumes that property owners
are politically powerful.84 I am not convinced by the assertion. Some
are, but that fact simply disregards the numbers and the growing
power of the ballot box,85 not to mention the instantaneous organiza-
tional power of social media.86 To the extent it once was true that
property owners and land developers had substantial political power
(particularly at county and municipal levels), it is no longer true.87
Concededly, there may have been a time when some government en-
tities catered to the political clout of land developers and enacted
82. See U.S. CONST., amend. 13, § 2; amend. 14, § 5; amend. 15, § 2.
83. See infra notes 133–51 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the police power—
the basis for Professor Singer’s reliance on “good reasons” as determined by a democratic
majority (Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 646)—became the basis for the perpetuation
of Jim Crow laws.
84. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 18–19.
85. Santa Monica, California, for example, has a very stringent rent control law, and the
city’s dominant political force is an organization called Santa Monicans for Renters’ Rights
(SMRR). Regardless of the city’s general affluence, it turns out that some 80% of its populace
is tenants. Once that was discovered, SMRR was organized across economic and political lines
and around this sole common issue. Soon, rent control was enacted by initiative, and SMRR
remains more politically important in that city than any recognized political party. Individual
apartment building owners were simply not “part of the body politic” that enacted that law.
Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 18. Compare Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 16 Cal. 4th 761 (1997).
86. Remember how the “Arab Spring” (not to mention our domestic “Occupy” movements)
was said to have been powered by social media? See, e.g., PAOLO GARBAUDO, TWEETS AND THE
STREETS: SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONTEMPORARY ACTIVISM (2012); Jeffrey S. Juris, Reflections on
#Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, public space, and emerging logics of aggregation, 39
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 259 (2012); Sasha Costanza-Chock, Media Cultures and the Occupy
Movement, 11 SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 375 (2012).
87. See BABCOCK, supra note 8.
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measures over the objections of the citizenry or in tension with sound
planning precepts. Those days are generally gone. Today, developers
may still have the money, but the NIMBYs have the votes. Thus,
politicians are faced with highly organized interest groups that are
able to turn out substantial numbers in support of targeted issues.88
You haven’t lived until you have seen a city council chamber packed
with placard-waving citizens demanding that some development proj-
ect be rejected.89 Governing boards quickly recognize that there is a
mother lode of votes either to be mined at pleasure or ignored at
peril. In the words of one of the grand masters of municipal law, “It
is a rare municipal legislature that will reject what it believes to be
the wishes of the neighbors.”90
Aside from openly agreeing with project opponents, local legislative
bodies have become expert at taking action that kicks the can down
the road a bit and slows the process.91 In addition to simply putting
sand in the development gears, such slowdowns allow municipalities
to make full use of the abomination that has become known as the
“ripeness” doctrine, something applied in takings cases in ways
far more vicious than in any other field of the law.92 In short, the
88. See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment
on Robert Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood”, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 881–83,
888 (1999).
89. I was once involved in a case in northern California where project opponents rented
buses and brought people from assisted living facilities on “outings” to have snacks, to wear
antidevelopment badges, and to swell the population in the hearing chamber. For similar
illustrations see, e.g., Jack McGrath, Should a Studio City carwash be preserved as a cultural
monument?, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1989 (residents rally to preserve a thirty-five-year-old
carwash); Tracey Kaplan, Is Site Historic or Just a Bum Steer?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993 (more
residents rally to prevent development of site where Sugwas Feudal, a prime breeding bull,
improved the stock of area cattle).
90. BABCOCK, supra note 8, at 141.
91. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655–56 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Com-
pensation, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 767–70 (1973); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts, supra note 33,
at 731–33.
92. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 1985 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39,
54–55; Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings,
3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2000); Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still
Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell
Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Regulatory
Taking Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 702–04 (2004)
[hereinafter Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!] (collecting scholarly invective heaped upon the
present state of ripeness law, from both sides of the ideological spectrum and from the courts).
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irresistible political impulse is for government to make highly visible
and popular regulatory decisions. After all, when an entity tells an
individual property owner that she must leave her land vacant for
public recreation or view or buffer or whatever, it does not take a
computer to calculate where the greater number of votes lies. In
short, individual developers can sometimes be viewed as being able
to buy local regulators’ votes; but, more often than not, they can be
overwhelmed by the local populace wielding influence over local
government or by courts that overturn local regulatory decisions
favoring development.93
—Straw Man #5: The wordplay that either equates or differentiates
“law” and “regulation” is a phony construct. Of course, they are the
same. Thus, to say that Americans love “law” but hate “regulation”94
is meaningless, other than to set up a supposed pedagogical contrast.
III. DEMOCRACY? DESPOTISM? YOU DECIDE
We should deal early with Professor Singer’s end point, i.e., his bold
conclusion that “[w]e have no obligation to compensate owners just
to get them to obey the law.”95 Wow. The expansiveness of that for-
mulation is mind-numbing. Perhaps this is another idea that “makes
sense only if you say it fast.”96 Yet it is the sort of thing that liberals
tend to say with a straight face.97 This “parade of horribles” argument
was in fashion in the 1990s,98 but eventually the Supreme Court grew
tired of it.99 The kind of “law” Professor Singer is talking about is the
sort of majoritarian bravado that the Bill of Rights was designed to
93. The California Supreme Court did this recently in Center for Biological Diversity v.
Calif. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 62 Cal. 4th 204 (2015). See generally Joseph F. DiMento et al.,
Land Development and Environmental Control in the California Supreme Court: The Defer-
ential, the Preservationist, and the Preservationist-Erratic Eras, 27 UCLA L. REV. 859 (1980).
94. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 1–2.
95. Id. at 22; Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 670. A bit long for a bumper sticker,
perhaps, but a great sound bite.
96. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 8.
97. No slur intended. Professor Singer self-identifies as a liberal. Id. at 2.
98. See Gideon Kanner, Lucas and the Press: How to be Politically Correct on the Taking
Issue, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COM-
PENSATION 82 (David Callies ed. ABA 1993).
99. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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curtail. Compare, for example, the following comments by Professor
Singer (on the left) and the Supreme Court (on the right):
Democracy—government by the
people—ordinarily provides an
adequate justification for sub-
jecting property owners to regu-
lation without compensation.100
It must be conceded that there
are such rights in every free gov-
ernment beyond the control of
the State. A government which
recognized no such rights, which
held the lives, the liberty, and
the property of its citizens sub-
ject at all times to the absolute
disposition and unlimited con-
trol of even the most democratic
depository of power, is after all
but a despotism. It is true it
is a despotism of the many, of
the majority, if you choose to
call it so, but it is none the less
a despotism.101
The “despotism of the many” is, in fact, central to Professor Singer’s
democracy concept. That is why he is concerned that a strong judi-
cial approach to compensating property owners for regulatory takings
would “decimate regulatory laws that are highly popular . . .”102
or eliminate environmental laws that have been around for “more
than fifty years . . .”103 or do away with “immensely popular” zoning
laws104—laws, in his view, that “have been in effect long enough now
100. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 660.
101. Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874) (emphasis added).
102. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 620.
103. Id. at 641, 665.
104. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 11. One needs to ask what makes zoning laws
so “popular”? Is it possibly their exclusionary impact? What Professor Singer sees as merely
“stopping . . . neighbors from doing horrible things next door” (Singer, Call Ahead?, supra
note 20, at 9) could be no more than building housing for the wrong kind of people. See, e.g.,
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Richard Florida, How Zoning Restrictions Made Segregation Worse, CITY LAB
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://citylab.com/housing/2016/01/how-zoning-restrictions-made-segregation
-worse/422352/.
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that viable takings claims should be few and far between.”105 Over-
looked in the Singer format, however, is Palazzolo,106 where the Court
bluntly declared that adopting the State’s similar position—confer-
ring constitutional immunity on regulations—would be untenable:
A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on
the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future gener-
ations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on
the use and value of land.107
Calling something “democracy” is simply not the final answer to
anything.108 Nor is continuing reference to “our democracy” as re-
quiring the limitation of property rights as part of our “commitment
to live in a nation of free and equal persons.”109 It sounds nice in the-
ory, but it isn’t real. Each of us is simply not the equivalent of each
of the others any more than the occupant of an endowed chair at the
Harvard Law School is the “equal” of any other professor of anything
anywhere else.
My favorite discussion of treating all people as “equals” appears
in a charming Kurt Vonnegut story that revolved around a govern-
ment official known as “the United States Handicapper General.”110
The Handicapper General’s job was to make sure that “everybody was
finally equal.” This goal was accomplished by blurring the vision of
those with good eyesight, interfering with the thought patterns of
those who were smart, placing heavy weights on those who were
swift or agile, and—well, you get the picture. Vonnegut, of course, was
tugging on our collective legs to make the point that we are not all
equal and that to pretend that we are is madness (much less to design
a governmental system around that proposition). Professor Singer,
however, seems serious.
In our constitutional system, we are concerned as much (and
sometimes more) about means as we are about ends. The attempt
by government to achieve righteous ends still requires compensation
105. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 666.
106. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
107. Id. at 627.
108. No slur intended here either, but I cannot fail to note that some of the most oppressive,
autocratic regimes on earth often have called themselves “democratic republics.”
109. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 6.
110. Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1988).
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in order to satisfy the Constitution.111 That is the whole point of the
Fifth Amendment, even if it sometimes impinges on the overwhelm-
ing democratic power of the populace. As the Court expressed it
when it finally112 reiterated as a modern concept that (1) the proper
remedy for regulatory takings is compensation and (2) that rule
applies to all takings, even to temporary ones:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners
and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting
land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from
any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of
the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexi-
bility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them.113
Nor does the enforcement of constitutional guarantees necessarily
imply any criticism of the regulators:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in
general, and of the Due Process Clause in particular, that they
were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citi-
zenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.114
That is why, in one of its seminal property cases,115 the Supreme
Court declared that the rights of property owners need to be
111. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987); Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015) (“The Government has
broad powers, but the means it uses to achieve its ends must be ‘consist[ent] with the letter
and spirit of the constitution.’”) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819).).
112. Having ducked the issue in serial fashion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson Cnty.
Reg. Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Cnty. of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986), the Court returned to the sensible rule that, when the
Constitution prescribes just compensation for takings of property, it means it. See Berger,
supra note 72.
113. First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added).
114. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
115. 1987 was a watershed year for takings law, with the Supreme Court deciding six cases
raising various takings issues. See Michael M. Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYU
J. PUB. L. 261 (1987).
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protected by the judiciary against the “cleverness and imagination”
of governmental word games.116
IV. CAN IT BE TRUE THAT A “GOOD REASON” IS ALL THE
GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO JUSTIFY TAKING SOMEONE’S PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT?
The core of Professor Singer’s thesis is that compensation is not
due if there is a “good reason” for the regulation.117 He uses several
apparently interchangeable terms to describe this baseline: “suffi-
cient reason,”118 “adequate reason,”119 “legitimate justification,”120
and “adequate justification.”121 The thesis is laid out at length
in Justifying Regulatory Takings, a title which I believe is really
shorthand for “Finding Reasons to Rationalize Not Paying For Reg-
ulatory Takings.” It boils down to this: “property rights can be regu-
lated or limited or even destroyed without compensation if there is
adequate justification for doing so.”122 Yet, despite the length of
his explication, no authority is cited to establish the idea that the
antidote for a regulatory taking case is a good reason or adequate
justification. None exists. If it came from someone else, you might
dismiss the idea as silly. But Professor Singer is not just “someone
else,” so his ideas must be dealt with seriously.123 The first question
that leaps from this formulation is “what is ‘a good reason’ or ‘an ade-
quate justification?’” The second—and, perhaps, more important—
question is “who decides” whether the stated justification is a “good”
one? Are we back to that democratic majority again—the “despotism
of the many,” as the Court called it? Sorry. Would that it were other-
wise, but this emperor wears no clothes.
116. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
117. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 646.
118. Id. at 612.
119. Id. at 618, 629, 630, 634, 642.
120. Id. at 617.
121. Id. at 612, 619, 628, 662.
122. Id. at 619 (italics in original; bold type added).
123. On the other hand, as Justice Sotomayor said recently, sometimes it doesn’t really
matter whether governmental action “is a good idea now [or] whether it was ever a good
idea . . . . The Order may well be . . . downright silly . . . .” Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135
S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting and—alone—trying to demonstrate the le-
gality of property confiscation even if it had no valid basis whatsoever, just because the gov-
ernment said so).
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Professor Singer simply assumes that rationales presented by
government fit his template ipso facto. In his words:
We start with a presumption that lawful obligations are both
legitimate and reasonable as well as fair and just.124
That is an awful lot of presuming to stuff into one little sentence,
encompassing “lawful,” “legitimate,” “reasonable,” “fair,” and “just.”
In fact, starting with that presumption also presumes what the
answer will be. Professor Singer continues:
A property right is not ‘established’ if it is legitimately subject to
regulation to promote public welfare.125
. . . .
. . . owners are . . . subject to duly-enacted laws . . . .126
. . . .
. . . property owners, like everyone else, have a duty to obey duly-
enacted laws promulgated by the people and for the people.127
The practical problem with Singer’s formulations is that in every
eminent domain case—direct or inverse—there must be a “good rea-
son” (i.e., public use or purpose and, in most jurisdictions, public ne-
cessity) for the taking. Thus, by Singer’s light, the public use clause of
the Fifth Amendment would swallow its just compensation provision.
Each of Professor Singer’s formulations begs the question whether
the action is constitutional by simply assuming its legality and/or
propriety. But that is not a determination for either a legislative
body or a law professor. It is for the courts. In the classic words of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (noting that even “our democracy”
has limits):
The genius of our democracy springs from the bedrock founda-
tion on which rests the proposition that office is held by no one
whose orders, commands or directives are not subject to review.128
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, “it always is open to inter-
ested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
124. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 659 (italics original; bold added).
125. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
128. Winger v. Aires, 89 A.2d 521, 522 (Pa. 1952).
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constitutional power.”129 Specific applications of governmental power
have always been subject to judicial review.130 Indeed, in reviewing
land use regulations, the Supreme Court has made clear that land
planners and regulators are not an aristocracy. They are subject
to constitutional limitations and judicial examination. As Justice
Brennan pungently noted, “After all, if a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner?”131 Moreover, the Court has
acknowledged that its review of governmental action was consti-
tutionally designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of govern-
ment authorities.132
Beyond that, the concept of “good reason” (or its alter ego, “adequate
justification”) is too elastic to serve as the basis for confiscation. How
elastic? Let’s return to a dark chapter in American jurisprudence and
open the Supreme Court Reports to Plessy.133 We needn’t dwell on the
facts of the case, because what is important is its ratio decidendi:
the Court held plainly that the State’s exercise of its police power to
enact the regulation in question was not only valid but solid. In up-
holding the racial separation law at issue, the Court concluded that
“every exercise of the police power must be reasonable and extend
only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of
the public good . . . .”134 Under this standard, the Court noted that ra-
cial separation laws were legitimate, including laws calling for sep-
arate schools,135 laws forbidding racial intermarriage, as well as those
establishing physical separation in theaters and railway carriages.
The not-so-tacit assumption of Professor Singer’s formulation is
that the public good implicit in land use regulation is achievable—as
the inimitable Richard Babcock put it—by “a bunch of happy, well-
informed people with a social I.Q. of 150 [who] sit around making
decisions in complete freedom from outside pressure . . . .”136 The
129. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
130. E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
131. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting but apparently expressing the views of five Justices (see supra note 2 and
accompanying text).).
132. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
133. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
134. Id. at 550.
135. Even, the Court noted, in abolitionist states like Massachusetts. Id. at 544.
136. BABCOCK, supra note 8, at 19.
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reality, of course, is far different, as the remainder of Babcock’s work
demonstrates. Twenty years after writing The Zoning Game, he up-
dated it,137 concluding:
much of what was wrong with land use policy in 1966 is still
wrong today. New zoning techniques flourish, but localisms, fis-
cal appetites, and xenophobia remain pervasive.138
The reality of today’s planning and zoning is neither pure, nor
necessarily public-spirited, nor related to professorial theorizing that
can be untethered to reality.
In short, the police power standard is very forgiving of govern-
ment abuses. That is why the Court insisted on a stricter standard
than “reasonableness” when clarifying its rules for determining un-
constitutional conditions in Dolan. The Court said it wanted more
than a “minimal level of scrutiny . . . .”139 How forgiving is the rea-
sonableness standard? Here is how a “reasonableness” standard
works in practice:
[T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of
Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this
there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is
at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, cus-
toms, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promo-
tion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order.140
So saying, the Court held that the racial separation statute at
issue there had been enacted in good faith and was reasonable and
therefore was constitutional. In a word, the “standard” is so loose as
to barely be called a “standard” at all. It can be used to justify any
majoritarian excesses.
Thus, if actions of a democratically elected government are to be
the baseline for determining “adequate justification,” that only dem-
onstrates why we need the Bill of Rights—perhaps now more than
137. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED (Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy 1985).
138. Id. at 1.
139. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
140. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (emphasis added).
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ever. Remember that in Korematsu141 the Supreme Court unleashed
government power to imprison without due process of law thousands
of innocent American citizens on the flimsy basis that a general142
thought there was a “good reason” for that.143 And, by the way, history
demonstrated that the “justification” relied on there was phony. Con-
gress apologized and granted reparations.144 Eventually, Korematsu’s
own conviction was set aside because the government suppressed
evidence.145 And, yet, for the justification thought to underlie the
decision, more than 100,000 American citizens were denied their
constitutional rights.
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.146
The “good reason/adequate justification” idea has no place in
takings law, at least not in the sense that a “good reason” can do
away with the Constitution’s explicitly laid down requirement that
compensation be paid for takings. The reason is that the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement for compensation deals with—indeed, is
based on—proper governmental actions, i.e., those done for “good
reasons” or “legitimate justifications” and for a public use or purpose.
They nonetheless require compensation. To put it another way, the
141. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945).
142. The general who provided the justification for the order later testified before Congress
that “A Jap’s a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not.” Wartime
and the Bill of Rights, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, http://www.crf-usa.org/america
-responds-to-terrorism/wartime-and-the-bill-of-rights.html.
143. Some of the double-talk in justification of the “good reason” is priceless, e.g.: “Korematsu
was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire . . . .” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
144. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50a U.S.C. § 1989b et seq.
145. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (petition for coram
nobis granted and conviction vacated).
146. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (emphasis
added). See James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Judicial Activism, GEORGETOWN J. L. &
PUB. POL. 125, 126 (Inaugural issue 2002) (“The entire Bill of Rights seeks to protect individ-
ual liberty by restraining governmental power.”).
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taking need not be improper to require compensation. The Fifth
Amendment is not a precept of tort law but a requirement of com-
pensation when property is taken to benefit the public. The presence
of any public benefit is simply not a defense to the compensation
requirement; rather, it is the raison d’être of the taking for which
compensation must be paid. That is why, in reaffirming that com-
pensation is the standard remedy for any sort of taking, the Court
concluded that the Fifth Amendment was designed “to secure com-
pensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to
a taking.”147
In other words, the Fifth Amendment presupposes that govern-
ment has an “adequate justification” for its actions, because without
one as the basis, the action is not legitimate at all. Indeed, absent
adequate justification for the government’s action, the action is ultra
vires and void.148 As the Court recently put it, “the Takings Clause
presupposes that the government has acted pursuant to a valid
public purpose.”149
I understand that Professor Singer has recently said that his thesis
is not based on the test used in due process and equal protection for
analyzing “rational relationship[s].”150 But somehow the explanation
rings both hollow and circular. Here are his words: “By ‘adequate
justification’ . . . I mean that we must address the normative ques-
tion of whether the government can give an adequate justification
for exemption from the presumptive obligation to pay just compen-
sation in these cases.”151
Interestingly, that lone footnote is the only place I have seen in
Professor Singer’s regulatory takings writings where he concludes
that there is a “presumptive obligation to pay just compensation” in
regulatory taking cases. It appears, for example, nowhere in the just-
published opus, Justifying Regulatory Takings, in which he sought
to lay out the theory of regulatory takings. If such a “presumptive
obligation” is at the heart of takings law—a concept with which I
147. First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
148. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (unlawful
wartime steel mill seizure voided) with United States v. Peewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951)
(compensation mandatory after lawful wartime seizure).
149. Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
150. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 19 n.53.
151. Id.
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wholly agree—its explicit statement appears nowhere else that I
have been able to locate in Professor Singer’s writings. If he meant
it, one would think it ought to have been included.
In any event, saying that the meaning of “adequate justification”
is whether one can deduce an “adequate justification” is a circularity
that explains nothing.
Moreover, in Professor Singer’s view of the Constitution, the Fifth
Amendment is severely restricted:
The Constitution may[152] require compensation if a regulation
destroys property, subjects the owner to physical occupation, or
deprives it of all value.153
Apparently, the founders might as well not have bothered. Re-
stricting the protection of the Fifth Amendment to total destruction,
or complete physical occupation, or utter devaluation provides little
that even the most flint-eyed government functionary would try to
evade. The problems arise when we move beyond the painfully obvi-
ous and ask such questions as the following: What if a regulation
leaves property with some value or use but not enough to be econom-
ically beneficial? Or useful? Or sensible? What if the property retains
some theoretical value because an appraiser would testify that it
has value as an ecological preserve, even if the owner has no interest
in maintaining such a preserve? Or no ability to do so? What if gov-
ernment action merely damages (albeit severely) the economic value
of the property but does not completely “destroy” it?154 As Professor
Singer notes, the real problems arise in the “hard” cases.155
In cases that do not pass the total destruction test, it appears that
the Singer thesis lets government off the hook if it has a “good
reason/adequate justification” for what it does. In his words, if gov-
ernment actions are “justified [they] do not count as unconstitutional
152. Note that even this “rule” is grudgingly stated in the subjunctive mode. Professor
Singer says that is because there are exceptions even in the case of total destruction.
(Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 19.) His exceptions, however, swallow the rule, leaving
it barren.
153. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 19 (emphasis added).
154. And while you ponder this hypothetical, remember that many state constitutions
contain provisions protecting against “taking or damaging” private property. See 2A NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01[12][b].
155. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 658, 663.
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takings.”156 In his world, all that matters is whether there is an
“adequate justification” for the regulation.157
Sorry. That perspective wipes too much from the constitutional
slate and removes almost all protection of private property owners
from ham-fisted (even if well-intentioned) government regulators.
Professor Singer’s thesis deals only with extremes. Either a regulation
is so awful and destructive that it must be paid for (and everything
else is done without financial consequence to the regulator) or we will
have a situation where “no regulatory laws can be passed . . . .”158
But extremes are not the only way to view the world. Perhaps be-
cause some of us have spent our careers trying to resolve problems
for real people, rather than spinning academic theories, we can see
ways to deal with issues that fall between the extremes. Regulation
is like fire; no civilized society can live without it, but a society that
leaves it without carefully crafted restraints is crazy. What no rational
society can afford is to have virtually unrestrained regulation.159
The Fifth Amendment was designed as that foundational restraint.
To trust everything to the “good reasons” of the government, like
Blanche DuBois relying on the kindness of strangers, may be asking
too much.
Aside from that, the Singer thesis doesn’t wash. If it held true,
one would expect that the cases in which takings were found had no
adequate justification at their core. But they often do. In Nollan, for
example, the Court found no flaw in California’s idea of having a
public beach from Mexico to Oregon. It simply said that, if created,
such a beach would have to be paid for.160 In Lucas, the Court did not
argue with South Carolina’s desire to protect its beaches from erosion.
It merely found a need to compensate.161 In Security National Bank
156. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 20. But note that a taking is only “unconstitu-
tional” if done without payment. So long as payment is provided (and some public benefit is
involved (however minor or tangential)), the taking is constitutional. As noted earlier, the
Fifth Amendment is not a tort precept but a quid pro quo requirement of replacement of prop-
erty with compensation of equivalent value.
157. Id.; Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 622.
158. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 9.
159. For a contemporary illustration, see a recent news article whose title says it all: David
W. Chan, Hurricane Sandy’s Red Tape Makes a Veteran Say, ‘I’d Rather Go Back to Falluja,’
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2015, at p. A1.
160. 483 U.S. at 841–42.
161. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Indeed, Mr. Lucas
conceded that the regulation was legitimate (except for the non-payment).
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and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, the Court approved
the exercise of the bankruptcy power but required compensation.162
In Ruckelshaus, the Court found the government’s release of confi-
dential intellectual property appropriate but sent the case down for
a determination of compensation.163 And so on. That being so, and
that takings were nonetheless found, shows that the “justification”
theme is not at the heart of takings law.
Too many Supreme Court opinions have been based on the prop-
osition that all government action must be based on adequate jus-
tification to transmogrify that concept into a “rule” that validates
confiscation. Indeed, the government cannot act except for good and
valid reasons. It follows from that and from the Fifth Amendment
that property can never be taken without adequate justification—
and that when it is taken for a good and valid reason, compensation
is mandatory. Period. To ignore those cases is to revert to the kind
of argument the Court rejected two centuries ago when agents of the
federal government argued in a case involving occupation of prop-
erty that the word “below” in a treaty describing property location
really meant “above.”164
V. COMPLYING WITH THE JUST COMPENSATION GUARANTEE
CREATES NO “VETO POWER” IN PROPERTY OWNERS
Compelling government to pay compensation does not give property
owners a “veto” power over legislation.165 It just puts a price tag on
severe government action that deprives owners of the ability to use
lawfully held property so we all can confront the cost of any desired
action. It asks government (which is to say—us) to consider how much
it really wants to either demand a specific land use or to preclude all
land use on a particular parcel—and how that fits into the overall
budget.166 It asks those in charge of the government, “Do you want
162. United States v. Security National Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Regional Rail Reorgani-
zation Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
163. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
164. Meigs v. M’Clung’s Lessee, 9 Cr. (13 U.S.) 11, 18 (1815).
165. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 12.
166. See ELY, supra note 14, at 55 ( just compensation guarantee protects property owners
by “imposing a practical cost limitation” on the amount of property acquisition government
can do); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277 (1985).
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this badly enough to pay for it? Is this game really worth the candle?”
Because there is always a price. The only question is, who pays?167
We must ask this question because, in the Supreme Court’s words,
“The political ethics reflected in the Fifth Amendment reject confis-
cation as a measure of justice.”168
Take a hypothetical (concededly extreme, but hypotheticals usually
are extreme in order to illustrate a point): a government agency de-
cides that society would be better off if all existing undeveloped land
is preserved in its pristine natural state. To accomplish that, a law (or
regulation, if you prefer) is passed that prohibits anyone from alter-
ing the natural state of any undeveloped property (which the Brits
actually tried, by the way, with disastrous results).169 That is all well
and good with respect to public property, but some of the affected
property is privately owned. Those who have been told that they
have suddenly become the involuntary custodians of a public trust,
which they must preserve but not disturb, would just as soon decline
the honor.170
Enter the just compensation clause. The Fifth Amendment’s
draftsmen provided a great leveler by guaranteeing that property
can be taken from private individuals for public benefit171 only
167. Compare the recent decision in Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015),
in which the Court concluded that EPA erred by refusing to consider the fact that proposed
power plant regulations would cost the operators nearly $10 billion each year.
168. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
169. See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 54–57 (1987);
Arthur Shenfield, The Mirage of Social Land Value: Lessons from the British Experience,
APPRAISAL J. 523 (Oct. 1976).
170. Compare Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). (No building allowed
in “stream environment zone”; lottery for future development compensation was essentially
eyewash and of no utility). The agency settled with Mrs. Suitum for $600,000, rather than
face trial on remand, although I understand the agency continues to enforce the same regula-
tion against others (see, e.g., Avila-Burns v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, no. cv-02558-KMJ-CKD
[ND. CA. filed 12/10/15]). Compare the discussion, infra notes 225–33 and accompanying text
for the governmental m.o. of continuing to act contrary to Supreme Court decisions.
171. Remember that public “use” really means something much broader now, like “purpose”
or “benefit.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). Following Kelo, property
may be condemned “on the slightest of public purpose pretexts.” David Callies, Through a Glass
Clearly: Predicting the Future in Land Use Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 67 (2014).
Kelo had been foreseen nearly a decade earlier in a sarcastic commentary in Time Magazine
concluding that “eminent domain” is “a legal term meaning ‘we can do anything we want.’”
Steve Lopez, In the Name of Her Father, TIME, July 14, 1997, at p. 4. Or, to put it in Valley
Girl argot, the answer to the question “what is a public use?” is now apparently “what . . . ever.”
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when the owner is paid. It is an attention-getter, a thought provoker.
Regulatory taking cases are almost always zero-sum games. It almost
never happens that one comes across a regulation provoking any
controversy in this field in which everybody “wins.” In virtually all
situations, every gain produces a loss. In our hypothetical, while so-
ciety as a whole may have gained by preserving all undeveloped areas
for posterity (a postulate put forth arguendo only), the owners of that
land have assuredly lost. What they could have used productively
the day before the law was enacted, they must leave fallow forever.172
So, what does the just compensation clause do? It puts the ques-
tion squarely to the regulators: in the calculus that results in your
annual budget, are there other things that rank lower on your scale
of needs than stultifying the use of this property so that you can
eliminate their funding to preserve this land inviolate?173
Professor Singer should agree, because this is really a very demo-
cratic concept. Calmly and dispassionately invoked, it calls upon the
majority to recognize that there is a cost attached to the desired end
and to exercise the political fortitude to pay that bill from the public
purse rather than compelling selected members of the minority to
do so.174 However, reality often intervenes. Given the way our major-
itarian form of governance works, democracy fails without the inter-
vention of the judiciary to provide what former California Chief
Justice Donald Wright called “institutionalized self-control.”175
The necessity of maintaining a judicial brake on the exercise of
governmental power over individuals has been a part of the fabric
of this country from its inception.176 The Constitution’s framers did
172. Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (all building
prohibited; no procedure for variance or excuse).
173. See Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not To Regulate—Is That the Question?
Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property
Rights, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 294–99 (1975) (discussing the concept of compensated zoning);
see also City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
174. In this context, “minority” includes both political and racial minorities. Justice Thomas’s
discussion of early urban renewal did us a favor by recalling that its announced goal of “urban
renewal” was often mocked as “Negro removal.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Not only were they “removed,” many have never been accounted
for. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 62–64 (1967).
175. Donald Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 1262, 1266 (1972).
176. See LARSON, supra note 27, for a discussion of the concerns about too much democratic
control that led to the Constitution’s system of checks and balances.
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an admirable job of interweaving two disparate threads in creating
a model form of government copied by state and local entities at all
levels: a strong central government that could create one from the
multitudes and a limitation on the ability of that central government
to act precipitously. The one overriding memory burned into the con-
sciousness of those who toiled over our Constitution and its Bill of
Rights was of an overbearing governmental executive whose will was
carried out without restraint.177
Enter the judiciary. For the checks and balances system to func-
tion, the judiciary must intervene when government regulators (or
the democratic majority, if you will) overlook or ignore their obliga-
tions to pay for what they want. It may aid the discussion if you can
personalize the concept of a governmental taking. It need not be
physical in nature. If you picture, for example, that your parents had
purchased some vacant land years ago with the intent of eventually
building their retirement home there or eventually selling it as their
retirement nest egg, you may be able to get a better view of our not-
so-hypothetical hypothetical example when their plans are dashed
and the investment rendered worthless by a post-acquisition regula-
tion. Contrary to Professor Singer’s theory, such regulatory stultifi-
cation after purchase can be overcome by the Fifth Amendment’s
just compensation guarantee.178
Absent judicial enforcement, the protection sought to be afforded
by the just compensation guarantee—as well as other Bill of Rights
provisions—becomes worthless. It will be no more than nice words
on parchment, sealed under glass in a museum case, for high school
civics students to look at when they tour the nation’s capital.
Three fine academic minds addressed the cost question in slightly
different manners. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne:
The fundamental question that should be faced, and which de-
serves a rationally developed legislative response, is not whether
these costs will be paid; it is who will pay them, in accordance
with what substantive and procedural criteria, and through
which institutional arrangements.179
177. See Jacobi et al., supra note 26, at 616.
178. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
179. Arvo Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative
Modification in California, 16 UCLA L. REV. 491, 543–44 (1969) (emphasis in original).
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Professor Frank Michelman:
[There is a] need for resolute sophistication in the face of occa-
sional insistence that compensation payments must be limited
lest society find itself unable to afford beneficial plans and im-
provements. What society cannot, indeed, afford is to impoverish
itself. It cannot afford to instigate measures whose costs, includ-
ing costs which remain ‘unsocialized,’ exceed their benefits. Thus,
it would appear that any measure which society cannot afford or,
putting it another way, is unwilling to finance under conditions
of full compensation, society cannot afford at all.180
One of the namesakes of the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights
Conference, in typical fashion, put it bluntly: “There is no such thing
as a free lunch.”181
One of the historic responsibilities of the judiciary has been to
protect “established rights in property.” The reported decisions are
legion. Almost any real property case that is litigated involves one or
the other party’s (if not both’s) rights in property that are claimed to
be well established. The one who does a better job of establishing
that right generally wins. So why did Professor Singer get so riled
up about the Stop the Beach Renourishment case?182 Remember, he
denigrated the plurality opinion to the degree of calling it a “top
candidate” for “an incoherent idea” and said that it “alarmed many
scholars” (though he cited only one) as well as some of the Supreme
Court Justices.183 What did the Court do? Well, technically, nothing.
No member of the Court voted to reverse the Florida Supreme Court,
so the underlying opinion remained valid. The problem, apparently,
was that the conservative four concluded that, as the law had al-
ways protected “established rights,” the Constitution could do so as
well, and that the judiciary—as much an arm of the state as its
coequal branches—was capable of taking property by its actions.184
But even they did not believe that the Florida Supreme Court had
gone too far. They were simply willing to consider the idea. The
180. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967).
181. Professor Gideon Kanner, Address at Victor Gruen Foundation for Environmental
Planning Symposium, Property Rights v. Public Need: There Is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch
(Sept. 18, 1973).
182. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 7–10.
183. Id. at 9, 10.
184. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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intriguing thing is that the others did not disagree (much less
demonstrate “alarm”). They simply did not want to reach the merits
of the issue.185 Justice Stevens recused himself (presumably because
his wife owned property in Florida that could have been affected by
the decision).186 The other four signed one of two concurring opin-
ions. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, said, as he often
does in takings cases, that he would prefer a due process analysis.187
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, neither agreed nor dis-
agreed with the plurality: “I do not claim that all of these conclu-
sions are unsound. I do not know.”188 Instead he was concerned that
adoption of the judicial takings doctrine would involve federal judges
in playing “a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state
interest—state property law.”189 Sorry, it is hard to get too worked
up about that at this late date. Haven’t the federal courts played
a significant role in shaping numerous matters of significant state
law involving—for example—law enforcement,190 schools,191 sexually
oriented businesses,192 religion,193 local budgets,194 and more?195 Fed-
eral courts are already hip deep in state property law and many other
issues of intense state interest.196
185. This happens now and then. At oral argument in Agins, for example, Justice White
smiled while telling Professor Kanner (representing Dr. and Mrs. Agins): “You can’t cram
issues down our throats that we don’t need to decide.” Gideon Kanner, “[W]e Don’t Have to
Listen . . .”, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Feb. 27, 2014), http://gideonstrumpet.info/2014/02/we-don’t
-have-to-listen. Or the Court simply dismisses an entire case “as improvidently granted” when
it cannot (or chooses not to) reach a merits determination. See, e.g., PFZ Properties, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992).
186. See John Paul Stevens, The Ninth Vote in the “Stop the Beach” Case, 88 CHI-KENT. L.
REV. 553, 556 (2013). After the fact, Justice Stevens says he would have voted to dismiss the
petition as improvidently granted. Id.
187. 560 U.S. at 735–37.
188. Id. at 743.
189. Id.
190. Turner v. Upton Cnty., 915 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1990); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89
F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996).
191. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
192. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
193. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
194. Berkley v. Common Council, 63 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
195. See additional cases collected at Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!, supra note 92, at
691–92.
196. See generally Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 192 (1959), where
the Court refused to abstain in an eminent domain action because of a claimed interference
with state interests. In the Court’s words, “eminent domain is no more mystically involved with
‘sovereign prerogative’ than a State’s power to regulate fishing in its waters, its power to
regulate intrastate trucking rates, a city’s power to issue certain bonds without a referendum,
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Nor am I convinced by Professor Singer’s feigned inability to “tell
when property rights are established and when they are not. . . .”197
In the Beach Renourishment case, as in myriad others, the parties
relied on established case law to make their pitch. To me, it seemed
pretty clear that the Florida Supreme Court made a substantial sea
change in the law. The question is whether that created a Fifth
Amendment violation. I think the case presented a fascinating ques-
tion that deserved an answer. Unlike Professor Echeverria, I was not
“alarmed”198 at this prospect.
Distinguishing between the concepts “mine” and “not mine” is
something that is supposed to occur in the preschool years. Some-
times some of us forget those early playground lessons. The concept
is easy: if it is “mine,” I get to play with it and you don’t, unless I ap-
prove. If you insist on taking it from me, then you need to pay me.199
When that concept gets tangled up with emotional issues like en-
dangered species or climate change, however, some people’s vision
tends to glaze over. They wrap themselves in global homilies and talk
as though what is “mine” is actually not.200 And they don’t realize (or
admit) they are speaking revolutionary thoughts. Our constitutional
system is based in significant part on the idea that property can be
privately owned—and can be used by its owners. But it seems hard
for some people to remain clear about it or content with it, at least
as long as the property in question belongs to somebody else.201
Nor does it aid either legal or economic theory to trot out Holmes’s
old “average reciprocity of advantage” saw,202 a line from Pennsylvania
its power to license motor vehicles, and a host of other governmental activities . . . .” (internal
citations omitted.).
197. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 8. Rights are “established” when they have “the
law back . . . them” and courts enforce that law. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 178 (1979) (quoting with approval United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502 (1945)).
198. See Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 10.
199. Kaiser Aetna v. United States 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
200. Ironically, people who do so are usually wealthy and tend to scream bloody murder
were someone to interfere with their ample assets. Compare FRIEDEN, supra note 8; William
Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, HARPER’S, Dec. 1977, at p. 49.
201. Actually, Professor Singer recognizes what he calls the “layperson’s” understanding of
property but insists that lawyers have complicated matters. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10,
at 655.
202. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 9 (quoted from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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Coal that was actually used in an entirely different context. The
Court used it there to explain why it was not applying an earlier
case that let the defendant off the hook, because in that earlier case,
there was a substantial trade-off (i.e., reciprocity of advantage);
there, the regulated mine owner got to continue operations, and his
workers were protected against drowning and being crushed by cave-
ins in adjacent mines.203 But the analysis (that is properly applied
in party wall cases) was of no use in Pennsylvania Coal, and it is not
something that Holmes “taught” should be broadly applied. This
“reciprocity” idea has been misapplied and said to be bestowed on all
members of the regulated community by allocation of permitted
land uses. Professor Singer uses it to equate the property rights of
various landowners.204 Others have similarly bloated it beyond what
the Court either said or intended. For, whatever merit may be found
in that concept is limited chiefly to those situations where the zon-
ing or other land regulations are stable and result in a pattern of
reliable and economically rational land uses by all regulated parties
(typically, but not always, in an established, built-out community).
Where the burdens are borne equally by all, there can be said to be
some reciprocity. But that reciprocity concept has little or no applica-
bility to imposition of new confiscatory regulations on some in order
to benefit others. These include situations that shift or impose new
land use regulations that stultify desirable land use for the aesthetic
pleasure of neighbors with clout. Owners of land whose reasonable
use has been precluded for the benefit of others receive no “reciproc-
ity of advantage.” Indeed, they receive no “advantage” whatsoever.205
All of this may explain why we need some ground rules in this area.
Professor Singer apparently feels that the law is better off simply
winging it intuitively rather than having more settled guideposts.206
He goes so far as to tweak Justice Scalia for not being able to con-
vince a majority of the Court to join him in establishing some rules
to clarify this field and then praises the Court for opting instead for
203. For expanded discussion see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 19–22 (1995).
204. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 9.
205. See Gideon Kanner, The Lie That the Regulated Benefit, 18 NATIONAL L.J. 2 (Apr. 29,
1996).
206. Although Professor Singer says that “we need legal rules,” it is apparent that the rules
he wants impinge on the rights of property owners rather than protect them. Singer, Call
Ahead?, supra note 20, at 5.
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Justice O’Connor’s “contextual, case-by-case approach.”207 A contrary
(and better) view was articulated by Justice Frankfurter when he
referred to such an uncertain legal regime as the law of a Kadi dis-
pensing justice by the seat of his pantaloons.208 I agree with Profes-
sor Singer that that is where we are. The Court repeatedly says that
the Penn Central multifactor approach is its “polestar,”209 even though
scholars from both ends of the political spectrum have questioned its
vitality.210 But I have to wonder how Justice O’Connor felt when the
carefully nuanced approach that she thought she had taught to the
rest of the Court came back to bite her in Kelo when the majority
made her eat her words.211
VI. REGULATION DID NOT END FEUDALISM AND SLAVERY—WAR DID
I have to quote this one; I did not make it up:
We did not get from the feudalism [and slavery] of the eleventh
century to our free and democratic society by deregulation. We
got here by regulation.212
I hate to burst any rhetorical bubbles, but we got from feudalism
and slavery to our current society not “by regulation” but by war.213
The Magna Carta was signed not as an act of “regulation” but
rather as a royal response to the threat made by the English Barons
to depose King John by force if he failed to grant the rights enumer-
ated in it, which included the right of a British freeman not to be
207. Id. at 7.
208. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949).
209. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
210. John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three Factor Test Ready for History’s Dustbin?,
52 LAND USE L. & ZON. DIG. 3 (2000); Brief for Institute for Justice as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(No. 00-1167) (written by Richard Epstein). Professor Singer himself says that Penn Central
presents “as far from a clear rule as one can get.” Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in
Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1402 (2013). For questions as to Penn Central’s prov-
enance, see Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005).
211. See 545 U.S. at 481–82, 484–85, 486 n.16.
212. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 12.
213. As Professor Singer has recognized, the law of conquest provides certain benefits to
the victors. Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Pos-
session to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763 (2011). See Johnson v. M’Intosh,
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
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disseized of his “free tenements” save only “by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.”214 And when we finally had enough
of English feudalism on this side of the Atlantic, we staged a revolu-
tion of our own—by force of arms. Royal government regulation in
these cases was the cause, not the amelioration, of public uprisings.
As for slavery, it was first driven from the high seas by the might
of the Royal Navy, and we Americans had to fight another war nearly
a century after our revolution to rid ourselves of it. It is thus overly
simplistic to say that we eliminated discrimination in places of busi-
ness in the South by “engag[ing] in democratic lawmaking . . . .”215
Having prevailed on the field of battle, the victorious Union adopted
three constitutional amendments that radically changed race rela-
tions, among other things. The civil rights acts that followed were
the result of the war and these post-war actions. Regulation of prop-
erty had nothing to do with either. Regulation, as noted earlier, per-
petuated the kind of Jim Crow laws that Professor Singer abhors.
But regulations can certainly protect property owners, just as
regulations protect other citizens. The Civil Rights Act216 applies to
all.217 In the Supreme Court’s words, “rights in property are basic
civil rights” that are constitutionally protected.218 That comes as a
surprise to some. I once appeared in court in a Civil Rights Act claim
on behalf of a land developer. At one point, the judge interrupted and
asked me, “So which of your clients is black?”219
VII. WHY ARE “REGULATORY TAKINGS” AN ISSUE?
The idea of a regulatory taking did not arise until the actions of the
regulatory state made it necessary. The combination of a felt need by
the democratic majority to either increase public ownership (by di-
rectly acquiring property interests) or decrease private ownership
214. Magna Carta § 29.
215. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 15.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
217. E.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
Judge Learned Hand had little patience for those who would distinguish “personal” rights from
“property” rights. See Learned Hand, Chief Justice Stone’s Conception of the Judicial Function,
46 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 698 (1946): “Just why property itself [is] not a ‘personal right’ nobody
took the time to explain.”
218. Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
219. Griffin Homes, Inc. v. City of Simi Valley, Ventura Cnty. Case No. 107352 (1991).
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(by enacting restraints on the exercise of property ownership) resulted
in government actions that brought constitutional compensation is-
sues to the fore. The impetus to obtain something for nothing by the
mere passage of a regulation (or law) that automatically transferred
control from private to public hands caused property owners alarm
and brought cases to court.220
In Professor Singer’s law/democracy theory, such regulations can
almost always be “justified”—that is, they can be rationalized as not
requiring compensation to constitutionally validate them.221 How-
ever, as the Supreme Court trenchantly put it, any legislative body
that cannot come up with a properly worded justification for its
action has “a stupid staff.”222 And there’s the rub. At the risk of repe-
tition, in every eminent domain case—whether direct or inverse—
government must act in pursuit of a public use or purpose, i.e., it
must have a valid justification to support the taking, which would
otherwise be a tort. Professor Singer’s discovery that takings are
based on adequate justification is like discovering that water is wet.
Of course it is. If there is no justification, there is no valid govern-
mental action.
Government agencies have for years been in the something-for-
nothing business when it comes to property acquisitions. The regu-
latory cases fit squarely into this preconceived mold—and called for
a response from responsible judges and legislators.
How bad was the problem? Illustrative is a chart showing offers,
trial evidence, and jury verdicts in a range of direct condemnation
cases (in which liability was conceded) that was presented at the
third annual iteration of this conference by Professor Kanner. These
were all cases in which government initiated the action, i.e., it
wanted to buy the property, and to that degree was willing to pay.
Yet, these numbers still show government offers many times lower
than eventual jury verdicts (and sometimes many times lower than
the same agency’s own trial testimony)—often involving many multi-
ples and millions of dollars.223
220. See Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate—Is That the Question?
Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property
Rights, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253 (1975).
221. See generally, Singer, Justifying, supra note 10 (passim).
222. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).
223. See Gideon Kanner, “[Un]equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously Disparate
Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 app. at
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Moreover, when it suits them, federal land acquisition officials
have been known to delay acquisition for years in a sometimes openly
brazen effort to wear down property owners and to acquire their
land for “thirty cents on the dollar,” as one Park Service functionary
put it.224
The number of inverse condemnation cases alone attests to the
fact that government does not pay willingly.225 If it did, there would
be no need for property owners to file suit. And they do file suit—in
droves—because government routinely seeks to obtain something
for nothing.
Even when confronted by Supreme Court opinions plainly estab-
lishing specific action as being covered by the Fifth Amendment,
government agencies routinely sit back and wait to be sued—and
then contest both liability and (when they lose) the amount of com-
pensation. The airport noise cases, whose underlying legal precepts
the Supreme Court essentially laid to rest in Causby226 and Griggs,227
1146 (2007). Compare JACQUES GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 47–97 (1982). The primary author (Mr. Gelin) was a long-time Department of Justice
lawyer who wrote briefs for federal government agencies. The book devotes an entire chapter
of fifty pages to the subject of “Property Devaluations for Which the Fifth Amendment Re-
quires No Compensation,” which is essentially a book of guidance to younger government law-
yers of how to evade the compensation requirement.
224. See United States v. 341.45 Acres, 751 F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 1984); Drakes Bay Land
Co. v. United States, 459 F.2d 504 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Even scholars and commentators who (at
least in the past) have expressed the belief that government should not compensate for con-
fiscatory regulation have had to acknowledge that, in practice, the land use approval process
is too often characterized by “one might almost say, the art, of delay, delay, equivocation and
never-ending ‘negotiation’ . . . . These actions are ubiquitous, vicious, and devoid of any resem-
blance of procedural due process. . . . Moreover, many local governments seem to relish pro-
longed administrative turmoil before reaching a decision from which judicial relief may be
sought.” Norman Williams, R. Marlin Smith, Charles Siemon, Daniel R. Mandelker & Richard
F. Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 242–43 (1984).
225. Indeed, it has been accepted federal practice for the government to seize property and
say to the owner, “sue me.” Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Herrero, 416 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1969). Note that this is one of those areas (see
supra note 78 and accompanying text) where the Fourth Amendment provides protection un-
known to the Fifth. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 46
(1993) (Fourth Amendment requires notice and hearing before seizure of property even though
property was involved in criminal activity and thus statutorily subject to seizure). Why a duly
convicted criminal is entitled to the full due process panoply of rights while a law abiding
property owner is not has not been explained.
226. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
227. Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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lingered for years as both state and federal agencies continued to
deny liability.228 In the early years of my practice, after winning the
Nestle case,229 which established airport operator nuisance liability
toward neighbors, I actually had the head of the legal team for Los
Angeles International Airport tell me that he would not acknowledge
that state Supreme Court precedent until the same state Supreme
Court so held in a case involving his own airport.230
The same sort of thing has happened in litigation involving the
federal Rails-to-Trails Act.231 In a nutshell, when railroads were being
laid across the country in the nineteenth century, right-of-way
agents fanned out and acquired property interests on which to lay
the tracks. While they sometimes acquired fee simple interests, most
of the rights-of-way were acquired as easements to remain in exis-
tence so long as the property was used for railroad purposes. Fast
forward to the twentieth century, when railroads were being replaced
as transport modalities and were abandoning rights-of-way whole-
sale. Congress passed a statute enabling their transfer to trail groups,
notwithstanding contrary state property law that returned full, unen-
cumbered use to the underlying owner upon abandonment of rail
use. The Federal Act interdicted the owners’ rights as established
228. E.g., Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Brown v. United States,
73 F.3d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996). I discussed this at last year’s conference. See Michael M. Berger,
Strong and Informed Advocacy Can Shape the Law: A Personal Journey, 4 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 1 (2015). For a somewhat earlier view, see Michael M. Berger,
Airport Noise in the 1980s: Its Time for Airport Operators To Acknowledge the Injury They
Inflict on Neighbors, INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 10 (Sw. Legal
Found. 1987).
229. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920 (1972).
230. For extended discussion of Los Angeles’s shenanigans both in court and in the press
following this California Supreme Court decision in another city’s case, see Michael M. Berger,
The California Supreme Court—A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 199, 244–52 (1973). That article includes a discussion
of Los Angeles’s “threat” to “shut down” LAX in thirty days unless the California Supreme
Court rescinded its opinion in Nestle. Spoiler alert: that effort to buffalo the Supreme Court
fell flat. Notwithstanding the “leak” of a “confidential attorney-client” memo so advising that
resulted (for those who remember how important print media used to be) in an eight-column,
double-banner headline in an “Extra” edition of the old Los Angeles Herald-Examiner
(reproduced at 9 CAL. WEST. L. REV. at 245), the threat was not serious.
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). See Michael M. Berger, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: Has Congress
Effected a Definitional Taking?, 1990 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN,
ch. 8 (Sw. Legal Foundation); Michael M. Berger, Not So Fast: “Rail-to-Trail” Conversions Could
Be More Costly Than They Appear, 37 RIGHT OF WAY, (Oct. 1990) no. 5, p. 4.
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by state law.232 After the Supreme Court held that the Act could
result in federal liability and directed the parties to the Court of
Federal Claims, the federal government kept routinely denying
claims, forcing property owners to continuously file suits.233
On a more general note, Congress responded to this governmental
abuse of power with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Prop-
erty Acquisition Policies Act?234 That statute proclaims (inter alia):
The head of a Federal agency shall make every reasonable effort
to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation.
. . . .
If any interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of
the power of eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency
concerned shall institute formal condemnation proceedings. No
Federal agency head shall intentionally make it necessary for an
owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the tak-
ing of his real property.235
Virtually all states later adopted versions of the same law. The
Act and its state counterparts were inspired by testimony at Con-
gressional hearings which demonstrated the prevalence of wide-
spread undercompensation and procedural abuse.236
When the government does pay (and certainly there is generally
some payment made in the standard eminent domain case), numerous
232. In its own way, this brings us back to the question of whether the Fifth Amend-
ment protects “established rights of private property,” as the plurality in Stop the Beach
Renourishment believe and Professor Singer decries. See Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20,
at 8, 10. In Preseault, the underlying land owners possessed “established rights of private
property” and the Court held that compensation was due for taking them. Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1 (1990). See subsequent opinion, 52 Fed. Cl. 667 (2002).
233. E.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d. 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Toews v. United
States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Farmers Cooperative Co. v. United States, 98
Fed. Cl. 797 (2011); Biery v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 565 (2011); Capreal, Inc. v. United
States, 99 Fed. Cl. 133 (2011); Rogers v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 418, 432 (2009); Ybanez
v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 659, 668 (2011); Anna F. Nordhus Trust v. United States, 98 Fed.
Cl. 331, 338 (2011); Macy Elevator v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 708 (2011).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 4651.
235. Id. at (1), (8).
236. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 386 Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong.
(1968); Real Property Acquisitions Practices and Federal and Federally Assisted Programs:
Hearings Before the H. Select Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisitions of the Comm. on
Public Works, 88th Cong. (1963).
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studies have shown that the compensation never actually accounts
for the owners’ losses.237 Or, as Professor Thomas Merrill aptly sum-
marized it, “The most striking feature of American compensation
law—even in the context of formal condemnation or expropriation—
is that just compensation means incomplete compensation.”238 Indeed,
a prominent federal appellate judge has publicly acknowledged “[t]he
fact that ‘just compensation’ tends systematically to undercompen-
sate the owners of property taken by eminent domain.”239
In this context, some response seemed in order from Professor
Singer beyond the curt conclusion that “legitimate regulatory takings
claims are truly exceptional.”240
VIII. COLLAPSING TAKINGS CONCEPTS ONLY ADDS CONFUSION
Professor Singer glosses over the distinction between a finding of
legal liability and a finding of the amount of compensation due. These
are entirely separate questions. This is no more evident than in his
discussion of Loretto.241 He argues that Loretto was wrongly decided
because, even though there was a clear (and permanent) physical
occupation, there was—in his view—no damage. Thus, no compen-
sation should be due. Thus, because no compensation was due, there
was no taking. While his conclusion about compensation in that case
may be correct, the analysis that no taking occurred is a little too
glib. There are actually two fundamental questions in any takings
case. First, has there been a taking? As a pure matter of liability,
there was a taking in Loretto—the New York Legislature authorized
permanent physical occupation of private property by a stranger. It
is important to maintain this clear delineation between liability and
compensation. As long as regulators are able to blur the line between
237. See Kanner, [Un]equal Justice, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. at 1108 n.162; Gideon Kanner,
“Fairness and Equity,” or Judicial Bait-and-Switch? It’s Time to Reform the Law of “Just”
Compensation, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 38 (2011).
238. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110,
111 (2002). See also id. at 116 (“the concept of fair market value is essentially a fiction in the
context of takings of property”). As that wise old Detroit condemnation lawyer remarked, “If
condemnors were reasonable, condemnees’ lawyers would starve.”
239. United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir 2010) (Posner, J.).
240. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 634. Compare cases awarding compensation cited
supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
241. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See Singer, Call
Ahead?, supra note 20, at 21–22.
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what is and is not a taking, it will remain easier to assume that
some desired action can be accomplished by ukase rather than by
due process. It was thus wholly appropriate for the Supreme Court
to lay down a rule that such a permanent physical invasion is a per
se taking.242 Once having decided that, however, we reach the second
question, i.e., what, if any, compensation is due? As the Court
expressed it:
The Court of Appeals determined that § 828 serves the legitimate
public purpose of ‘rapid development of and maximum penetra-
tion by a means of communication which has important educa-
tional and community aspects,’ and thus is within the State’s
police power. We have no reason to question that determination.
It is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid
regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must
be paid.243
The New York Legislature concluded that presumptive compensa-
tion was $1. And after remand from the Supreme Court, that is all
that was awarded.244 But the fact that no compensation was due does
not detract from the fact that the government had compelled the
property owner to submit to a permanent occupation. Whether I or
Professor Singer—or anyone else—believes that it caused any mea-
surable harm is a different issue.245 That is why we have juries.246
A jury could find that this kind of coerced occupation required com-
pensation, regardless of whether Professor Singer or anyone else
242. Loretto was reaffirmed in 2015 when the Supreme Court held that a taking can occur
“without regard to the claimed public benefit or the economic impact on the owner.” Horne v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427.
243. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added; citations omitted). See also Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459
U.S. 70, 74–75 (1982) (“however ‘rational’ [this] exercise of the bankruptcy power may be, that
inquiry is quite separate from the question whether the enactment takes property within the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment”). As noted earlier (supra notes 111–16 and accompanying
text), the compensation issue only arises upon passage of a valid regulation.
244. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983).
245. Justice Breyer, at least, may be in sync with this part of the Singer thesis. See his
questions during the oral argument of Horne II, where he asked—essentially—if there is no
damage, how can there be a taking? By the time the opinion was filed, he retreated and signed
the part that found a taking, dissenting only from the refusal to remand for a compensation
evaluation. 135 S. Ct. at 2433.
246. My old Contracts professor (a crusty old Missouri judge) used to preach that whenever
there is a contested question the jury will always know the answer.
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believed that the government’s action did not actually harm the
owner. The property owner ought to be allowed to present his case,
given that a full blown physical taking had actually occurred. That
others might disagree with his position only reinforces the need for
trial to sort out the difference.
Most recently, in a highly publicized case, the Court of Federal
Claims held that the U.S. government took the stock of AIG when
it “bailed out” that company but that no compensation was due for
the taking, because the stock was worthless at the time it was
taken.247 In other words, takings liability and the amount of com-
pensation due are separate questions.248
IX. WORD GAMES DON’T RESOLVE ANYTHING
Unfortunately, when push comes to shove, Professor Singer
retreats to wordplay. He concludes that compensation is “ordinarily
required” when the state “takes” “an entire property right” but not
when the right is “merely limited or regulated.”249 That formulation,
of course, resolves nothing. It simply raises other questions. First,
one must always be wary of the use of the word “mere.” It is a signal
that the author has already concluded that nothing noteworthy has
happened.250 Second, Singer’s formulation provides no guidance,
stating the obvious—that compensation is due when government
action “takes” property. Of course compensation is due then. Plain
English and the Fifth Amendment tell us that. Explicitly. But it
evades the harder question of what kind of regulations go beyond
the “mere” stage to the “actual” acquisitive stage. As noted earlier,
Justice Brennan effectively demonstrated that land use regulations
can be just as effective at taking property as physical invasions.251
247. Starr International Co., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 475 (2015) (“the Court
concludes that the Credit Agreement Shareholder Class shall prevail on liability due to the
Government’s illegal exaction, but shall recover zero damages . . . .” (emphasis added)).
248. It is rare, but not unheard of, that even a conceded taking may cause no damage. For
that reason, no compensation is due. Redevelopment Agency v. Tobriner, 215 Cal. App. 3d
1087 (1989). Still, the fact that a taking causes no economic damage does not make it any less
a taking—injuria absque damno and all that.
249. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 9.
250. For commentary on imaginative judicial uses of the belittling adjective “mere,” see
Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 765, 797 n.169 (1973).
251. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Third, to restrict the constitutional protection to the taking of only
“an entire property right” unduly restricts the inquiry. The Supreme
Court has held that the protection applies to all takings, whether
permanent or temporary, total or partial.252 As even the California
Supreme Court recognized:
The constitutional guarantee of compensation extends to both
types of cases and not merely where the taking is cheap or easy;
indeed the need for compensation is greatest where the loss
is greatest.253
Professor Singer understands the impropriety of defining words
out of existence as a way of ending an argument. See his critical dis-
cussion of Tee-Hit-Ton.254 There, he rightly excoriates the Court for
its refusal to order the government to compensate Native Americans
for confiscating timber on an island they owned. The Court played
the label game of saying that the island may have been “property” as
a matter of common law and tribal law but not under U.S. Constitu-
tional law. Plainly, the Court was wrong.255 But Professor Singer is
no more right by using the same sort of definitional sleight of hand
toward property owners in general in the regulatory context.256
252. E.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
253. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 43 (1972).
254. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); see Singer, Call Ahead?,
supra note 20, at 22–23.
255. While we are talking about Native Americans and governmental foot-dragging, I must
tip my hat to my cousin, Thomas Tureen, who, as a young legal aid lawyer, successfully rep-
resented the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes against the United States and the State
of Maine and obtained a judgment essentially establishing title for his clients to the greater
part of the state. The matter eventually settled for $81.5 million but not until after conten-
tious litigation. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1975). For further discussion see PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF
THE MASHPEE, PASSAMAQUODDY AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND (with Afterword
by Thomas N. Tureen) (1985). An excellent discussion of the Nonintercourse Act at the heart
of that litigation is in Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession &
Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006).
256. To Professor Singer’s query “Why then was it not property?” Singer, Call Ahead?, supra
note 20, at 23, I can do no better than refer him to Gideon Kanner, When Is “Property” Not
“Property Itself”: A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation For Loss of
Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 57 (1969), in which the author makes the
same query about a stick from the property rights bundle that had been treated as “property”
for all purposes except for compensation when taken in eminent domain. See also Gideon
Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
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Part of the problem is Professor Singer’s insistence that “[p]roperty
owners are normally subject to regulation without compensation.”257
No, they are not—not when the regulation is so intrusive or far-
reaching that it seriously impairs or eliminates customary rights
and prerogatives of property ownership, leaving the owner with little
or nothing save only the obligation to pay taxes and bear other bur-
dens of property ownership.258 As liberal a Justice as Thurgood
Marshall had no trouble penning these words—with the agreement
of all members of the Court:
We have frequently recognized that a radical curtailment of a
landowner’s freedom to make use of or ability to derive income
from his land may give rise to a taking within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment, even if the Government has not physi-
cally intruded upon the premises or acquired a legal interest in
the property.259
And speaking of word games, one is almost at a loss for words at the
acceptance—even hearty approval—by a respected scholar of the so-
called analysis of the Supreme Court in a case for which neither he
nor the Court obviously had any sympathy: Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States.260 I have no quarrel with the Court’s decision to
uphold a statute requiring equal access to public accommodations.261
What concerns me is the back-of-the-hand administered by the Court
and the evident approval of that treatment by Professor Singer. To
refresh you, the entirety of the Court’s takings analysis was this:
“Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is a taking of
property without just compensation.”262 Sorry, but with all the respect
765, 771 (1973) (“concepts and notions of what constitutes ‘property’ in other areas of the law
are of little assistance when dealing with definitions of ‘property’ in eminent domain law”).
Apparently that dissonance applies to Indians as well as the rest of us.
257. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 24 (emphasis added); see also Singer, Justifying,
supra note 10, at 670.
258. See Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. 1938).
259. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (emphasis added).
260. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 17–18; Singer, Justifying,
supra note 10, at 617.
261. Although I disagree that the statute created some sort of easement of access in the
general public (see Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 14, 19 n.52); rather, it appears to
be more of an equal protection determination, providing equal access to all of what is afforded
to any.
262. 379 U.S. at 261.
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one can muster, that is not appropriate analysis from the Supreme
Court. Indeed, calling it “analysis” is an affront to the language. The
argument was not so far afield that it was not entitled to the same
respect given to miscellaneous Eighth Amendment claims or many
other claims that some people might not find meritorious. And it is
hardly appropriate for a scholar to applaud. Would the applause
have been as enthusiastic had the Court held “Neither do we find any
merit in the claim that the right of access to public accommodations
cannot prevail over private property rights”? Wouldn’t Professor
Singer have demanded to know more about the “why”? As a practicing
lawyer who has toiled years to get cases into the Supreme Court,263
I find it offensive to have the arguments brushed aside like so much
lint. All of us should.
In the end, Professor Singer’s thesis boils down to tautology and
circularity. In describing what he sees as the law governing regula-
tions, Singer concludes:
Only when a regulatory burden is one that an owner should
not have to bear as a citizen in a democracy is compensation
required.264
A regulatory taking exists only when a regulatory law imposes
an uncompensated burden on an owner that cannot be justified
as legitimate in a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect.265
This is a persistent theme in Professor Singer’s works.266 I would
like to believe that those words mean something and that they ac-
tually convey some sort of standard or rule or template by which
government and governed can order their lives and conduct. I may
be missing something, but I do not see how those generalities aid the
process. The paean to democracy and equal treatment and respect
263. The Court now decides about seventy cases on the merits—from the entire country,
with all its state and federal jurisdictions—each year. Odds of being one of the seventy are
pretty slim.
264. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 21. Who decides what they “should not have
to bear”?
265. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 661.
266. E.g., Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 662, 670; Joseph William Singer, Democratic
Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORN. L. REV. 1009 (2009).
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may feel good, but it contains nothing solid to which legal rights can
be attached.
But Professor Singer has another approach, viewing matters from
the property owner’s vantage point. That may help. In his words:
When a law cannot be justified to those harmed by it, we have
reached the limits of democratic decision making.267
. . . .
And even severe decreases in the value of property are justi-
fied if the reasons for the regulations are ones that owners
should accept.268
. . . .
[L]aws do violate constitutional property norms when they im-
pose burdens that should be shared by all taxpayers because we
cannot adequately explain to owners why they alone should bear
those costs.269
Having dealt with regulated property owners for many years
(including some who ended up in cases cited either here or in Profes-
sor Singer’s articles), I can assure you that none of them understood,
let alone accepted, the idea that they ought to be required to bear
the costs of the regulation so that the greater populace could benefit
from stultifying the use of their land. Were this seriously put forth
as a standard of some sort, it would not “justify” any of the regula-
tions that have been litigated. Take this to the bank: no severely
regulated property owner will accept that he has been justly singled
out to bear a public burden for the benefit of his neighbors. So, if the
test is whether those who are harmed by regulations can accept that
they should be, then no regulation will meet the Singer “justifica-
tion” test.
But perhaps Professor Singer has not actually been looking
for answers in all of his research into the depths of takings law.
Toward the end of Justifying Regulatory Takings, he reveals this
simple conclusion:
What matters is not what the right answer is but that we under-
stand why the cases are hard.270
267. Id. at 659 (emphasis in original).
268. Id. at 622 (emphasis added). Who gets to say what they “should” accept?
269. Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
270. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 663 (emphasis in original).
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That formulation rang a bell. It took me back in time to the
musings of another Harvard professor, this one from the mathemat-
ics department, who was ruminating on a mathematical construct
(with which I, along with many others, was afflicted in my youth)
called “new math.” In an effort to clarify the concepts, Professor
Lehrer explained:
But in the new approach, as you know, the important thing
is to understand what you’re doing, rather than to get the
right answer.271
I am not sure whether that helps us to understand either Profes-
sor Singer or regulatory takings, but it seems that this is a touch-
stone of the idea that the “right answer” is not important.272 That is
a prescription for a society in which neither its plumbing nor its
ideas hold water.
X. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE LAST FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE?
Reading Professor Singer’s output, one might get the impression
that the Supreme Court stopped deciding takings cases five years
ago. The most recent case Professor Singer discusses273 was decided
in 2010,274 and the one before that was in 2005.275 The intriguing
thing about the cases since 2010 is that the property owners won all
of them—by large votes, which always included some (and sometimes
all) of the liberal Justices. They are worth some analysis as showing
that all, and particularly current, Supreme Court jurisprudence can-
not easily be squeezed into the box of noncompensatory action. In-
deed, I believe that this group of cases shows that the Supreme Court
has become tired of listening to the same old government doomsday
pap and has begun to enforce the Fifth Amendment.276
271. Tom Lehrer, “New Math” (1990).
272. As Professor Henry Higgins noted when discussing the French in My Fair Lady: “the
French don’t care what they do actually as long as they pronounce it properly.”
273. Except for Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), which
he dislikes—very much.
274. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (1910).
275. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
276. I understand Professor Singer’s point that the Fifth Amendment doesn’t really apply
to state and local government. (Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 8 n.27.) But, as we
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Perhaps more important from the viewpoint of the Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Conference, we should ask: “How do these cases im-
pact Professor Singer’s democracy theory, or his justification idea for
regulatory takings?” How, indeed. To begin with the punch line, I
don’t think they fit those concepts at all. The representatives of the
majoritarian side not only lost each case, they even lost the votes of
the liberal Justices more often than not.277 Moreover, many of their
arguments were not merely rejected; they were scoffed at. We should
take a closer look at these cases to gain some insight into where the
Court may be headed and what contemporary takings law looks like.
My surmise is that the Court at first cut the regulators some
(largely procedural) slack, in the hope that they would at least real-
ize that they were dealing with a serious constitutional issue and
would try to mend their ways. Instead, the regulators grew bolder,
to the point of openly cynical abuse of property owners,278 in the evi-
dent hope that the Court would continue to turn a blind eye toward
their excesses.
—Item: Lozman279 was not technically a takings case, but bear
with me. I think it was a warning shot across the governmental bow.
Mr. Lozman has his counterparts in many cities. He is the kind of guy
who drives city council members nuts. He appears at most city coun-
cil meetings and asks to be heard during the open discussion period.
Then he takes off on his pet peeve of the day. This particular guy’s
problem got compounded because the city council was not only tired
of listening to him, the city was also his landlord. He had a floating
home in its harbor, but do not call it a “houseboat.” There is a photo
of Mr. Lozman’s home attached to the Court’s opinion. Take a look;
it doesn’t look like any “boat” you’ve ever seen. First, it is a boxy affair
that actually looks like a house, rather than a boat, with picture
agree that the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment are applied to state and local government
through the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment (Chicago B&Q R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); see Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 8 n.27), the
difference is of purely academic interest, as due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
requires just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
277. In the six cases, the four liberals cast twenty-three votes: seventeen were cast in favor
of the property owner and against the government (plus four more on one of the issues in
Koontz). Justice Kagan recused herself in Arkansas Game & Fish. If you are counting, the
remaining three votes were all cast by Justice Sotomayor—one in each of the three cases. So,
to the extent the liberals voted as a bloc, the bloc stood firmly in these cases in defense of
individuals and against the collective might of the State.
278. See Michael M. Berger, Municipal Myopia Run Rampant, 31 URBAN LAW. 363 (1999).
279. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).
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windows and French doors instead of portholes. It has no raked
(pointed) bow (to ease its way through the water if one wanted it to
move), no engine, no bilge pumps, no navigation gear and more (or
less, actually). When he got behind in his rent, some bright folks at
city hall decided it would be a good idea to evict him (and possibly
get rid of him for good?). They took him to state court via an unlaw-
ful detainer action—and lost when the jury concluded that the city
was engaging in improper retaliation rather than a legitimate
landlord/tenant dispute. Stung by its loss, the city got even craftier,
deciding that, because the home was floating in its harbor, the case
actually involved a “vessel” and could be brought in Federal Admi-
ralty Court.
They thus invoked the federal admiralty jurisdiction which is in
rem (i.e., the property, not the property owner, is the named defen-
dant). The court had the defendant (i.e., the floating home) “arrested”
and towed. It took three U.S. marshals to arrest the structure and
tow it away. They towed this unseaworthy structure to Miami—
eighty miles away—losing pieces of it along the way. Judgment even-
tually was entered for the city, which bought the defendant at an
execution sale. And then destroyed it. That is why I class this as a
“takings” case, even though it will go down in history as an admi-
ralty case. The lower courts held that this intentionally unseawor-
thy floating home was a “vessel” and ruled for the city.280
Long story short, the Supreme Court saw through the city’s ploy,
decided it did not want to open this can of worms for future exploita-
tion and held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction. (The opinion
makes for interesting reading, as the Court struggles to explain why
it is rejecting admiralty jurisdiction here. Among other things, it
reverted to nursery rhymes to demonstrate the absurdity of expand-
ing admiralty jurisdiction. Remember “rub-a-dub-dub, three men in
a tub?” The Court did, wanting no part of such a journey.)281
So, how does Lozman fit here? It was a warning by the Court—a
warning that the Court was getting tired of government gamesman-
ship that treated property owners without respect while clogging the
280. Bearing witness to the truism that some courts will buy any argument proffered by
the government. See City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel
Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2011).
281. Had the city’s ingenuous theory survived judicial scrutiny, every houseboat in the land
would become subject to regulation and inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard. Just what the
Coast Guard and the judiciary needed!
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courts in the process. The conservative Justices were joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. I think the opinion contained
a message that needs to be heeded. Now read about the other cases.
They are less humorous but much more substantively on point.
—Item: Another warning came in a case that one might call the
real estate equivalent of the fanciful “one bite” rule in tort law. You
know, the “rule” that says that a dog owner cannot be held liable for
her dog’s nasty temper until after the first bite because, until the dog
actually bites someone, the owner doesn’t know the dog is vicious.
Not sure if that makes sense with dogs; it never made sense to me
for flood control projects.
And yet that was the law. Federal courts had held that government-
induced flooding cannot be a taking unless it is absolutely, positively,
and irrevocably permanent—and it must happen more than once to
demonstrate permanence. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied that rule and reversed a judgment for compensation, saying
that the situation “at most created tort liability.”282
The property taken was bottomland timber. The taking was done
by six consecutive years of flooding (protested by the owner) during
the growing season.283 The Supreme Court decided to address the
presumed rule that repeated, temporary flooding is merely a tort
and never a taking.
Changes in the law should have eased the Court’s task. After First
English,284 where the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects
282. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. U.S., 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Is anyone else
getting tired of modern-day courts pulling out the hoary old “sorry, you sued out the wrong
writ” dodge? Can’t they just look at the facts, determine whether they state a legitimate claim,
and get on with life? Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies For Takings, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1630 (2015).
283. Note that the property owner was an agency of the State of Arkansas. (Yes, the Fifth
Amendment protects government-owned property but only against depredation by a govern-
ment agency of a higher class. See City of Inglewood v. Unnamed Citizens, Residents & Prop-
erty Owners, 508 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1974) (Inglewood could not state a federal takings claim
against Los Angeles, as both were cities)). Even government agencies get peeved when other
agencies take their property without compensating. And speaking of governmental focus on
the money, recall what happened in the Lucas case. There, South Carolina fought strenuously
to keep Mr. Lucas from doing anything on his lots in order to “protect” the shoreline. When,
under the prod of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, the State Supreme Court remanded the
matter for determination of just compensation, the State bought the property. Did the State
keep it vacant? No. The State sold it to another private individual for the very development
it had earlier denied Mr. Lucas, so it could recoup its purchase price. See Gideon Kanner, Not
with a Bang, but a Giggle: The Settlement of the Lucas Case, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT
CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS, ch. 15 (D. Callies ed. 1996).
284. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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against temporary—as well as permanent—takings, the issue should
have been closed, because as a matter of constitutional law, it no
longer mattered whether the flooding was permanent or temporary.285
Since then, the Federal Circuit dealt with the concept of “permanence”
(albeit in a nonflooding context) and concluded that if the action
happens for as long as the government wants it to, it is permanent—
even though the government may stop at any time.286 Moreover, that
same court held that the destruction of timber (which apparently
happened six times in this case) requires compensation.287
The Claims Court had determined that the flooding was both
substantial and predictable and awarded $5.7 million in damages
for lost trees and reclamation costs. The Federal Circuit reversed.
Acknowledging the temporary taking rule of First English, the Cir-
cuit decided to ignore the rule because “cases involving flooding and
flowage easements are different.”288 The “flooding cases are different”
rationale was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. “No decision
of this Court authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding exception to
our Takings Clause jurisprudence, and we decline to create such an
exception in this case.”289
The highlight of the opinion was the Court’s response to the Feds’
argument that imposing liability “would unduly impede the govern-
ment’s ability to act in the public interest.” That canard is routinely
raised by many governmental defendants. At the Federal level, it is
almost a truism that there will be a section in the government’s brief
making that argument (almost as though federal computers have a
macro that automatically inserts the argument with a single key-
stroke). “Time and again in Takings Clause cases,” according to the
Supreme Court’s accounting, the government has made this assertion.
“The sky did not fall” after the argument was rejected before.290 So
it was rejected again. Forcefully. In a unanimous opinion. By Justice
Ginsburg. Perhaps government lawyers will finally stop dragging
out this shopworn argument.
285. Professor Tribe had endorsed the compensation for a temporary taking concept even
before First English. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 385–86 n.23 (1985).
286. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
287. Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
288. 637 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (relying on pre-First English decisions).
289. 133 S. Ct. at 519. Professor Singer notes the decision in this case but nothing about
its significance other than that flooding can be a taking. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at
642 n.165.
290. 133 S. Ct. at 521.
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It may be worth noting that the decision did not criticize the reason
for the governmental decision to flood this land repeatedly in order
to provide flood control benefits elsewhere. It simply required com-
pensation for the harm inflicted regardless of the justification for
the action. That the justification may have been good did not negate
the harm. “The question is what has the owner lost, not what has the
taker gained.”291
—Item: Koontz292 was perhaps the most eye opening of the recent
decisions. It not only built on the Court’s earlier jurisprudence that
unconstitutional conditions can constitute unlawful takings,293 it
expressed some strong displeasure with the government and some
understanding of the shabby way that government agencies have
treated property owners doing no more than seeking permits to use
their own land. The earlier cases dealt with conditions attached to
permits that had been granted. But what if the regulator proposes
conditions during the administrative process, the owner refuses to
be intimidated, and the permit is then denied? Do the Nollan/Dolan
rules apply? Should it matter, in other words, whether the regulating
agency imposed a condition precedent or a condition subsequent?
Does it matter that the proposed conditions would have required
work to be done or money to be spent on unrelated and distant land?
The trial court found a taking. The District then changed its mind
and issued the permits. Compensation of some $376,000 was awarded
for a temporary taking. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the
Florida Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Nollan/Dolan rules
do not apply (1) to money or (2) to where the permit is denied because
the owner will not accept the conditions.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on both issues. The bottom-line
vote was 5-4, but as to the latter point, the Court was unanimous. All
of the Justices recognized the word game that the government was
playing and would have none of it. Indeed, probably the most refresh-
ing thing about the majority opinion was that those of us who have
toiled for years on the property owners’ side of these cases seem
finally to have made some headway showing the Court what actu-
ally occurs during municipal land use permit hearings. Four times.
291. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
292. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
293. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994).
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Count ‘em—four times (five, if you count the one quote from Nollan),
the Court used some form of the word “extortion” to describe the im-
position of such conditions. Elsewhere, the Court also seemed to grasp
the unfair attempts that many municipalities make to “leverage”
their power:
[L]and use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the
type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to
deny a permit that is worth far more than the property it would
like to take . . . . So long as the building permit is more valuable
than any just compensation the owner could hope to receive for
the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to the government’s
demand, no matter how unreasonable.294
“Extortion”? “Coercion”? “Leverage”? I’d say the Court is beginning
to understand the unequal bargaining power enjoyed by government
agencies in land regulation matters.295 But none of that fits with
Professor Singer’s theories about either “democracy” or “justification”
for government action. Rather, Professor Singer’s sharp criticism of
Koontz is that it will make “negotiation” between government and
property owners more difficult.296 As the Court used language appro-
priate to Mafioso “negotiations” to describe the governmental conduct,
I suspect that the Court intended to eliminate that type of dealing.
—Item: Rails-to-Trails returns to the Supreme Court. I feel confi-
dent that, twenty-five years ago, the Court thought it had resolved
the question of whether transfer of an abandoned railroad right-of-
way easement pursuant to federal statute could be a taking that re-
quired compensation. I feel that way because, although it refused to
strike down the statute, it undid a Second Circuit decision holding
that the statute could never, at any time or under any circumstances,
be a taking and said the Claims Court could decide the issue as in
other routine cases against the Feds.297 However, the Feds never took
that seriously and have been forcing property owners to litigate their
294. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594.
295. Compare supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
296. Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 669 n.304.
297. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990). See supra notes 46–66 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the use of compensation as the remedy for regulatory takings, rather
than invalidation.
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cases for years while awaiting either death or the final conclusion of
their Claims Court suits.298
In Brandt299 the Feds decided to take the initiative, presumably
tiring of constantly defending against—and losing to—property owner
suits based on defunct and abandoned rail lines being converted into
public hiking trails. They filed a quiet title action, claiming that the
railroad easement involved there was not really a traditional ease-
ment and that abandonment of rail usage meant that the United
States regained control of the property. Presumably the plan was to
get a favorable decision that could then be used offensively against
other property owners to cut off further litigation.
The Feds won in the District Court and the Tenth Circuit. They
lost where it counted—with only Justice Sotomayor dissenting. And
they got bench-slapped in the process:
The Government does not dispute that easements normally work
this way [i.e., abandonment restores full use and ownership
to the underlying fee owner], but maintains that the 1875 Act
granted the railroads something more than an easement, reserv-
ing an implied reversionary interest in that something more to
the United States. The Government loses that argument today,
in large part because it won when it argued the opposite before
this Court more than 70 years ago . . . .300
The case was actually pretty simple. One wonders why the lower
courts allowed themselves to be led astray on so elementary a point
of law. The property owner was the patentee of an eighty-three-acre
parcel of land in Wyoming. It was subject to a railroad right-of-way
easement covering nearly ten acres. The government settled with all
other property owners on this rail line—as the Court explained, their
interests were “much smaller” than Brandt’s and less worth litigating.
The opinion explains the basic law of easements and shows how that
law means the government loses. More than that, it analyzes the
federal statutes dealing with railroad rights-of-way, demonstrating
that grants made after 1871—like this one—were merely garden
variety easements.
298. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
299. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
300. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added).
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The Court’s displeasure with the government’s position was mani-
fest. In addition to the material quoted above, the Court said, inter
alia, that the government tried to tell it that an earlier opinion “did
not really mean what it said”; that the federal statute does not sup-
port “such an improbable (and self-serving) reading”; and, in short,
that “[w]e decline to endorse such a stark change in position.”301
This reaction seems part of a pattern in the recent decisions where
the Court not only rules against the government’s position but does
so in an opinion that is highly critical of either the underlying gov-
ernment action or the arguments in the government’s briefs, or both.
As far as democracy and the will of the majority go, the Rails-to-
Trails Act was passed for the greater good—not to mention physical
fitness—of the American public to convert existing linear rights-of-
way from rail traffic to exercise trails without the expense and effort
of creating them from scratch. From that standpoint, the general
public gained while the underlying property owners had not had use
of the land for a century or so anyway. But democracy lost to the con-
stitutional imperative. And the conservatives were joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
—Item: Horne was actually two of the recent Supreme Court
decisions. The Ninth Circuit was reversed twice—first on procedure
and then on the merits.
The case302 involved a marketing order that is a relic from a
bygone era, enacted in 1937 as a direct descendant of one of Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s “New Deal” programs, created in reaction to market
turmoil out of a desire to recreate an agricultural market that was
apparently viewed as the golden age of American agriculture, i.e.,
between 1910 and 1914. The order allowed a federally created body
to commandeer a percentage of the raisin crop each year, thus re-
ducing the size of the market and (presumably) making life better
for all. Mr. and Mrs. Horne, tired of turning over raisins to the gov-
ernment, when asked for 47% of their crop one year, refused. In a
letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, they invoked their right against
involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment.303
Horne I was a procedural case because the government insisted,
and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that as a precondition to defending
301. Id. at 1266, 1268.
302. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (Horne I).
303. Alas, the Thirteenth Amendment issue never made it into the litigation.
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against the enforcement order brought with regard to that 47% crop
forfeiture, the Hornes would have to pay the fine the government
levied against them—$483,843.53 for the value of the raisins they
did not surrender and another $202,600 as a fine for not turning
over the raisins, plus interest. A pretty hefty ticket of admission to
court. The Supreme Court unanimously said the ruling was nonsense
and reversed for a merits determination. Two interesting comments
came from the liberal side of the Court during oral argument. First,
Justice Kagan suggested that they remand to the Ninth Circuit to
determine whether the program constituted an unconstitutional
taking of private property or “was the world’s most out-dated law.”304
Then Justice Ginsburg recalled that the Ninth Circuit initially de-
cided the case on the merits (in the government’s favor) before decid-
ing that the procedural ploy was the easier way out. She mused as
follows about what she called “one mysterious thing”: “[t]he first
time around, the Ninth Circuit decided this case on the merits. So if
you’re right, I take it, we remand and then they adjudicate the mer-
its of the takings claim. But they already did that.”305
The Court remanded, and the Ninth Circuit swiftly turned it
around, ruling—as predicted—for the government and setting up
the second round in the Supreme Court in two years. Recalling Pro-
fessor Singer’s comment about liberals not being the “enemies of free
markets,”306 it was interesting to see the government argue that the
Hornes’ financial predicament was their own fault because all the
government had done was to place a tariff on the Hornes’ voluntary
choice to enter the stream of commerce. And if they didn’t like it,
they could sell their grapes for something else, like wine, or grow
some other crop. The Court made short work of that. Even Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined the part of the opinion finding
a taking, concluding that the government may not “hold [property]
hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional protection.”307
Nor would that majority swallow the Marie Antoinette-like conclusion
that, if they did not like the tariff on raisins, let them make wine.
304. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Horne v. Dep’t of Agric. 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013)
(No. 12-123).
305. Id. at 26.
306. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 2.
307. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015) (Horne II).
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CONCLUSION
Professor Singer is obviously a gifted theoretician. But he has
allowed his theories to run away with him. His fervent belief in
democracy, for example, is admirable but cannot provide an answer
for everything. This country’s founders understood both the strengths
and weaknesses of democracy. That is why we have a Bill of Rights
that is designed entirely—and solely—to restrain the power of the
democratic majority. I am certain that Professor Singer would take
umbrage were the government to apply his reasoning to other civil
rights protected by the Constitution. We simply cannot have the kind
of society we all want to have if the vote of the majority can control
property ownership and use, any more than we can allow that vote
to control speech, religion, voting, reproductive rights, desegregation,
marriage (in any of its permutations), gender discrimination (in any
of its permutations), or any of the other major constitutional issues
of the day. Majority rule is wonderful in theory but often messy and
unprincipled in practice.308
That is why the Bill of Rights is controlled by an independent
judiciary.309 While Professor Singer is correct that we all want a rule
of “law,” part of the “law” that we want is the tempering influence of
judges who have to swear obedience to the Constitution before mount-
ing the woolsack.
It would be nice to live in Lake Wobegon, where all the women
are strong, all the men are good-looking, all the children are above
average, and all government functionaries pursue the “public good,”
untainted by the influence of special interests, whether public or
private.310 However, in the land of reality, where we actually live,
the majority needs some restraint—particularly when dealing with
other people’s resources. As Justice Brandeis put it, “The goose that
lays golden eggs has been considered a most valuable possession. But
308. See, e.g., the inspiration for the title of Professor Singer’s paper for this conference,
“Should we call ahead?”. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 15.
309. See Michael M. Berger & Richard D. Norton, An Independent Judiciary: Society’s
Bulwark, VERDICT, 2nd Quarter 1998, at 18.
310. Compare BABCOCK, supra note 8. It may be worth noting, in this context, that
Professor James Buchanan received the Nobel Prize in Economics for demonstrating that, for
all the familiar platitudes about public interest, government officials act in pursuit of their
own self-interest, the same as private parties. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
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even more profitable is the privilege of taking the golden eggs laid
by somebody else’s goose.”311 The Constitution provides the balance
to ensure that eggs stay in the proper baskets and that when regula-
tions take significant sticks from one’s bundle of property rights—if
you will allow me to shift metaphors in mid-sentence—their rightful
owners are compensated. Doing so isn’t “compensat[ing] owners just
to get them to obey the law”;312 it is providing the proper check on the
majority, just as the Constitution mandates, while at the same time
providing compensation for the sacrifice wrung out of the owner for
the “public good” du jour.
Throughout the last century, the Supreme Court has consistently
acknowledged the power of the majority (exercised through its offi-
cials) to pursue its vision as long as it is coupled with the necessary
balance provided by the Fifth Amendment.
[T]he state has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domains. It has
the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might
have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with
it remains the final power.313
[The California] Coastal Commission [has a] belief that the public
interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible
beach along the coast. The Commission may well be right that it
is a good idea . . . . California is free to advance its ‘comprehensive
program,’ if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for
this ‘public purpose,’ see U.S. Const., Amdt. 5; but if it wants an
easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay for it.314
In our democracy, majority power and constitutional restraint are
inseparable, and the way to ensure their enforcement and coexistence
is through the courts. As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky (a scholar whose
liberal credentials cannot be questioned) put it in his recent book,
“The primary reason for having a Supreme Court then, is to enforce
the Constitution against the will of the majority.”315
311. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 12 (1914).
312. Singer, Call Ahead?, supra note 20, at 25; Singer, Justifying, supra note 10, at 670.
313. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (empha-
sis added).
314. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987) (emphasis added).
315. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 9 (2014).





It is a great pleasure to honor Professor Joe Singer’s work today.
His work has illuminated the deep structures and questions that
the idea of property presents, in a way matched by few others. Schol-
ars in the United States and elsewhere are profoundly indebted to
his work.
The core of Professor Singer’s work can be captured by these
seemingly simple questions: “What is property? How can we explain
its protection, and nonprotection, in society and law?” Although phi-
losophers had long debated such questions, Professor Singer was one
of the first American legal scholars to place this essential question
in the cross-hairs of probing legal analysis.
Although questions about the nature of property might have
seemed of largely academic interest in the late 1980s when Profes-
sor Singer began his work, this quickly changed with world events.
The sudden need to sort out conflicting property claims in the wake
of radical regime change in Africa, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and elsewhere, the emergence of “new” property claims as the
result of rapid advances in the fields of biotechnology and computer-
ized information gathering, the expanded regulatory powers asserted
by governments to address worsening global environmental prob-
lems, and other events, all worked to bring fundamental questions
about the nature of property and its protection to the forefront of
popular and legal consciousness.
In the United States, the most important prism through which
these questions have been viewed is the constitutional protection of
property. Although debates about property certainly occur in other
contexts, it is the idea of constitutional protection that has for de-
cades captured American popular and legal imagination. In the
property field, it has been the center of attention for academic
commentators, the popular media, property-rights protesters, and
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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ordinary citizens alike. Somehow it seems to capture popular angst
about rights, powers, and change more than any other legal or
cultural idea.
Because of the importance of Professor Singer’s work in this field,
the constitutional protection of property has been an important theme
for this conference. The question seems to boil down to this: What
does the constitutional protection of property promise? What can
it promise?
The protection of property, by constitutional guarantee or other-
wise, is an emotionally charged issue. It always has been, and it al-
ways will be. From the earliest moments of childhood, humans feel
the need to assert themselves through the language of possession.
As Kevin Gray has written, “we are not far removed from the primi-
tive, instinctual cries [of identification] which resound in the play-
group or playground: ‘That’s not yours—it’s mine.’”1
This instinctive sense of acquisition is well founded. Property—in
the sense of material things—is necessary for the sheer survival of
each of us. That might not have the immediate resonance for most of
us, in our rich country, that it has for those in other parts of the
world. But even in our country, there is acute public awareness that
individual security, options in life, a sense of achievement, and power
are deeply rooted in the protection of property.
What, then, does the Constitution provide? The simple answer
would be that it protects property like it protects other rights. The
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment states, “nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation.”2 As Richard
Epstein and other contemporary commentators have argued, this
must mean that property is as protected as other rights. In this view,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, due process of law, and the
protection of property are all enumerated rights under the Constitu-
tion. All are of equal stature. There is no basis for protecting the first
three, for instance, and leaving the fourth to the whims of politics
and the “democratic process.”3
1. Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 157, 159 (1994).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI.
2016] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 111
That view of rights is simple and—I believe—is our intuitive one.
Rights have power. That is why they are “rights.” In particular, they
have power against competing public interests. Public interests might
be desirable, for some reason, but they do not have the power to de-
feat rights. At least, they do not have that power absent extraordi-
narily compelling circumstances.4
The assumption that legal rights (particularly constitutional rights)
function to protect individual interests from public demands is deeply
ingrained in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Freedom of speech, free-
dom of religion, due process of law, and so on involve values that we
particularly prize in our society and are, accordingly, interests to
which we grant special legal protection. The same, one could argue,
is true of property.
However, the simple addition of property to the list of unquestion-
ably protected constitutional rights raises an oddly perplexing ques-
tion. If the ownership of property is a constitutional right like any
other right, why are property rights so often not given the presump-
tive power to which they are entitled?
In fact, we find that in practice, courts and legislatures often seem
to disregard what appear to be clearly established, pre-existing prop-
erty rights in favor of what are simply “desirable” public interests.
For instance, few courts have privileged property-rights claims over
environmental regulations, even though owners have demanded it.
As one property-rights advocate has observed, “courts have with-
drawn from protection of property [in these cases], except for occa-
sional unpredictable intervention in some of the most egregious
situations.”5 A similar observation could be made about zoning reg-
ulations, endangered species laws, historic-preservation statutes,
cultural-property laws, and other restrictions upon or deprivation
of claimed property rights in general service of the public interest.
We certainly would not say that law exhibits such a “casual” ap-
proach toward rights of speech, religious exercise, or other enumer-
ated constitutional rights. Why is it the case with property?
L. REV. 41 (1992); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1997).
4. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
65–69 (2003).
5. JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS: HOW PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER ASSAULT—
AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE 88 (1997).
112 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 5:109
We could, for instance, come up with a constitutionally mandated
rule that would unequivocally protect property—for instance: “[a]ll
existing property rights are protected. Period.” Is it simply that the
courts (for instance) lack the backbone to protect property rights? Or
is it something more complex?
I. THE PROBLEMS OF PROPERTY
A. The Problem of Abstract Definition
We must admit at the outset that even if we adopted such an
unequivocally protective rule, there would be some definitional dif-
ficulties. For instance, what would “property” be? After much thought,
theorists have offered definitions such as “property is . . . rights, . . .
rights in or to things,”6 or, more narrowly, property is “legal relations
between people with respect to . . . thing[s].”7 The question immedi-
ately arises, of course: what rights and involving what things? Most
theorists, when faced with this question, opt for an all-inclusive
understanding. For instance, one has offered this:
The idea of property—or, if you prefer, the sophisticated or legal
conception of property—involves a constellation of Hohfeldian
elements, correlatives, and opposites; a specification of standard
incidents of ownership and other related but less powerful inter-
ests; and a catalog of ‘things’ (tangible and intangible) that are
the subjects of these incidents.8
This gets us farther—but not much farther. We still need to know
which Hohfeldian elements (rights, privileges, powers, and immuni-
ties), regarding which catalogued things, are included. To answer
this question, recourse to some other external idea is needed. Fre-
quently offered possibilities include “commonly recognized” incidents
of ownership (e.g., the rights to use, transfer, exclude, and otherwise
control) regarding “commonly recognized” things (e.g., land, chattels,
6. C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL
POSITIONS 1, 2 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (emphasis in original).
7. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 1 (2001).
8. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 23 (1990) (emphasis deleted). Cf. AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 2 (“property” encompasses legal relations “designated by
the words ‘right,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘power,’ and ‘immunity’”).
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wealth-creating intangibles, and other sources of material security).9
However, attempted applications of such understandings immedi-
ately exposes their inadequacies. Are all conceivable sources of
personal wealth or security included? Are all legal rights that af-
fect such sources, and affect our control of them, a part of “prop-
erty” understandings?
In the end, we must have more: we must have some underlying
reason why we designate certain rights, privileges, powers, or immu-
nities “property” within the guarantee of permanence that it ostensi-
bly affords. Recognition of this need has prompted various offerings
of what the goals of property regimes should be. For instance, those
who believe in economic liberalism have argued that property should
protect the fruits of individual labor and the operation of market
systems.10 Others have stressed broader ideas of human flourishing11
or the development of broad human capacities of some sort.12
The uncertainty in the meaning of property has infected United
States Supreme Court decision-making as well. In a series of cases,
the Court has cited widely varying—and potentially conflicting—
understandings of what constitutionally protected property should
be. For instance, “property” in the takings13 context has been de-
fined by the Court as “bundles” of “traditionally” or “commonly” rec-
ognized rights to possess, use, transport, or exclude; or, alternatively,
it has been defined as the right to the protection of “reasonable,”
9. See, e g., MUNZER, supra note 8, at 47 (discussing the right to transfer as determinative
of the identification of property rights); LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS 18 (1977) (citing “ownership” rights to use, transfer, and exclude as essential
property rights); A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (citing the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the
right to receive income, the right to capital, the right to security, the power of transmissibility,
the absence of term, and the incident of residuarity as classic examples of property rights).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32–35 (4th ed. 1992); Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS)
347 (1967).
11. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligation: The Human Flourishing
Theory of Property, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 451 (2013); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 6 (1993).
12. See, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, 24 DISSENT 72, 77 (1977)
(property as a means to a “full and free life,” “using and developing and exerting our capabili-
ties and energies”).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 2.
114 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 5:109
“investment-backed,” or “historical” expectations.14 Tests of the latter
type, by their terms, turn upon the investment made by the partic-
ular owner; tests of the former type, as statements of abstract en-
titlements, might not.15
As the result of such doctrinal problems, the Court has most often
and uncomfortably settled on the idea that it is “the several States,
[not the United States, that are] possessed of residual authority . . .
to define ‘property’” for constitutional purposes.16 However, making
state definitions determinative has its own problems. First, there is
the thorny issue—for federal courts—in determining whether state
laws create “established rights” or only “non-established interests.”17
In addition, there is a more profound problem. If “property”—the core
material of the constitutional right—is a matter of state law, a state
can presumably interpret it as it sees fit. And, with federal courts
bound by state determinations of state law, there is often not much
left for the exercise of federal power.18
In short, the idea of a “simple” property-protection guarantee
quickly becomes illusory when the complexities of the idea of prop-
erty itself are considered. It is very difficult to have a simple, le-
gally enforceable guarantee when articulation of its central idea is
so difficult.
14. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (right to “essential
use” of land); id. at 1055–60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing eighteenth-century and
nineteenth-century understandings of rights incident to land ownership as determining
modern property interests); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (citing “investment-
backed expectations”); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499
(1987) (citing “financial-backed” expectations); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“[p]roperty rights in a physical thing” include the rights to possess,
use, exclude, and dispose of it); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979) (“traditional”
rights of possession, exclusion, and other powers of disposition are the rights of property).
15. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419 (facts that cable service installation was present when
the building was purchased, and enhanced the building’s value, did not preclude the building
owner’s claim that mandated cable service “intrusion” was a taking of her right to exclude
without the payment of compensation).
16. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980). See also Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010); Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
17. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715–18 (plurality opinion); id. at 732–33 (major-
ity opinion).
18. See, e.g., id. at 729–33 (claim by Florida landowners that the Florida Supreme Court
changed the law—and eliminated their property rights—must be rejected, because that court’s
prior decisions did not establish the property rights that the landowners claimed in the
first instance).
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B. The Problem of Reciprocal Rights and Powers
Let us assume, however, that the definitional problem somehow
vanishes—or, more accurately, that there is a consensus that the
rights claimed by the complaining party in a particular case are
unequivocally part of constitutionally recognized “property”. For in-
stance, imagine a case in which a landowner claims the right to build
a house on a shorefront lot that is flanked by similar lots with single-
family structures. Or imagine a case in which a landowner claims
the right to fill a marsh in order to develop his land—a course of ac-
tion previously taken by countless others. In these cases, at least, it
should be an easy judicial task to unequivocally and constitutionally
protect the owners’ claimed property rights—correct?
At this point, we stumble upon the next problem. Claimed property
rights—because of the nature of the resources that they concern—
are often inextricably and unalterably interdependent. The right to
use one’s land, once accepted, might appear to be a right that we can
unilaterally enforce. But the situation with land is rarely that sim-
ple. What one person does in the name of ownership rights in land
is almost certain to affect the property rights and interests of others.
In other words, because of the physical interconnectedness of
land, wildlife, and human habitation, the claimed rights and actions
of an owner of land cannot be viewed in isolation. It is not a situa-
tion in which I—as a landowner—can say, “this is my land, so I will
do what I want, and to heck with the rest of you.” It is a situation in
which—whether we like it or not—our actions and fates are inextri-
cably intertwined.
Consider, for instance, the first hypothetical situation posed above:
a landowner’s claim of right to build on a shorefront lot in the face
of newly imposed environmental restrictions. This, of course, is the
famous Lucas19 case. Lucas demanded that he be permitted to de-
velop his two ocean-front lots on the Isle of Palms in a way that was
permissible when the land was purchased. The State of South
Carolina claimed that environmental damage that unregulated
building had caused—such as the acceleration of erosion, the jeopar-
dizing of the beach/dune system, and the endangerment of adjacent
properties—justified a facial ban on building.20
19. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1003 (1992).
20. See S.C. CODE § 48-39-259(4) (2003); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008–09. I use the term “facial”
deliberately, as the law provided landowners an opportunity to challenge the way in which
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Protection of the ability to build or to otherwise use one’s land
is something that we generally associate with property rights and
thus—it could be argued—is something that should be protected
under a rule of unequivocal property protection. However, if we afford
Lucas such a right to build, what do we do with the damage that his
actions will cause to public property and to the private property
rights and interests of others?
This dilemma is replicated in other land-use cases in which the
landowners’ proposed actions, claimed as property rights, would se-
verely and directly affect the use or enjoyment of land or its resources
that are claimed as protected by others. Consider, for instance, the
second hypothetical situation posed above: a landowner’s claim of
right to eliminate wetlands, with fill, an action that has been pursued
by landowners for centuries.21 Opposing this action is more recent
scientific understanding of the physical and biological interdepen-
dence of wetlands with groundwater, other shoreline lands, and the
bodies of water that border them. Thus, on the one hand, there is the
claim of the landowner to engage in an ancient practice; on the other
hand, there is knowledge that the filling and pollution of wetlands
will cause damage to other land and bodies of water in ways that
transcend the boundaries of the claiming landowner’s parcel. Again,
we are faced with an activity (filling and building) that would appear,
on its own, to be included within an unequivocal (constitutional)
property-protection rule. But what do we do with the damage to the
rights and interests of others?
It is cases such as these—and a myriad of others—that illustrate
why an unequivocal rule of protected, “traditional,” or “expected”
property rights cannot be undertaken by courts. The physical inter-
dependence of property rights claimed by owners and the property
rights of others makes such an absolute rule impossible.
baseline and setback lines had been drawn by the State. This was a path that other landown-
ers had taken; however, Lucas spurned this alternative. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green
Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES
221, 231 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004). Furthermore, after the Lucas
trial concluded, the law was explicitly amended to allow owners to build modified structures
under a special permit procedure. Of the twelve lots on the Isle of Palms that were restricted
under the law, the owners of ten—all but Lucas—sought such permission and obtained it. See
id. at 246.
21. See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606.
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There are two responses that simple-protection-rule advocates
might advance. First, there is the argument that recognition of phys-
ical and biological interdependencies involving land will erode land-
use rights too far—that if these are recognized any use now protected
might be prohibited.22 However, even those advocates admit that our
recognition of natural dependencies in law is “more pervasive today
than before, not because the world has changed but because our per-
ception of the world has changed.”23 Our perception of the world has
changed, and our perception of the world will continue to change with
advances in scientific knowledge. As a result, activities that were once
thought to be harmless to the property rights and interests of others
are often now clearly seen as not. Law—as the set of enforceable soci-
etal rules—must grapple with these realities. Pretending that the
world is not what it is will not help to solve interdependent problems.
The bottom line is that any property right, previously conferred,
is at most a statement of the way that conflicting interests have been
resolved at one particular moment. As understandings of consequences
change, “rights” will change. There is no way to avoid that reality.
There is, however, a final objection that simple-protection-rule
advocates might raise. It is not our position, they might argue, that
the Constitution prohibits all changes in rights; we acknowledge that
reality. When it comes to property, the Constitution is not a guaran-
tee against change; rather, it is a guarantee of indemnification. South
Carolina can institute prohibitions against the development of ocean-
front lots; Rhode Island can prohibit the filling of wetlands; but there
is a price for these changes. When landowners’ established rights are
abolished, those who want those changes must pay for them.
The core of this argument is that compensation, in such cases, is
owed as a matter of justice. If someone is hurt, the wrongdoer must
pay; and when rights are taken, that party is the government. Al-
though this argument has a certain surface appeal, how justice ac-
tually compels this result is difficult to articulate. That is because
justice, in any situation, is an inherently relational inquiry. “When we
decide whether a law or its operation is ‘just,’ this is an inquiry about
the advantages and disadvantages that ‘X’ derives from the operation
of that law, or its absence—and the advantages and disadvantages
22. Richard A. Epstein, Life in No Trump: Property and Speech Under the Constitution,
53 MAINE L. REV. 23, 26–27 (2001).
23. See id.
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that are suffered by ‘Y’.”24 In short, it is impossible to evaluate either
party’s claim without reference to the claim of the other. Yet that is
what the simple-protection rule requires: that the injury to one party
should be compensated, without fail, with no consideration of the
injury to the other.
Even aside from problems with the justice of this rule, there is—
even more fatally—another. Could the public—that is, the taxpay-
ers—afford to pay all of the claims that a simple-compensation rule
would generate if such a rule were implemented?
In fact, there were reasons why the attempted per sé compensatory
rule that was adopted in the Lucas case quickly faded into irrele-
vance. In that and later cases, the Supreme Court held that a land-
owner can always recover his loss if a regulation deprives him of
“all” or “practically all” of his land’s economic value.25 In Lucas’s case,
that meant recovery of more than $1.2 million for two small lots;26
for Palazzolo, a claimant in a later case, it would have meant recov-
ery of $3.1 million in “development value” of wetlands.27 It does not
take a sophisticated mind to appreciate that those values, multiplied
by millions upon millions of environmentally restricted shoreline
and wetlands parcels in the United States, is not something that
“government”—state and local taxpayers—can afford to pay. Aware
of this, courts have simply held that true “Lucas” wipe-outs of all
value are exceedingly rare, or that the land that is the subject of the
claim is part of a larger, more valuable parcel.28
An important attempt to implement a simple-compensation rule
was recently tried in the State of Oregon. In 2004, Oregon voters en-
acted a law that came to be known as “Measure 37.” This law required
24. Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property
and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENTARY 727, 749 (2004).
25. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1019 (1992) (compensation is required,
under a per sé test, when a regulation deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses”
of his land and the land is “worthless”); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (Lucas rule applies when
“the landowner is left with a token interest”). Accord, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) (repeating Lucas test). The only exception,
as articulated in the Lucas case, is when the restriction is a “background principle[ ] of the
[s]tate’s law of property and nuisance” in place when the property was acquired. Lucas, 505
at 1029. This would preclude (among other actions) all subsequent legislative enactments.
26. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
27. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
28. For instance, this was the approach taken by the Court in Palazzolo. See Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 630–32.
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that if any state, city, county, or metropolitan government enacted or
enforced any kind of land-use regulation that restricted the use of pri-
vate real property or any interest in it, after the owner of that prop-
erty or any family member acquired it, that government was required
to pay the owner the reduction in the fair market value of the affected
property or forego enforcement.29 “Land use regulations” included
environmental laws, state and local land conservation laws, local
government comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, land division
ordinances, transportation ordinances, rules regulating farming and
forest practices, and any other statute or local ordinance “regulating
the use of land or any interest therein.”30
The impact of this law was immediate. Within two years of enact-
ment 2446 claims had been filed, which would have cost more than
$5.7 billion to reimburse.31 By the time of its effective repeal, more
than 7000 Measure 37 claims for compensation had been filed, with
a total amount exceeding $17 billion.32 One orchard owner filed a
claim for $57 million, based on what his land would be worth if di-
vided into nearly 800 housing units.33 Claims ranged from the subdi-
vision of residential lots, to the development of restricted green space,
to the right to conduct an open-pit mining operation.34
29. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.352(1), (2), (3)E (2005). The relevant portions of the statute
read as follows:
(1) If any public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or enforces
a land use regulation enacted prior to December 2, 2004, that restricts the use
of real private property or any interest therein and has the effect of reducing the
fair market value of the property, or any interest therein, then the owner of the
property shall be paid just compensation.
(2) Just compensation shall be equal to the reduction in the fair market value
of the affected property interest resulting from enactment or enforcement of the
land use regulation. . . .
Excepted were “public nuisances under common law,” restrictions “for the protection of public
health and safety, such as fire and building codes, health and sanitation regulations, solid or haz-
ardous waste regulations, and pollution control regulations,” and restrictions prohibiting the
“selling [of] pornography or [the] perform[ance of] nude dancing.” Id. §§ 197.352 (3)(A), (B), (D).
30. See id. § 197.352 (11)(B).
31. See Ben Arnoldy, Topping 2006 Ballots: Eminent Domain, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(Boston) Oct. 5, 2006, at 1.
32. See OREGON DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BALLOT MEA-
SURES 37 (2004) AND 49 (2007): OUTCOMES AND EFFECTS (2011), at 3, 5.
33. Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2005, at A1.
34. See Jeff Barnard, Growing Number of Counties Approving Property Rights Claims,
ALBANY DEMOCRAT-HERALD, Feb. 11, 2005, at A6.
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Faced with claims that they never could pay, counties and local gov-
ernments simply waived the challenged regulations.35 As restrictions
were waived, neighbor was pitted against neighbor as landowners
who relied on restrictions to create value for their property now saw
those restrictions crumbling.36
Public outrage at these results led to the enactment of “Measure
49” three years later, also by popular referendum. This new law,
passed overwhelmingly by voters, effectively reinstated prior land-
use laws and cut far back on rights to compensation.37
The lesson here is that the interconnectedness of property rights
and property interests means that an owner’s actions cannot be
viewed in isolation. Actions by one property owner will affect the
rights and interests of others, and no legal scheme can ignore that re-
ality. A simple-compensation-rule approach to constitutional or stat-
utory guarantees might seem appealing as an abstract idea, but it
will fail as a matter of practical implementation. Neither unvarying
waiver of “offending” rules nor unvarying payment to claimants is a
viable alternative. A rigid rule that compensation will be paid when-
ever pre-existing rights are changed ignores too much to be workable.
C. The Foundational Problem of Allocation
Recognition of the frequently reciprocal nature of property interests
and rights—such as those in land—is, in truth, only one manifestation
of a deeper and more ubiquitous problem. Property rights in physical,
finite, nonsharable resources are different from all other funda-
mental (constitutional) rights. This is because—unlike other rights—
property rights of this kind are necessarily allocated by government.
35. See William Yardley, Anger Drives Property Rights Measures: Support Is Strong for
Measures Limiting Governments’ Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at 34 (“‘Not a penny’ has
been paid to property owners . . . . Local governments, lacking money to pay, have simply
waived the zoning rules.”). In only one claim out of the 7000 filed was compensation paid to
the takings claimant. In all other cases, governments waived the regulation. See Bethany R.
Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the Oregon Experiment, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 2384 (2009).
36. See Harden, supra note 33; Barnard, supra note 34; Douglas Larson, Measure 37 Puts
Newberry Crater at Risk, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Ore.), Sept. 11, 2006, at A11.
37. See Todd Murphy, Oregon Voters Overwhelmingly Back Measure 49, PORTLAND TRIB.,
Nov. 6, 2007; OREGON DEPT. OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 32. For the
text of Measure 49, see http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/oars_600/oar_660/660_041.html.
2016] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 121
Consider, for instance, familiar constitutional rights such as free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion, due process of law, and others. The
enjoyment of these rights by one person does not affect their enjoy-
ment by others, except in very extreme cases. Although it is possible
(at the margins) that my exercise of free speech might shout you
down, there is nothing about the intrinsic nature of this right that
mandates its allocation (by government) to only one person. By con-
trast, if we recognize and protect my claim to property rights in land,
chattels, or other physical, finite, and nonsharable goods, we must
deny your claim to the same. In other words, property is a zero-sum
game. The granting of property rights to one person necessarily and
inevitably precludes the granting of the same right to others.
When one deals with a governmentally enforced allocation scheme
of this type, a simple statement that “rights are rights” or “once a
right, always a right” is not enough to answer the allocation ques-
tion. We do not often think about this aspect of property and its
rights, although it lurks behind all decisions by government. One
need only think of current desperate struggles over water in the
American West or over the patenting of human genes, to immedi-
ately grasp the nature of the problem. The fact that prior allocative
decisions about property rights in water or biological materials might
have been made does not necessarily foreclose questions about cur-
rent, critical impacts on others. We—as a society—must be aware
of allocative issues and must be free to re-evaluate previous alloca-
tions in the light of urgent conditions. In short, although there is an
ostensible “certainty” about property rights, their allocation is nec-
essarily and fundamentally contingent.
II. IF NOT A SIMPLE RULE, THEN WHAT?
Professor Singer’s work, which we honor today, has been both
incisive and eloquent in pointing out the deeper nature of property
and its rights. In particular, what we see as desirable and acceptable
property rights is profoundly contextual. Under what circumstances
are development projects environmentally damaging? Under what
circumstances are investment expectations reasonable? It is extraor-
dinarily difficult to answer such questions with any blanket rule or
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absolute guarantee. As Professor Singer has observed in this sympo-
sium, such decisions—by their nature—must be “essentially ad hoc.”38
If that is indeed the case, then an important question confronts
us. If there can be no broad and implemented guarantee in this area,
does the constitutional protection of property have any meaning?
We have a situation in which the constitutional protection of
property is unavoidably complex, contingent, and often denied—far
more so than is true of other enumerated rights. If the protection of
property is always going to be a case-by-case determination in which
we must determine the values that we have and how conflicting
rights and interests reflect those values, then does the “special pro-
tection” for property matter? Is the constitutional protection of prop-
erty anything more than a textual relic with no practical meaning?
The constitutional protection of property is certainly not necessary
for the existence and stability of a private property regime. Indeed,
private property flourishes in many nations—such as England,
Canada, New Zealand, India, and others—with no supermajoritar-
ian or constitutional guarantee. I have previously written:
The constitutionalization of property rights is certainly not nec-
essary to entrench ideas of the sanctity of property rights or the
division between public and private spheres. . . . These ideas are
rooted in the fundamental tension between individual security
and collective control, a tension which runs far deeper than the
constitutionalization question.39
The conviction that government should forbear from the change
of existing property rights is a ubiquitous assumption in our culture,
as it is in others. Property rights, as we have already acknowledged,
are of unparalleled importance to individuals in the conduct of their
lives. The fact that property rights in physical, finite, nonsharable
resources are, in fact, a complicated and zero-sum game does not
change their importance to the contestants involved.
In our society, and others like it, the importance of individual
property is reflected in legal guarantees. These legal guarantees
38. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Should We Call Ahead? Property, Democracy, & the
Rule of Law, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONF. J. 1, 7 (2016).
39. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 160.
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might in fact be more necessarily contingent than their simple state-
ment indicates, but this does not mean that those guarantees have
no meaning.
The meaning of property in American culture is more than what
a court might decree it to be in a particular case. It is a societal
attitude—a societal presumption, if you will—that property is im-
portant to the individuals who hold it.
The constitutional protection of property has a unique place in
American law and a very real function. The constitutional protection
of property—with its legal, emotional, and rhetorical power—means
that the protection of property is something that we value and that
must be seriously considered in every case. It means that claims of
property protection will receive an extra layer of review, whether by
direct “democratic” actors—such as legislatures and town halls—or
by democratically anointed actors, such as administrators and courts.
It means that in particular cases, and under particular circumstances,
such claims will be honored even when there are serious interests
asserted by others. However, it does not mean, and cannot mean, that
this most contested, intertwined, and important of all rights is—
upon someone’s claim—automatically exempt from the broader soci-
etal interests and values that form our social fabric. It does not mean,
and cannot mean, that the claim of a historical right will necessarily
trump the property claims of the rest of us.

THE STRANGE CAREER OF PRIVATE TAKINGS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE USE
JAN G. LAITOS*
Throughout the Intermountain West, an interesting and disconcert-
ing trend is occurring in resort communities that are also world-class
skiing meccas, such as Breckenridge, Aspen, Telluride in Colorado
or Summit County in Utah. Wealthy second-home buyers, dubbed
“amenity migrants,” have driven up prices so much in these com-
munities that virtually no one else can afford to either buy or rent
homes there. Those who actually work in these resort communities—
the police, firefighters, cooks, ski-lift operators, waitstaff and house-
keepers—cannot afford to live there and instead must commute from
more affordable locations, often hours away.1
In order to provide close-in housing for those who actually work
in these communities, many of the resort areas have contemplated
ways of providing affordable “workforce housing.” Some local govern-
ments have adopted inclusionary housing ordinances, which require
developers to make affordable a certain portion of new development.
Other local governments have town or city housing authorities build
their own affordable housing.2 But would it be possible for state leg-
islatures in states experiencing the amenity migrant phenomenon
to instead delegate to a private housing developer the power to ex-
ercise eminent domain? Would a private developer constitutionally
be able to condemn private land for the purpose of building private
workforce housing? Would not such a delegation to a private party
be contrary to the essential law of eminent domain, which seems
to require that (1) only the sovereign—only a government—exercise
that power,3 and (2) private property may not be taken from one
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Professor of Law and John A. Carver, Jr.
Chair in Natural Resources and Environmental Law.
1. Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Problem of Amenity Migrants in North America
and Europe, 45 URB. LAW. 849 (2013).
2. Jonathan Thompson, When Living Where You Work Is out of Reach, THE DENVER POST
(May 23, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/perspective/ci_28170119.
3. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in relevant part, “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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private party for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party?4
With respect to the first question, state constitutions and legislative
enactments in the Intermountain West have traditionally granted
authority to private parties to exercise the power of eminent domain.
This broad power has been delegated either to promote private de-
velopment and use of coal, oil, gas, timber, water, and other natural
resources5 or to acquire land so private entities, as “common carriers,”
could build private pipelines, transmission lines, or railroads.6 With
respect to the second question, the United States Supreme Court has
decided in several cases that if eminent domain has been exercised
to take private property for the public purpose of private economic
development, then the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment is satisfied.7 The transfer of property from one private party to
another is constitutionally acceptable—even if the property will not
be put into use by the public—if the transfer is for a “public purpose,”
such as promoting a community’s economy.8
When a state or local government initiates eminent domain to
take from A to give to B in order to support an area’s economic growth,
the public is implicated in this transaction because a government
body is behind the condemnation.9 But when a private natural re-
sources company, or a private common carrier, has the power to take
Although this Takings Clause is written in the passive voice, it is generally understood that
it was added to the Bill of Rights to impose a federal constitutional limit on the new federal
government’s exercise of eminent domain.
4. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
5. Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Govern-
ment: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HISTORY 232, 244–45 (1973); Alexandra B.
Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 651 (2008). Several states in the
West have constitutions that permit private takings for private use in order to ensure that
private parcels surrounded by other land are not landlocked and to allow diversion canals and
ditches to be constructed across private land to perfect a water appropriation. See, e.g., COLO.
CONST., Art. II, § 14.
6. 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.05[3][a] (3d ed. 2007).
7. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
8. Id. at 479, 484.
9. Robert Dreher & John Echeverria, Kelo’s Unanswered Questions: The Policy Debate
over the Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y
INST. REPORT (2006), http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current_research/documents/GELPIReport
_Kelo.pdf; Klass, supra note 5, at 653.
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property from a private party in order to secure a private economic
gain, then the exercise of eminent domain power has become a “pri-
vate taking of private property for private use.” What follows below
is a discussion and critique of this little-known, but commonly ac-
cepted, class of private taking.
Part I summarizes the two private entities that traditionally have
been conferred the power to take private property for their own pri-
vate use: (1) natural resource developers and (2) common carriers
involved in, and responsible for, our country’s transportation, storage,
and distribution (TS&D) system for energy infrastructure—pipelines,
electrical transmission lines, and rail lines. Part II considers the tra-
ditional rationale for those private takings, which typically relies on
some version of the notion that the public at large may, or will, even-
tually benefit from this private exercise of eminent domain. Part III
explores the four central problems associated with these kinds of
private takings: (1) the potential for inefficiencies and abuses when
state laws distrust normal private market allocations of resources
and instead rely on private party condemnation decisions to create
a public benefit; (2) the typical absence of meaningful judicial review;
(3) the failure to take into account countervailing interests when au-
thorizing private parties to determine the best use of another’s pri-
vate property; and (4) the inability of traditional calculations of “just
compensation” to truly compensate a private party whose property
has been taken by another private party. Part IV offers suggestions
on how to reform this particular class of private takings.
I. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTABLE PRIVATE TAKINGS
In two settings, the significant power of eminent domain is used
as a tool by private industry to promote private interests by taking
land and property from other private parties—(1) when state consti-
tutions and statutes give condemnation power to private natural
resource developers, and (2) when statutes grant condemnation au-
thority to so-called “common carriers,” such as private power compa-
nies, pipelines, or railroads. In the former case, the private taking
may at best produce a public use by contributing to the growth of the
larger community economy. In the latter case, for common carriers
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such as power utilities or railroads, the eventual transmission line
or railroad freight car will eventually be for “use by the public,” and
should in theory provide services to the entire community. Also,
common carriers are often subject to rate regulation by a public
utility commission.10
Historically, it was quite common for states in the Intermountain
West to have both state constitutions and statutory enactments that
gave broad authority to private developers of natural resources to
exercise the power of eminent domain to promote use of coal, oil, gas,
hard rock mining, timber, and water. These provisions permitted pri-
vate resource companies to file condemnation actions in state court
to take existing private property in order to extract valuable mineral
wealth; to produce energy from coal, oil, or gas; to engage in timber
harvesting; and to build irrigation ditches to appropriate water. Some
western states, such as Wyoming, grounded the right to condemn in
the state constitution, in which case the private condemnor was not
even required to show “public interest or necessity” when there was
a private condemnation.11 This extraordinary use of the eminent do-
main power for immediate private use was justified as a way for
these states to develop their economies, which were, in the West,
built largely on natural resources.12
The other way for private parties to exercise eminent domain is
when a private entity is deemed a common carrier by state law. The
condemnation rights of certain common carriers, such as petroleum
pipeline companies, may be even greater than those of the gas and
electric utilities, which are subject to regulation by the Public Service
Commission.13 To become a common carrier, a private company must
show that it will deploy the eminent domain power and then use the
10. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1884 (2007).
11. ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION 67 (1993);
Matt Micheli & Mike Smith, The More Things Change, the More Things Stay the Same: A Practi-
tioner’s Guide to Recent Changes to Wyoming’s Eminent Domain Act, 8 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2008).
12. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE GOV-
ERNANCE 583 (West 2007); Klass, supra note 5, at 661.
13. Julie A. Beberman, Exercise of Power of Eminent Domain for Special Purposes: Provide
Restrictions on Use of Eminent Domain Power by Petroleum Pipeline Companies, 12 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 184, 186 (1995).
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“taken” private land for a public use or public purpose.14 In many
states, common carrier status is conferred on pipeline companies,
transmission lines, and railroads if the condemnation serves the
“public interest and necessity.”15 States vary with respect to whether
the common carrier seeking to condemn has the burden of dem-
onstrating need and public use16 or whether it is legislatively pre-
sumed that the exercise of eminent domain automatically serves the
public interest.17
Pipelines are a particularly common and powerful type of common
carrier that exercise eminent domain. This eminent domain power
permits the private pipeline company to condemn land, rights-of-way,
easements, and virtually any property from private parties.18 Natural
gas companies may also obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity under the federal Natural Gas Act and thereby acquire pri-
vate rights of eminent domain pursuant to that federal certificate.19
II. HOW CAN A PRIVATE TAKING BECOME A “PUBLIC USE”?
The text of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion seems to declare that governments, particularly the federal
14. Cyrus Zarraby, Regulating Carbon Capture and Sequestration: A Federal Regulatory
Regime to Promote the Construction of a National Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Network, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 950, 967 (2012); Holly Bannerman, Fracking, Eminent Domain, and the Need
for Legal Reform in North Carolina: The Gap Left by the Clean Energy and Economic Security
Act, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 35, 55 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 118 P. 3d 996, 1014
(Wyo. 2005).
16. Brandon Gerstle, Giving Landowners the Power: A Democratic Approach for Assem-
bling Transmission Corridors, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 535, 544 (2014); Gregory S. Ramirez,
Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC: A Probability of
Future Use by the Public as a Key to Exercising Eminent Domain, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89,
92 (2012).
17. Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 4; John Allen Chalk, Sr. & Sadie Harrison-Fincher,
Eminent Domain Power Granted to Private Pipeline Companies Meets with Greater Resistance
from Property Owners in Urban Rather than Rural Areas, 16 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 17,
18 (2009).
18. Laura A. Hanley, Judicial Battles Between Pipeline Companies and Landowners: It’s
Not Necessarily Who Wins, but by How Much, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 125, 136 (2000); Amanda Niles,
Eminent Domain and Pipeline in Texas: It’s as Easy as 1, 2, 3—Common Carriers, Gas Util-
ities, and Gas Corporations, 16 TEXAS WESLEYAN L. REV. 271, 280–81 (2010).
19. Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by Private
Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural Gas Act and the
Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L. J. 499, 501–07 (2006).
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government, may “take” private property so long as two conditions
are met. First, the taking must be for a public use, and second, just
compensation must be paid to the private property owner for the
property that has been taken.20 Most state constitutions contain a
similar requirement that the taking be for a public use.21 The ques-
tion that arises is how this exacting constitutional standard for a
public use is satisfied when the taking by a private entity seems to
be for a private party, either a private natural resource developer or
a private common carrier.
A. Public Use Satisfied When the Taking Is by a Private Resource
Developer or Energy Company
In the nineteenth century, legislatures in Midwestern and Inter-
mountain West states delegated eminent domain authority to private
resource developers, energy providers, and transportation companies
in order to help these states create their economies.22 Since private
economic development was seen as the primary driver of community
or statewide economic growth, private company use of eminent do-
main power for resource, energy, or transportation development
was thought to bring about a larger public benefit rather than a pri-
vate purpose.23 When these delegations of eminent domain power to
private parties were challenged in court, they were upheld on the
grounds that since the needs of communities were furthered by eco-
nomic growth, private company takings that furthered economic ex-
pansion were for a public goal and therefore a public use.24
Several other rationales have been used to convert what appears
to be private takings of private property for private benefit into pri-
vate takings of private property that work, in effect, as a public use.
20. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I (Bill of Rights), § II: “No private property shall be . . . taken
for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.” Compare COLO. CONST., art. II
(Bill of Rights), § 15: “private property shall not be taken . . . for public or private use, without
just compensation.”
22. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 259–62
(1977); Klass, supra note 5, at 655, 657.
23. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Klass, supra note 5, at 675.
24. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (Idaho 1906); Hand Gold Mining Co. v.
Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877).
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In the case of a power line constructed to serve a private company,
the private power company’s exercise of eminent domain has been
justified as a public use because other members of the public would
have the same right to use the new line as the private company.25
Some state legislatures have permitted private entities to exercise
eminent domain authority for either the “public use” or the much
broader “public benefit.”26 Private takings which result in some gen-
eral benefit or advantage to the public then may satisfy the public
use requirement. But the most important development involving pub-
lic use has been the gradual judicial acceptance of the broad defini-
tion of the phrase that encompasses public advantage, public utility,
or general (and often amorphous) “public purpose.” The United States
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London27 sig-
naled that the Fifth Amendment’s public use requirement was largely
coterminous with public purpose even when eminent domain ulti-
mately benefits private entities.28
B. Public Use Satisfied When Private Condemnor Is a
Common Carrier
It has long been assumed that the nation’s important TS&D system
for energy infrastructure—pipelines, power lines, and railroad lines—
would require private energy service providers to exercise eminent
domain. Indeed, as hydrofracturing increases domestic oil and gas
supplies and makes the United States more energy independent,
demand is growing for transportation, storage, and distribution sys-
tems; pipelines, power lines, and rail lines are needed to move, store,
and deliver both clean energy fuel (e.g., oil and gas) and electricity
from even cleaner energy sources (e.g., from wind, solar, and hydro).29
25. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1989); Montana Power Co. v. Bokma,
457 P.2d 769 (Mont. 1969).
26. See Bannerman, supra note 14, at 54–56.
27. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
28. See, e.g., id. at 479–80; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
29. Rob Garver, Review Finds US Energy Infrastructure in Desperate Shape, FISCAL TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/review-finds-us-energy-infrastruc
ture-in-desperate-shape/ar-AAbsrsE; Jeremy Miller, Trains Carrying Oil Raise Tough Questions
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The private companies that typically provide these TS&D services,
especially for energy infrastructure, are often conferred special sta-
tus by state law—the status of being a common carrier.
When a private entity is designated as a common carrier, it may
enter on and condemn the land, rights-of-way, easements and property
of private parties.30 A private company, such as a pipeline company
or a company that owns a power line, may become a common carrier
if it qualifies under various conditions set forth in state law.31 Often,
state law establishes that the private common carrier is authorized
to condemn property but only if the condemnation either serves “the
public interest and necessity”32 or if the taking is for a public use.33
In states where common carriers can exercise eminent domain
when the condemnation serves the public interest and necessity,
the private condemnor need only show a reasonable necessity for the
project, which often means “reasonably convenient or useful to the
public.”34 In other states, the common carrier’s decision that a public
need exists is conclusive and not subject to review.35 More commonly,
statutes across America granting condemnation power to common
carriers presume that the project that is the reason for the exercise
of eminent domain will be destined for eventual use by the public,
thereby satisfying the public use requirement.36 Or, states may con-
vey eminent domain authority to private common carriers by simply
statutorily defining pipelines, transmission lines, and rail lines as
a public use under state law.37 In all of these states, public use does
in Northwest, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2014, at 5, available at http://www.hcn.org/is
sues/46.20/trains-carrying-oil-raise-tough-questions-in-pacific-northwest.
30. Hanley, supra note 18, at 134–36; TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019 (granting
common carriers the right of eminent domain).
31. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002 (“a person is a common carrier if it . . .
owns or manages a pipeline for the transportation of crude petroleum”).
32. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801-815.
33. Daniel B. Benbow, Public Use as a Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain in
Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (1966).
34. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cnty. v. Atter, 734 P. 2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1987).
35. Saunders v. Titus Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.
App. 1993); but see Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 363 S.W.3d 192
(Tex. 2012) (merely registering as a common carrier does not bar property owners contesting
in court whether a planned exercise of eminent domain meets statutory requirements for a
common carrier).
36. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Klass, supra note 5, at 659.
37. Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastruc-
ture Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 983 (2015).
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not mean that the public must have the right to actually use the
property that is taken.38
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVATE TAKINGS
The legitimacy of private takings was threatened in the wake of
the Kelo case, when nearly half of the states adopted statutory or
constitutional restrictions on the use of eminent domain to transfer
land to private developers.39 Although much of this post-Kelo legisla-
tion was “largely symbolic in nature,”40 what was perhaps most no-
table about this flurry of legislation is that it did not put restrictions
on the private exercise of eminent domain authority for private proj-
ects associated with electric transmission lines, oil and gas pipelines,
and the development of natural resources.41 Nor did any of this post-
Kelo legislation alter the states’ tradition of giving eminent domain
power to private entities deemed to be common carriers.42 The power
of private entities to exercise the power of eminent domain for pri-
vate ends is still largely intact. What problems arise when eminent
domain is used by private parties to reallocate private property?
A. Inefficiencies and the Potential for Abuse
A truly private taking—when a private party “takes” the private
property of another for some private use that theoretically has some
public purpose—is an acknowledgment by the state that is authoriz-
ing the taking that the private party vested with eminent domain au-
thority is better able than the original owner to decide the use of the
land being taken. The state has in effect preferred A’s use of the land
(where A is granted eminent domain) over B’s use, where B is the
owner of the land being taken by A. The state’s distrust of the private
market as an allocative mechanism may be warranted when there
38. Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So.3d 192, 198–99 (La. 2010).
39. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 579 (18th ed. Founda-
tion Press 2013).
40. Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative
and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 708 (2011).
41. Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1094 (2013);
Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 4–5.
42. Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 37, at 983–84.
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is market failure or private holdouts preventing coherent, benign
development patterns.43 On the other hand, expropriating property
from “unoffending” private owners and transferring their land to
more “favored” developers (i.e., those authorized to exercise eminent
domain) has been likened by some commentators as a form of “reverse
Robin Hoodery.”44
Indeed, in many ways a private taking has all the characteristics
of a classic lose-lose situation. From the perspective of A, the private
party conferred the power of eminent domain, the projected public
benefits may be speculative and subject to unfounded exaggeration
compared to the magnitude of purely private benefits enjoyed by A.45
From the perspective of B, the private party whose land is taken,
there follows a loss of individual autonomy that results when there
is unwilling property dispossession.46 And there is always the risk
that those dispossessed by eminent domain will be unfairly under-
compensated for their loss.
If state agencies overseeing the private takings are deferential,
and if there is little effective judicial review, then the rationale for
private takings—to achieve some larger public purpose—may be se-
riously undermined.47 It is difficult to determine whether a transfer
from A to B is more private than public.48 Nor does a public purpose
test give guidance on how much “public” is necessary for a purely
private transfer of private property to become a public use. Moreover,
state laws authorizing private takings do not necessarily require a
plan as a precondition to A taking B’s property; nor do these laws
usually explicitly require of A, or impose an obligation on A, to ac-
complish some specific social welfare goal.49 As a result, a private
43. George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight Got to Do with It?,
17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803, 805 (2008).
44. Gideon Kanner, We Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning—Sorry About That,
Justice Stevens, 39 URB. LAW. 529, 531 (2007).
45. Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and
Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 183 (2009).
46. Jeffrey Kleeger, Kelo’s Influence on Keystone Pipeline Asks “Where’s the Public Purpose?”,
44 URB. LAW. 719, 720 (2012).
47. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005) (private economic development
is a public use because it should, or may, bring about the legitimate public purpose of eco-
nomic growth).
48. Lefcoe, supra note 43, at 851.
49. Kleeger, supra note 46, at 721–23.
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taking not only legitimizes private expropriation of private property,
it also may cloak ulterior motives such as rent-seeking.50
B. The Absence of Meaningful Judicial Review
When state legislatures and constitutions delegate eminent domain
authority to private natural resource development interests, or pri-
vate energy TS&D entities, the operating premise for this extraordi-
nary grant of condemnation power is that the private party granted
the power will exercise it for a public use. If an owner’s property was
being taken by another private party pursuant to these state laws,
the challenge was usually based on the claim that the property taken
would not in fact be for a public use but rather for a private gain. How-
ever, reviewing courts rarely disturbed the private taking on those
grounds. These courts developed several theories that permitted them
to defer to the private taking and to conclude that the taking was
indeed for a public use.
For transmission lines and pipelines, where after the eminent
domain power had been exercised property ownership would reside
in a private party, courts still could find a public use if the public had
the ability to use the private electrical lines or gas/oil that flowed in
the private pipeline.51 Many state courts broadened the “public use”
definition to require only that the taking yield some public benefit or
advantage, a view which equated public use with “public interest” or
even “public purpose.”52 The United States Supreme Court eventually
adopted a construction of public use that defined the phrase as fur-
thering public advantage or public utility.53 The Kelo case rejected
an interpretation of public use that meant the property would ac-
tually be used by the public.54 Kelo held that public use was cotermi-
nous with public purpose, where courts should defer to legislative
determinations as to what constituted a public purpose.55
50. Kelly, supra note 45, at 176.
51. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 318–19 (Colo. 1989); Montana Power Co. v.
Bokma, 457 P.2d 769, 772–73 (Mont. 1969).
52. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 196 (2002).
53. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
54. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005).
55. Id. at 488–89; City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1132–33 (Ohio 2006).
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Lack of meaningful judicial review means that states are defaulting
to those private parties that have been delegated the eminent do-
main power. One court found that a pipeline company’s decision that
a public need existed is conclusive and not subject to review.56 A state
legislator concluded that a petroleum pipeline company enjoyed an
“unfettered” power of eminent domain.57 When private parties not
only have eminent domain power but the ability to wield this power
without a meaningful judicial check, the potential exists for private
takings to have far more private than public benefit.
When statutes confer common carrier status on private parties,
courts are even more deferential when it comes to these parties exer-
cising eminent domain. Challenges based on a taking being for an
unconstitutional “private” use are typically rejected when a common
carrier is doing the taking.58 Commentators have concluded that the
standard for courts to overturn a company’s designation as a common
carrier exercising eminent domain is “almost insurmountable and
essentially unreviewable.”59 A similar, largely unreviewable situation
arises when a gas utility or gas pipeline exercises eminent domain
in states whose legislatures grant the power of condemnation to pri-
vate gas TS&D companies.60
C. Failure to Broaden the Limited Scope of Public Use
One persistent issue with private entities deploying eminent
domain is a stubborn insistence on the part of courts to assume that
public use and public purpose may be satisfied only if narrowly defined
economic benefits might result. Courts reviewing private takings have
been content to sustain private exercises of eminent domain as consti-
tutional public uses so long as the public experiences some plausible
56. Saunders v. Titus Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 847 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.
App. 1993).
57. Lawmakers ’95 (GPTV broadcast, Jan. 24, 1995) (remarks by Senator Hooks, Senate
Dist. No. 14, cosponsor of SB 24).
58. Linder v. Ark. Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 362 S.W.3d 889 (Ark. 2010); Smith v.
Ark. Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 377 S.W.3d 199 (Ark. 2010). See also MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 70-30-103; 69-13-104.
59. Niles, supra note 18, at 292.
60. Thatcher v. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co., 180 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1950); Valero
Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 990 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. App. 1999); id. at 284–85.
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traditional economic gain. Courts will rarely, if ever, consider whether
any countervailing non-traditional economic benefits, or the achieve-
ment of non-economic values, might be a better “use” of the power
of eminent domain.61
Prior to the Kelo case, the United States Supreme Court had de-
cided only two public use cases in the previous forty years—Berman
v. Parker (1954)62 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984).63
Berman upheld as a public use the taking of private property for the
purpose of redeveloping blighted urban neighborhoods, and Midkiff
sustained the use of eminent domain to solve the problem of concen-
trated land ownership. Both cases rejected the argument that private
property taken outright by eminent domain is a private purpose when
the property is transferred to private beneficiaries. Rather, since
urban blight (Berman) and land oligopoly (Midkiff ) were economic
problems involving land ownership in the land market, it would be
a legitimate public use for eminent domain to be exercised to solve
these economic problems.
The Kelo case built upon the Berman-Midkiff rule by declaring that
“[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted
function of government.”64 Indeed, Kelo explicitly recognized that
economic development takings were a traditional and acceptable
public use, as were private takings related to natural resources and
energy development.65 But Kelo did not discuss or consider whether
there might be other economic drivers besides the extraction of nat-
ural resources, the development of energy resources, or the removal
of urban blight and excessive concentrated land ownership.
By the twenty-first century, land development other than natural
resources and mineral development, and land uses quite different
than urban renewal and the construction of shopping malls, are in-
creasingly important to the economies of states and local communities.
Particularly in the Intermountain West, recreation, tourism, hunting,
61. Klass, supra note 5, at 666.
62. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
63. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
64. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
65. Id. (Kelo acknowledged the “importance of [natural resources] industries to the [economic
welfare of the states] . . . .”).
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and fishing have become the foundations for the economy.66 In these
states, the best public use of private property targeted for a private
taking might not be for natural resource extraction or for urban re-
newal but instead for uses involving recreation or tourism.67 How-
ever, these more modern uses of natural resources have historically
not yet been granted “public use” designation by legislatures or courts.
A public use typically requires there to be a traditional land transfer
from one private party to another private party who will mine or re-
configure the land for standard economic growth purposes.68
The public use designation required for acceptable private takings
is almost always locked into some type of economic use or benefit. In
other words, acceptable public uses have entailed that the private
condemnor not only “take” the private property of another but also
use that property somehow for some economic purpose enjoyed by the
public. However, there is another value inherent in land and prop-
erty that should be able to compete with private land transfers that
only entail use. And that is the value that follows when land and
property are preserved and not used. Eminent domain use should be
able to be exercised by private parties where the end use is, in fact,
no use. Open space, wilderness, and land trusts for preservationist
non-use purposes should be considered as a countervailing, equally
valuable public use.69
D. An Unjust Measure of Just Compensation
When private takings occur, it is generally a formidable uphill
battle for the party whose property is being taken to argue that the
private party doing the taking will violate the constitutional public
use requirement. As noted above, most state courts have concluded
that natural resource-related takings benefit the public, and state
66. See generally THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N. BARRETT, POST-COWBOY ECO-
NOMICS: PAY AND PROSPERITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN WEST (2001).
67. Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural Resources, 34 ENVTL.
L. 1091 (2004); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 140 (1999).
68. Klass, supra note 5, at 677–80.
69. Jan G. Laitos & Catherine M. H. Keske, The Right of Nonuse, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
303 (2010); see generally JAN G. LAITOS, THE RIGHT OF NONUSE (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
2016] THE STRANGE CAREER 139
statutes and constitutions often expressly provide that private TS&D
entities exercising eminent domain for energy infrastructure are a
per se public use. The only remaining argument then is that the land-
owner may not be receiving a fair measure of constitutionally re-
quired “just compensation.”
Although the definition of just compensation varies between
states,70 most courts generally rely on the property’s “fair market
value” to determine the actual calculation of what is just.71 This fair
market value standard is intended to replicate the price that would
otherwise be reached in a normal arm’s-length market transaction
between a willing, but unobligated, buyer and seller.72 Two common
considerations, or formulae, are used when deriving fair market value
in condemnation situations. “Highest and best use” not only considers
the property’s value in its present use but also its value in a reason-
ably probable use that results in the highest economic value.73 The
“before and after” test is used when the condemning party, such as
a TS&D energy company building a pipeline, takes only a portion of
the landowner’s parcel. This test ascertains the difference between
the fair market value of the entire parcel and the fair market value
of what remains after the condemnation.74
Increasingly, scholars and commentators have criticized these
taking valuations, especially when the taking is a private taking.75
The concern is that the standard just compensation model tends to
undercompensate landowners.76 There are several reasons why the
use of fair market value results in an undue share of condemnation
costs borne by the landowner whose property is being taken by an-
other private party. Perhaps the most important failure of the fair
70. JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS, Ch. 17 (Aspen 2014).
71. Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation”, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 693, 696 (1969).
72. Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Group, Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 3876 (2d Cir. 2006).
73. Baston v. Cnty. of Kenton ex rel Kenton Cnty. Airport Bd., 319 S.W.3d 401, 406
(Ky. 2010).
74. Hanley, supra note 18, at 160.
75. Kelianne Chamberlain, Unjust Compensation: Allowing a Revenue-Based Approach
to Pipeline Takings, 14 WYO. L. REV. 77, 87–90 (2014); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight:
Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 767 (1973).
76. Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent
Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1479–80 (2008).
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market value test is that it denies compensation for what has been
termed “real but subjective values.”77 One must remember that the
owner of property in a private taking has not voluntarily chosen to
sell it to the private party taking it. It follows then that the land-
owner values the land at a price higher than its fair market value,
because otherwise the owner would have accepted this market price
and sold the land.78
There are two other reasons why the standard just compensation
model tends to undercompensate landowners experiencing a private
taking. First, most states do not permit the value of the project for
which the property is being taken (e.g., a pipeline, or transmission
line) to affect the fair market value of the property.79 If the land after
the private taking will enhance the value, that positive change in
value cannot be included in the just compensation calculation.80 Sec-
ond, fair market value usually fails to consider what have been termed
“dignitary harms,” which is the perception of being unfairly targeted
for condemnation.81 Such resentment can be very real, especially if,
as noted in Part III.A above, the private taking becomes a form of
“reverse Robin Hoodery” where politically powerful private parties
can condemn private land regardless of the landowner’s wishes.82
IV. AN AGENDA FOR REFORMING PRIVATE TAKINGS
In light of the many issues and problems that have arisen due
to private takings of private property, it would seem that states
should consider how they might change the laws that presently allow
77. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
183 (1985); Yun-Chien Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings
Compensation Is Efficient?, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 36–37 (2012).
78. THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE PROPERTY,
PUBLIC USE 153 (2011), Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 94–95; Gerstle, supra note 16, at 541
(“the just compensation model tends to undercompensate landowners because it ignores indi-
viduals’ anthropocentric valuation”).
79. State Dept. of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1003 (Colo. 1994).
80. Matthew C. Williams, Restitution, Eminent Domain, and Economic Development:
Moving to a Gains-Based Conception of the Takings Clause, 41 URB. LAW. 183, 190 (2009).
81. Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 95.
82. See Kanner, supra note 44; Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain
and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Iden-
tity, 5 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 13, 721–22 (2008).
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a private party to condemn private land for private gain. Any such
“reform” legislation should track the deficiencies in current “economic
development takings law” that have been summarized in Part III
above. Three structural changes seem necessary: (1) improved proce-
dures to govern interactions between the private party exercising
eminent domain and the party whose land is being taken; (2) meaning-
ful judicial review; and (3) adequate and realistic just compensation.
A. Procedural Reforms
New and more informative protocols should be established between
condemning parties and landowners. Initially, companies and entities
should notify landowners of their rights prior to initiating the eminent
domain process.83 This type of provision could protect landowners who
may not have any knowledge of their legal rights prior to or during
the condemnation process.84 These legal rights derive from both con-
stitutional and statutory law.
Next, the condemnor should be expected to make reasonable efforts
to acquire the property by purchasing it after good faith negotiation.
This negotiation should entail at least one bona fide offer by the con-
demning authority. A bona fide offer requirement shifts some of the
power away from the condemning authority and towards the land-
owner.85 Some states, like Texas, require the condemnor to make at
least two separate offers before resorting to eminent domain.86
But the most important procedural change would be some consti-
tutional or statutory obligation to create an administrative record
that allows for meaningful judicial review of whether the private tak-
ing is really for a public use. This “record” should entail a written ac-
count of a process—a public process—where the merits of the taking
have been considered and perhaps even debated.87 The condemnor
83. Beberman, supra note 13, at 192–94.
84. Malcolm Means, Private Pipeline, Public Use?: Linder v. Arkansas Midstream Gas
Services Corp., Smith v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Services Corp., and Arkansas’s Eminent
Domain Jurisprudence, 64 ARK. L. REV. 809, 835–37 (2011).
85. Micheli & Smith, supra note 11, at 8–9.
86. Compare State v. Dowd, 867 S.W.2d 781 (Texas 1993) (only one offer needed), with
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 21.0113 (b)(1)–(2) (two written offers needed).
87. Klass, supra note 5, at 695.
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should have the burden of making a case to some administrative
body that the private taking will result in a truly public use. The
individual landowners affected, along with other environmental or
public interests, should be afforded the opportunity to argue that
the taking will be for some private benefit. If the relevant adminis-
trative authority concurs that the taking, albeit by a private party,
is for public use, that determination can be the basis for some future
judicial appeal.
The Texas Supreme Court has seemed to acknowledge the need
to affirmatively demonstrate the presence of a public use when there
are private takings by common carriers and other TS&D entities. In
Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas (2012),88
the Court found that “[m]erely registering as a common carrier does
not . . . ban [landowners] from contesting in court whether a planned
pipeline meets the statutory requirements [for a public use]. Noth-
ing . . . leaves landowners so vulnerable to unconstitutional private
takings.”89 The Court thereby rejected the otherwise irrefutable pre-
sumption that simply proclaiming that one is a common carrier is
sufficient to confer the power of eminent domain.90
While the Denbury case is limited to Texas law and common car-
riers there, some of its central holdings have instructive potential
regarding other examples of private takings elsewhere. First, the
private condemnor should have to demonstrate a reasonable proba-
bility that members of the public other than the condemnor (or its
customers) would experience some benefit after the private exercise
of eminent domain.91 Second, there is no presumption that the private
taking will yield a public use; the burden of demonstrating public
use is on the private entity seeking to use eminent domain.92 These
two changes help level the playing field between the private con-
demnor and the landowner.
88. 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
89. Id. at 195.
90. Megan James, Checking the Box Is Not Enough: The Impact of Texas Rice Land Partners,
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC and Texas’s Eminent Domain Reforms on the
Common Carrier Application Process, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 959, 987–89 (2013); John Gray,
The Door Opens to Challenge Some Pipeline Claims of Eminent Domain, 50 HOUSTON LAW.
43 (2012).
91. Ramirez, supra note 16, at 90–92.
92. 362 S.W.3d at 202 (mere fiats by the Legislature do not make a private use a public one).
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B. The Opportunity for Meaningful Judicial Review
As noted above in Part III, the absence of “meaningful” judicial
review is one of the primary reasons private takings have been so
dominated by the private condemnor, whose power to assume own-
ership of private property has seemed limitless. The reason why this
power has been exercised so brutally is because there has been no
effective check on whether the condemnation has been for a truly
public use or whether the condemnation’s end use is preferable to
other competing uses of the land. The former issue goes to the ques-
tion of whether the taking yields a private or public benefit. The lat-
ter issue assumes that some public benefit will ensue but asks
whether the taken land might be put to some better public use.
The most frequently debated and litigated question addresses
whether the private taking of private land will actually result in some
larger public good instead of simply enhancing the economic wealth
of the condemnor.93 Most courts have taken their lead from the United
States Supreme Court and simply assumed that if private economic
development will result from the private taking, this economic end
use satisfies the public use requirement.94 Private economic develop-
ment seems to be an acceptable end use and public purpose if the
private taking also yields land reform,95 economic growth,96 or natu-
ral resources development.97
But meaningful judicial review will not occur until courts have the
ability to review a record that reveals whether competing environ-
mental or preservationist interests might, or should, be preferred to
standard, traditional interests involving economic growth or devel-
opment. As noted above in Part III.C, land uses for recreation, tour-
ism, and even nonuse preservationist purposes are increasingly
becoming more important than shopping malls and gas pipelines to
local communities.98 Courts should be able to hear evidence about,
and to decide, whether private takings for natural resource develop-
ment or TS&D energy systems are as conducive to achieving a public
93. See James and Gray, supra note 90; Denbury, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012).
94. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
97. Klass, supra note 5, at 655–66.
98. See Laitos & Carr, supra note 67; Laitos, supra note 69.
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use as some recreational or nonuse purpose. Even a private taking
that protects natural capital or ecosystem services should be able to
be considered by reviewing courts to be a countervailing acceptable
(and perhaps preferred) public use of private land.99
C. Making Compensation More Just
When there is a private taking, there is little the landowner can
do other than to argue that the taking is for a private use or that the
compensation is unjust. Reviewing courts either presume that a
private energy or natural resources-related taking is a public use
because of the economic benefit accruing to the public or uphold stat-
utory declarations that takings by TS&D common carriers are an
acceptable categorical taking. Therefore, the only real battle to be
waged involves how much the landowner will receive in compensation
for the private taking.
Commentators, and landowners, increasingly argue that current
compensation valuation methodologies for private taking fail to fully
compensate unwilling landowners and are therefore unjust.100 Schol-
ars have suggested various reforms. If fair market value continues
as the standard, then rural landowners should be able to use compa-
rable sales of easements and other property interests to define this
value.101 The idea of fair market value should perhaps also include
the worth of the use to which the private condemnor is planning to
put the property.102 Such a “project influence rule” would permit the
value of the extracted natural resource, or TS&D facility, to influence
the value of the landowner’s property.103
Other commentators have suggested that the value for just com-
pensation, to be just, should attempt to capture the landowner’s sub-
jective values for the land, which otherwise remain private.104 Each
99. See generally DIETER HELM, NATURAL CAPITAL: VALUING THE PLANET (2015); J.B. RUHL,
STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).
100. Douglas Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining “Just Compensation”, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 693, 714 (1969); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993); Lee, supra note 76.
101. Klass, supra note 5, at 683.
102. Williams, supra note 80, at 192.
103.  Most states disallow use of the project influence rule. See State Dept. of Health v. The
Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1003 (Colo. 1994); ALA. CODE § 18-1A-173(a). Micheli & Smith, supra
note 11, at 18–19.
104. Gerstle, supra note 16, at 550.
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landowner whose property is about to be taken by a private party
holds a subjective land valuation for the land, which is unique to that
landowner. To assess this valuation, the just compensation calcula-
tion should consider how the affected landowner may perceive the
property differently than a hypothetical seller. Relevant inquiries
would involve ascertaining the factors that are subjective—duration
of land occupancy, nature of use by that landowner, future plans for
the land by that landowner, method by which the landowner came
to own the property (for example, by inheritance).105
Another model for just compensation largely abandons the fair
market value standard because it tends to undercompensate land-
owners whose property is being condemned against their will106 and
instead embraces a system which better compensates landowners
by (1) permitting them to share in the value their land contributes
to the eventual end use, (2) approximating the benefits of in-kind
redress, and (3) accounting for landowners’ lost opportunities re-
garding their condemned land.107 Two related just compensation cal-
culations that accomplish these three goals are a “revenue-based
approach”108 and a “rental formula.”109
A revenue-based payment for private takings would ensure that
the just compensation valuation would not undervalue the actual
cost of the taking, which tends to subsidize private development and
over-incentivize such takings by private companies.110 Revenue-based
payments also provide more efficient use of land by fixing a price for
the taking of the land that will affect the private demand for the
taking.111 Similarly, a rental formula reflects the fact that most pri-
vate takings for natural resource development or TS&D facilities will
generate a private profit for the private condemnor.112 The measure
of damages should therefore be a measurement of periodic rent. A
105. Nadler & Seidman, supra note 82, at 713.
106. Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political Philosophies
Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 292 (2006).
107. MICELI, supra note 78, at 71; Williams, supra note 80, at 184; id. at 292.
108. Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 77.
109. David A. Domina, Eminent Domain & For-Profit Energy Companies: Avoiding Unrest
with Landowners, THE NEBRASKA LAWYER 19 (Jan/Feb. 2015).
110. Miceli, supra note 78, at 69, 71.
111. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999); Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 99.
112. Domina, supra note 109, at 20.
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rental formula may thereby leave the property owner “subjectively
indifferent to the taking.”113
Consider the case of a private power company’s transmission line,
or a private gas company’s pipeline, that needs to stretch across rural
countryside that is privately owned farmland. Both of these private
parties (two TS&D entities) wish to exercise eminent domain across
private farms for the transmission lines or pipeline. Since the elec-
tricity and gas will surely be perceived as an eventual public use, the
only question for the farmers is the measure of just compensation due
for the private taking. If the private condemnor is taking an easement
across private property, this private taking will interfere with yearly
agricultural use. The appropriate calculation of damages, which is an
alternative measure to fair market value, could be either a revenue-
based compensation114 or a rental calculation.115 Either method seems
more “just” than a simple fair market value calculation.
113. Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
239, 259 (2007).
114. Revenue-based payments approximate the landowners’ lost opportunity costs.
Chamberlain, supra note 75, at 103.
115. Rental payments allow a jury to set, as compensation, annual rent payments for the
use of the property. Domina, supra note 109, at 21.
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INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE—MAPPING THE NEXT FRONTIER
It is a great honor to participate in this conference celebrating
Professor Joseph Singer’s wide-ranging contributions to property
law and policy.1 And it is fitting that the Brigham-Kanner Property
Rights Conference, now in its twelfth year, has chosen to bring intel-
lectual property within its renowned property tent. Although Profes-
sor Singer’s scholarship is firmly rooted in tangible resources, his
focus on the human, cultural, social, and distributive dimensions of
property law provides a springboard for thinking broadly and deeply
about the interplay of intellectual property and social justice.
For a growing portion of our society, and especially younger
generations, life increasingly revolves around intellectual creativity,
entrepreneurship, and the digital domain. General Motors and
other manufacturing companies are no longer the largest and most
significant economic enterprises. Digital Age start-ups, such as Apple,
1. Representative scholarship includes: Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory
Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601 (2015); Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of
Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287 (2014); Joseph William Singer, Property Law Conflicts, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 129 (2014); Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American
Property Law, 1 ALA. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 109 (2011); Joseph William Singer, How Property
Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY (Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver eds., 2009); Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver,
Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Property and Equality in
Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243 (2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE
FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000); Joseph William Singer, No Right to
Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996); Joseph
William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical
and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821 (1990).
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Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix, provide the social and com-
merce platforms of daily life. They dominate the business news. Tesla
is revitalizing the American automobile industry and revolutionizing
automobile transportation. The balance sheets of these companies
are not based on tangible resources but rather intangibles—intellec-
tual property rights, information, and human capital. As President
Obama emphasized in his final State of the Union Address,2 technolog-
ical innovation provides the greatest hope for addressing the most
pressing human challenges—climate change, public health, food and
fresh water supply, and world peace. Social interaction occurs more
and more in cyberspace, a seemingly infinite, borderless “place.” And
a growing proportion of the most salient “property” rights issues that
concern netizens and the U.S. judiciary relate to information re-
sources and digital technology.
The ascendency of intangible resources profoundly affects social
justice—from access to life-saving genetic information to the control
of knowledge dissemination, creative freedom, group identity, and,
increasingly, the distribution of wealth. Even the first-year property
course is shifting increasingly to intangible resources. At law schools
throughout the nation, and especially in California, intellectual prop-
erty has become a de facto core subject. And many more of our grad-
uates find law careers in the realm of intangible resources rather
than land and other tangible resources.
While use of the term “property” to characterize rights in intangible
resources traces back centuries,3 the digital revolution of the past
few decades has elevated intellectual property rights and issues to
a new and more prominent economic, social, and political pedestal.
Policymakers increasingly discuss the importance of reforming edu-
cation to better prepare new generations for the information age and
bridging the digital divide.4 From grade schools to universities,
2. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.white
house.gov/sotu.
3. See generally Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy,
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006).
4. See Richard Pérez-Peña, Facebook Founder to Donate $100 Million to Help Remake
Newark’s Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, at A27; DALE RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE: WHO’S IN
CHARGE OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS? (2015); Lyndsey Layton, How Bill Gates Pulled off the Swift
Common Core Revolution, WASH. POST (June 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/how-bill-gates-pulled-off-the-swift-common-core-revolution/2014/06/07/a830e32e-ec34-11e3-9f5c
-9075d5508f0a_story.html.
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administrators and educators are striving to harness digital technol-
ogy to improve and remake education.5
In expanding its tent to embrace intellectual property, the Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference can look to one of the greatest
graduates of the College of William & Mary for inspiration. Thomas
Jefferson took a deep interest in the contours of intellectual prop-
erty rights and the development of intellectual property institutions
in the early American republic.6 Jefferson had an insatiable appetite
for knowledge, which extended to architecture, civil engineering, ge-
ography, mathematics, ethnology, anthropology, mechanics, and the
sciences.7 He was a successful inventor.8 And among his responsibil-
ities as the nation’s first Secretary of State was the duty to serve—
with the Secretary of the Department of War and the Attorney
General—the nation’s first patent institution (“Commissioners for
the Promotion of Useful Arts”).9 His words still resonate in modern
intellectual property philosophy, policy, and jurisprudence.10
Another great Virginian, George Washington, viewed intellec-
tual property as a vital institution for a great nation. In advocating
enactment of the nation’s first intellectual property laws during
5. See, e.g., Kahn Academy, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 27, 2016, 4:43 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Khan_Academy (describing a free online academy comprising microlectures across a
broad range of subjects).
6. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reeval-
uating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007); Hughes,
supra note 3, at 998–99, 1026–33.
7. See Jefferson’s College Life, WILLIAM & MARY, http://www.wm.edu/about/history/tjcol
lege/tjcollegelife/.
8. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (noting that “Jefferson was himself
an inventor of great note. His unpatented improvements on plows, to mention but one line of
his inventions, won acclaim and recognition on both sides of the Atlantic.”).
9. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Pasquale Joseph (P.J.) Federico, Operation
of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 238 (1936) (characterizing Jefferson as the
moving spirit of the patent board who might well be called “the first administrator of [the U.S.]
patent system”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard: Early Ju-
dicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 103, 107–08 (2005); Steve Mirsky,
Founding Father of Invention, SCI. AM. 104 (Oct. 2000).
10. See Mossoff, supra note 6; Hughes, supra note 3; Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (1966)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334–35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)); see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980).
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the very first State of the Union Address,11 President Washington
presciently declared:
The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures
by all proper means will not, I trust, need recommendation; but I
can not forbear intimating to you the expediency of giving effec-
tual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and useful
inventions from abroad as to the exertions of skill and genius in
producing them at home . . . .
Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me in opinion
that there is nothing which can better deserve your patronage
than the promotion of science and literature. Knowledge is, in
every country, the surest basis of public happiness. In one in
which the measures of government receive their impression so
immediately from the sense of the community as in ours, it is
proportionably essential.12
Adapting intellectual property laws in response to changing techno-
logical, social, and economic conditions remains an ongoing challenge.
It has taken on greater moment as advances in digital technology
have remade so much of modern life.
Professor Singer’s contributions to property law invite broad
thinking about the interplay of intellectual property and social jus-
tice. This Essay offers my own preliminary thoughts on framing this
important scholarly frontier.13 I have realized that much of my earlier
11. See Laura Clark, The First State of the Union Address: Way Shorter, Way Less Clapping,
SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/first-state-union
-address-way-shorter-less-clapping-180953954/ (explaining how President Washington outlined
the nation’s most pressing needs).
12. George Washington, First Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8,
1790), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29431; THORVALD SOLBERG, LIBRARY OF CONG.,
COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789–1904, at 115 (Greenwood Press 1976) (1905).
13. I am certainly not the first to venture into this “critical”—in multiple senses of the
word—terrain. I am fortunate to stand on the shoulders of other scholars. Of particular note,
Professors Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder convened a path-breaking conference at
UC Davis’s King School of Law in 2006. See Rex R. Perschbacher, Welcoming Remarks: Intel-
lectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2007); Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, Foreword: Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (2007). The wide-ranging papers from that conference are
collected in an impressive conference volume. See Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. No. 3 (Mar. 2007). I also note the contributions of Professor Amy Kapczynski
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work touched on these issues.14 Part I constructs a philosophical
framework for thinking about the many crosscurrents between intel-
lectual property and social justice. Part II uses this framework to
explore a range of social justice questions that arise within particu-
lar modes of intellectual property protection. Part III examines the
macro interplay of intellectual property and social justice, focusing on
inequality, gender and racial inclusion, and global justice challenges.
to framing the interplay of IP, political mobilization, and inequality. See Amy Kapczynski, The
Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV.
970 (2012) [hereinafter Kapczynski, The Cost of Price]; Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowl-
edge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008)
[hereinafter Kapczynski, New Politics of IP]. At an institutional level, Professors Lateef
Mtima and Steven Jamar have shone a spotlight on the intersection of intellectual property
and social justice. See Steven D. Jamar & Lateef Mtima, The Centrality of Social Justice for an
Academic Intellectual Property Institute, 64 SMU L. REV. 1127 (2011); see also LATEEF MTIMA
(ED.), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: FROM SWORDS TO
PLOUGHSHARES (2015).
I have also benefitted from the work of and discussions with my colleagues. See, e.g., Chris
Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular
Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606 (2014); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Exclud-
ability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013); David R. Hansen, Kathryn
Hashimoto, Gwen Hinze, Pamela Samuelson & Jennifer M. Urban, Solving the Orphan Works
Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFY-
ING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley,
In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive
Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (2005); William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global
Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581
(2007); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004); ERIC RAKOWKSI, EQUAL
JUSTICE (1991).
14. We each bring our own perspective to the enterprise. I was trained in science, technol-
ogy, economics, and law and have enjoyed a front row seat to the digital revolution. I pursued
a Ph.D. in economics at Stanford University and a J.D. at Harvard Law School just as the
digital revolution was fomenting, which inspired my early work on the economics of legal
protection for computer software. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for
Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987) [hereinafter Menell, Tailoring Software
Protection]. I had the opportunity to work with Professor Paul Goldstein on one coast and
Judge—now Justice—Stephen Breyer on the other. I also had direct exposure to the emerging
microcomputer/software marketplace and the path-breaking network economics scholarship
of Joe Farrell, Michael Katz, Garth Saloner, Carl Shapiro, and Hal Varian. Soon after joining
the UC–Berkeley faculty in 1990, I laid the groundwork for the Berkeley Center for Law &
Technology (BCLT), which launched in 1995. Over the past two decades, my colleagues and
I have conducted a wide range of research, hosted numerous conferences, organized IP edu-
cation programs for the Federal Judicial Center, and worked closely with federal agencies,
much of the time focusing on the digital/information revolution. I have also had extensive ex-
perience advising Congress, government agencies, individuals, and technology and entertain-
ment companies about intellectual property, antitrust, and technology policy issues over the
past nearly three decades.
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I. FRAMING IP/SOCIAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS
At a basic level, it is difficult to doubt President Washington’s
declaration that the promotion of science and literature serves human
and social flourishing. Yet the use of exclusive rights to inventions
and writings introduces significant complications for a free and just
society. Such protections can hinder competition, constrain cumula-
tive innovation, and interfere with free expression. They reinforce
market-based institutions, influence the development of culture,
affect the allocation of resources and distribution of wealth, and
privilege particular individuals and enterprises. Thus, the interplay
of intellectual property and social justice depends on many premises
and factors.
In view of the property basis for this conference, it is useful to start
the inquiry from a tangible property foundation. Yet intellectual re-
sources differ fundamentally from tangible resources in character and
governance principles. The United States grounds patent and copy-
right protection in largely utilitarian purposes, as opposed to natural
rights. Section A explores the carryover of tangible property concepts
to the analysis of intellectual property rights. Building on the utilitar-
ian grounding of intellectual property rights, Section B distinguishes
between two levels of social justice ramifications—those internal to
utilitarian purposes and those external to those purposes.
A. Property and Intellectual Property: Questioning the
Carryover Hypothesis
It is tempting to view intellectual property through a tangible
property lens.15 After all, intellectual property draws on tangible prop-
erty concepts of first in time, exclusivity, and transferability, and
scholars have explored the philosophy of tangible property rules and
institutions for centuries. Yet as a young property law professor whose
principal areas of interest were intangible resources—intellectual
property and environmental protection—I quickly came to see that
15. See Richard Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2010); cf. Molly Van Houweling,
Intellectual Property as Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter eds., forthcoming 2016); MERGES,
supra note 13, at 4–5, 237–69, 289–311.
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Blackstonian conceptions of land and other tangible resources missed
a lot of the most important economic and social concerns. Both the
positive and normative analysis of resource governance depend on
the characteristics of the resources, the characteristics of the com-
munities in which the resources are situated, and the available gov-
ernance institutions.16
Although intellectual property draws upon certain characteristics
from the law relating to real and other tangible “property”—most
notably, the concept of exclusive rights—and many parallels can be
readily identified, the differences between tangible forms of “prop-
erty” and “intellectual property” are profound and numerous. To take
a few prominent examples—whereas the traditional bundle of rights
associated with real and other tangible property involve perpetual
ownership (the classic “fee simple absolute” of real property law)—
two of the most prominent forms of intellectual property, patents and
copyrights, protect rights for limited durations (although in the case
of copyrights, the term is very long). Furthermore, exclusivity in the
field of “intellectual property” is far less inviolate than it is in the
traditional property domains. Intellectual property law comprises a
system of policy levers that legislatures tailor and courts interpret to
promote innovation and protect the integrity of markets.17
Patent protection, copyright protection, and the law of trade
secrets are principally based on the utilitarian goal of promoting in-
novation and creativity. Trade secrecy law also brings in notions of
commercial morality.18 Trademark protection, by contrast, focuses
on safeguarding the integrity of markets.19 It is more of a consumer-
protection regime. But by lowering consumer search costs, it also
serves a commercial purpose and indirectly promotes investment in
creating quality brands.
The very notion of exclusive rights over knowledge and commerce
conflicts with one of America’s founding principles: freedom. The
American Revolution was sparked by the Boston Tea Party, a citizen
16. See Peter S. Menell & John P. Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599
(2002); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998).
17. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1474 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
18. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE ch. 1 (6th ed. 2012).
19. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 17, at 1536–37.
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revolt against government-imposed monopolization of the tea trade.
Yet the founders of the nation recognized the need to provide time-
limited intellectual property to promote technological progress
and expressive creativity. President Abraham Lincoln, an inventor
himself,20 eloquently and concisely captured the power of intellec-
tual property protection: “the patent system . . . added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new
and useful things.”21 The potential for exclusive rights attracts in-
vestors (“the fuel of interest”) and inventors (“the fire of genius”). As
Justice Brennan noted, “[t]he patent laws attempt to reconcile th[e]
Nation’s deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to en-
courage progress.”22
The contingent character of intellectual property protection
contrasts with the default principle of private ordering of most tan-
gible resources. While some tangible resources, such as water and
air, reflect a mix of governance regimes, most land and other tangi-
ble resources fit relatively comfortably within a private-ownership
framework. Standard economic models view comprehensive resource
ownership in conjunction with freedom of contract to be an efficient
and just resource allocation system.23 It bears mentioning, however,
the extensive scholarship identifying limits to this default.24 None-
theless, absolute, exclusive ownership in perpetuity subject to free
transferability is a widely accepted starting point for land and tan-
gible resource analysis.
20. See U.S. Patent No. 6,469 (Buoying Vessels Over Shoals); Owen Edwards, Abraham
Lincoln: The Ingenious Inventor, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Oct. 2006), http://www.smithsonian
mag.com/history/inventive-abe-131184751/.
21. See 3 R. BASLER, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 361 (1953) (President
Lincoln made these remarks in a speech delivered at Jacksonville College on February 11,
1859). This quotation is engraved over the northwest entrance to the U.S. Department of
Commerce at 15th and E Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., which housed the Patent Office for
many years.
22. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10–13 (1973); Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 102 SCI. 1243 (1968).
24. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369 (2013); ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005); Peter S.
Menell, Institutional Fantasylands: From Scientific Management to Free Market Environmen-
talism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (1992); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986);
cf. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2004) (emphasizing property doctrines that diverge from the Blackstonian conception).
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By contrast, intellectual property emerges as a limited exception
to the free competition default. It is justified as bait to attract inven-
tion and creativity, with the recognition that overprotection of infor-
mation resources or removal of knowledge from the public domain
limits dissemination of knowledge and undermines the follow-on
innovation and creativity that is critical to progress.25 Standard eco-
nomic analysis limits the scope and duration of such rights so as to
reduce the deadweight loss of monopoly exploitation26 and to encour-
age cumulative creativity.27 A robust public domain helps to dissem-
inate knowledge and fuel intellectual creativity.28
Intellectual property seeks to balance the motivational pull of
property rights with broad dissemination of knowledge and the cu-
mulative creative push of building on the ideas and expression of
others. The U.S. Supreme Court explained:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private ben-
efit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the cre-
ative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a spe-
cial reward and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
The copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward
to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 [1932], Chief Justice Hughes
spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted
by Congress, “The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”
It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to in-
duce release to the public of the products of his creative ge-
nius. (United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948)).29
25. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 17, at 1476–78.
26. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREAT-
MENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969).
27. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and
the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
28. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
29. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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Thus, tangible property and intellectual property begin from very
different locations on the ownership spectrum. Tangible resources
begin with a capacious default, viewing ownership as discouraging
resource-use conflict and viewing contractual freedom as promoting
efficient development. Intangible resources start with a parsimoni-
ous default—only so much as is necessary to bring about desired
innovation and creativity.30
This divergence in perspective derives from fundamental differ-
ences in the character of tangible and intangible resources. Tangible
resources are, by the laws of physics, inherently rivalrous and ex-
cludable. They occupy physical space, and human rivalry for control
of these resources undermines stability and progress. My enjoyment
of an ice cream cone necessarily depletes the amount of ice cream
for others.
This is not to say that such resources cannot be shared in construc-
tive ways. Societies have long developed a wide range of strategies
to share rivalrous tangible resources—from land and air to beachfront
and roadways—in creative and just ways. Zoning, the public trust
doctrine, and various other regimes seek to promote balanced resource
use. Such rules and institutions are central to human civilization.
Information resources begin at the other end of the rivalry spec-
trum. They can inherently be enjoyed by everyone without rivalry
or depletion. Thomas Jefferson eloquently captured this distinction:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the
progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugi-
tive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right,
be claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature has made
any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive prop-
erty, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the
possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess him-
self of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the
less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who re-
ceives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one
30. See Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693 (2010).
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to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction
of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made
them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their
density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move,
and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits aris-
ing from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas
which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, ac-
cording to the will and convenience of the society, without claim
or complaint from anybody.31
Jefferson ultimately came to see the need for the granting of limited
exclusive rights to encourage inventions,32 but his parsimonious in-
stinct proved prescient. Intangible resources significantly differ from
tangible resources and merit distinctive treatment. Intellectual prop-
erty rules create artificial scarcity as a means to encourage the de-
velopment of inventions and creative expression.
When the nonrivalrous characteristic of information resources is
combined with the economic feedback effects of network markets—
such as telecommunications and computer software—the policy
ramifications become more complex.33 In conventional markets, con-
sumers’ utility functions are largely independent. My enjoyment of
a good does not depend on others’ enjoyment of that good. In network
markets, by contrast, the demand functions (and hence, welfare) of
consumers are interdependent. For example, the value of a telecom-
munications network depends critically on the number of other con-
sumers that are part of that network because each person’s utility
depends on the number of other people with whom they can commu-
nicate. Such network externalities affect a variety of important in-
formation technology markets.34 The design of intellectual property
regimes for such technologies must consider the dynamics of these
markets. Interoperability and compatibility of products take on
great importance.
31. See VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.).
32. See Hughes, supra note 3, at 1004–05, 1031–33.
33. See Menell, Tailoring Software Protection, supra note 14.
34. See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY (1998).
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The difficulties of delineating the boundaries of intangible rights
further complicate the puzzle. Tangible resources occupy physical
space and hence can be observed and measured.35 Land resources can
typically be represented in two-dimensional grids. The boundaries
of tangible resources are typically directly observable. Fugitive and
subsurface resources, such as wild animals, oil, natural gas, and
water, are more complex to map but nonetheless have definable
boundaries when captured.
By contrast, information resources are often difficult to delineate.36
Inventors claim their advances using words, which introduce inter-
pretive challenges.37 More significantly, inventors typically seek to
claim the full range of embodiments that flow from an inventive con-
cept. Patent specifications typically contain prophetic examples to
illustrate the inventive concept, but the claims often go further. The
law seeks to balance protecting inventors’ supported claims with
providing the public, including competitors and follow-on inventors,
fair notice of the boundaries of the intellectual property rights.38 This
often results in unclear boundaries, which has ramifications for the
optimal design of defenses, remedies, and other aspects of intellec-
tual property rules and institutions.39 We also see in the intangible
realm much greater opportunism in claiming resources.40
35. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 257 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds. 2011).
36. See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5
J. LEG. ANAL. 1 (2013).
37. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128–29 (2014) (noting that
the disclosure requirements of the Patent Act entail a “delicate balance” “tak[ing] into account
the inherent limitations of language. Some modicum of uncertainty . . .‘price of ensuring the
appropriate incentives for innovation’”; “At the same time, a patent must be precise enough to
afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby ‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open to
them.’” (citations omitted)).
38. See id.; Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(explaining that the doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee to proceed against the producer
of a device that does not literally infringe a patent claim “if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” (citation omitted)).
39. See Menell & Meurer, supra note 36.
40. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 6.5.19, at
6–114 (2005) (including a section entitled “Include Ambiguous Claims,” which offers numerous
“strategies” for “intentionally writ[ing] ambiguous claims”); ROBERT D. FISH, STRATEGIC PAT-
ENTING 7–35 (2007) (advising drafters to “[a]void . . . like the plague” claim language that clearly
identifies the “gist of the invention” or the “factor” that makes it “unique”).
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Copyright protection introduces other notice challenges. Unlike
land, the boundaries of expressive works cannot be mapped onto
two-dimensional grids.41 Authors, artists, and musicians draw upon
the works of others as well as unprotectable ideas and the public
domain to create new works. Thus, their claim to copyright protec-
tion is less—and often, far less—than all of the elements (and the
compilations of elements) that appear in their work.42 Furthermore,
the fair use doctrine43 and other limiting doctrines, such as the
idea/expression dichotomy that channels protection for useful arti-
cles and functional aspects of works between the patent and copyright
realms,44 greatly complicate the notice of copyright boundaries.45
And given the long duration of copyright, the problems posed by
difficult-to-trace and true orphan works plague artistic creativity.46
As a result of these fundamental differences between tangible and
intangible resources, we must be especially cautious in extrapolating
positive and normative precepts and ramifications from the realm
of tangible resources to the analysis of intangible resources. Simple
rules, such as full ownership and automatic injunctions, do not
presumptively “carryover” to intangible resources.47 Policy analysis
must address the protection of intangible resources based upon the
underlying economic, social, and human effects. More complex tan-
gible property rules—such as nuisance, servitudes, and trespass to
chattels—provide some useful models for intellectual property re-
gimes. Conventional property rules and institutions provide insight
and useful metaphors, but they cannot substitute for detailed analysis
of the particular characteristics of the resources; the human, cultural,
41. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Copyright Notice: Tracing and Scope in the
Digital Age, 96 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
42. I refer to this as the “Swiss cheese” character of copyrights. Copyright registration has
never required anywhere near full specification of what is excluded from the copyright claim—
i.e., the Swiss cheese holes—and the costs of doing so fall well below any realizable benefit.
See id.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
45. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1092–120 (2007).
46. See Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising from Copyright Duration Rules, 96
BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Maria A. Pallante, Orphan Works & Mass Digitization:
Obstacles & Opportunities, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1251 (2012); U.S. Copyright Office, REPORT
ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
47. These issues sparked a contentious dialogue with a prior Brigham-Kanner honoree.
See Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual
Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523 (2011); Epstein, supra note 15.
2016] PROPERTY, IP, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 161
social, technological, and historical dimensions of the communities
in which the resources are situated; and the attributes and limita-
tions of the full range of available institutions.
B. Framing the IP/Social Justice Interface: Internal Legitimacy
and External Effects
The utilitarian purposes undergirding intellectual property protec-
tion directly address multiple social justice goals. To the extent that
intellectual property protections function effectively, they serve a
variety of economic, human, cultural, and social goals. Advances in
technological knowledge increase productivity, enhance the quality
and reduce the costs of goods, and improve standards of living. Tech-
nological innovation can also address climate change, cure disease,
and expand what societies can accomplish with limited resources.
With regard to expressive creativity, well-functioning intellectual
property systems can spur investment into the production of knowl-
edge and can entertain and inspire.
Note, however, that these inferences are based on a critical as-
sumption: “if ” intellectual property regimes function effectively. They
also presume that intellectual property protection is the most effec-
tive means of promoting innovation and creativity. Yet, intellectual
property is but one of many approaches to promoting innovation and
creativity. Direct procurement, prizes, secrecy, and various forms of
indirect appropriation might be better or at least complementary
mechanisms for addressing the appropriability problem that justi-
fies intellectual property protection on utilitarian grounds.48 Relat-
edly, the negative impacts of the granting of intellectual property
rights might be weighed in the balance.49 Thus, a critical primary
question in assessing the interplay of intellectual property protection
and social justice must focus on internal legitimacy: are intellectual
property regimes the optimal mechanism for prompting innovation
and creativity, and are they functioning effectively in pursuing their
purported utilitarian mission?
48. See Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to
Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Michael Abramowicz, Perfect-
ing Patent Prizes, 56 VANDERBILT L. REV. 115 (2003); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Inven-
tion Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
49. See Kapczynski, The Cost of the Price, supra note 13.
162 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 5:147
When the policy landscape extends beyond promoting innovation
and creativity within a conventional, capitalist economic setting, the
challenges expand significantly. The cultural setting greatly compli-
cates the design and functioning of both tangible and intangible re-
source regimes. As William Cronon discovered in his seminal study
of ecology in pre-colonial and colonial New England,50 different cul-
tures can produce different, yet effective, resource governance re-
gimes. The effects of those regimes on economic development and
natural resource sustainability can vary widely.
Thus, the treatment of indigenous peoples and their traditional
knowledge and folklore does not easily translate into conventional
economic calculus. Furthermore, human and civil rights can be dif-
ficult to reconcile with economic/utilitarian goals as well as among
themselves. In analyzing the interplay of intellectual property re-
gimes and social justice, therefore, it is also critical to assess the ex-
ternal effects of utilitarian intellectual property regimes as well as
interactions—conflicts and complementaries—among the array of
social justice considerations: human rights, civil rights, cultural in-
terests, and distributive justice.51
II. MODE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
Intellectual property and social justice interact on multiple levels.
This section analyzes this interplay within patent, trade secret, copy-
right, and trademark law. It summarizes the principal trade-offs and
tensions within the traditional utilitarian framing and then traces
some of the larger external social conflicts. Part III then turns to
macro aspects of the IP/social justice relationship.
A. Patent Protection
1. Internal Validity
The patent system is built upon a core economic premise that
capital and talent will gravitate toward the highest bidder. In com-
petitive markets, profits will be driven to zero, not accounting for
50. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).
51. See Kapczynski, The Cost of the Price, supra note 13, (emphasizing the internal/external
dichotomy).
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sunk costs such as research and development (R&D).52 From an ex
ante perspective, most firms would not invest in developing new tech-
nologies if rivals could free-ride on their R&D, enter the market, and
dissipate the inventors’ profits. This produces a suboptimal level of
investment in R&D, which reduces dynamic competition and inno-
vation. The provision of time-limited exclusive rights to control a
patented invention provides a mechanism for appropriating a return
to R&D and commercialization.53
Within the internal utilitarian frame, patent protection has two
principal defects. First, it creates exclusive rights, which can raise
prices above marginal cost, thereby resulting in deadweight loss to
consumers.54 Second, it can inhibit cumulative creativity to the ex-
tent that follow-on inventors face the risk of infringement (due, for
example, to notice problems55) as well as transaction costs from nego-
tiating with blocking patent holders.
But intellectual property also has virtues. Every invention funded
with intellectual property creates a Pareto improvement56 relative
to a baseline competitive market.57 No one is taxed more than her
willingness to pay for any unit she buys; otherwise she would not
buy it. In contrast, funding out of general revenue runs the risk of
imposing burdens on individual taxpayers greater than the benefits
they receive.
A second virtue is decentralization. Probably the most important
obstacle to effective public procurement is in finding the ideas for
invention that are widely distributed among firms and inventors.
The lure of intellectual property protection does that automatically.
52. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 17, at 1476–78.
53. See NORDHAUS, supra note 26.
54. The early, primitive economic models of patent protection vary the duration of patent
protection so as to balance incentives to invent and deadweight loss. See NORDHAUS, supra
note 26. This analysis, however, overlooks the complexities of cumulative innovation and the
potential benefits of licensing markets. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 17; Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839 (1990).
55. See Menell & Meurer, supra note 36.
56. The Pareto standard, named for the Italian engineer, social scientist, and philosopher
Vilfredo Pareto, judges social welfare based on whether it is possible to make any one individ-
ual better off without making at least one individual worse off. See generally VILFREDO PARETO,
MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: A CRITICAL AND VARIORUM EDITION (Aldo Montesano, Alberto
Zanni, Luigino Bruni, John S. Chipman & Michael McLure eds., 2014).
57. This proposition overlooks, however, the potential of other tools, such as prizes and
government procurement. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Decentralization is especially important if private inventors are more
likely than public sponsors to think of good ideas for innovations.
A third virtue is that intellectual property is an effective screening
device.58 Since the private value of the invention at least partially
reflects social value, inventors should be willing to bear higher costs
for inventions of higher value. The intellectual property mechanism
encourages investors and inventors to weed out ideas for which the
private costs exceed the private benefits.
These considerations, however, bear on only a subset of the insti-
tutions for promoting innovation. Public procurement, regulatory
mandates (e.g., such as best available technology requirements for
reducing pollution and targets for zero-emission vehicles), prize sys-
tems, trade secrecy, and ancillary means of appropriating a return
on R&D can encourage innovation without deadweight loss.
Each of these other institutions, however, have limitations. As
noted above, public procurement and centralized decision-making
cannot easily prioritize projects and identify the best contractors.
For example, in 1990, California mandated automakers to bring a
specified percentage of zero-emission vehicles into their fleets,59 yet
little resulted.60 It was the entrepreneurial efforts of the private sec-
tor, with government subsidies, that ultimately produced the major
breakthroughs.61 Now many of the major automobile manufacturers
are feverishly competing to advance electric and other alternative
energy vehicle technologies.62
The financial payoff of patent protection encourages the risk-taking
that can surmount major technological challenges. While centrally
planned economies, such as the former Soviet Union, were able to
achieve some impressive large-scale innovation goals (such as space
exploration) through direct procurement, they failed miserably at
58. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).
59. See Leslie Harrison Reed, Jr., California Low-Emission Vehicle Program: Forcing
Technology and Dealing Effectively with the Uncertainties, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 695,
708–09 (1997).
60. See Gary E. Marchant, Sustainable Energy Technologies: Ten Lessons from the History
of Technology Regulation, 18 WIDENER L.J. 831, 836–38 (2009).
61. See Bradley W. Lane, Natalie Messer-Betts, Devin Hartmann, Sanya Carley, Rachel
M. Krause & John D. Graham, Government Promotion of the Electric Car: Risk Management
or Industrial Policy?, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 227, 230–31 (2013).
62. See Agence France-Presse, BMW, VW, Audi, Daimler Take on Tesla in Race of Electric
Cars, INDUSTRYWEEK (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.industryweek.com/technology/bmw-vw-audi
-daimler-take-tesla-race-electric-cars.
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promoting the broad range of innovations that proliferate in capitalist
nations with robust patent systems. Patent systems identify, nurture,
and cultivate needles in the technological haystack that central plan-
ners fumble to find and develop.
But even in the United States, the patent system works in conjunc-
tion with other institutions. Military, space, biomedical, and basic
research procurement, philanthropy, and prizes complement the
patent system. The patent system plays a significant role in commer-
cializing scientific advances. Trade secrecy can inhibit cumulative
creativity by keeping unobservable knowledge from public view. Pat-
ent protection brings that unobservable knowledge into the open,
even if its use is subject to time-limited exclusive rights.
In the end, the internal validity of the patent system can be
assessed only through a comparative institutional lens. The patent
system’s efficacy depends in substantial part on a broad range of
doctrinal and policy levers. The limitations of bureaucracies and dis-
cretion inevitably lead to excessive uniformity.63 Furthermore, inno-
vation systems can be complementary.
Nonetheless the parsimonious baseline remains useful in thinking
about patent protection.64 The patent system produces the highest
social return in those areas of innovation requiring high capital
cost and involving high technological risk—such as pharmaceutical
research.65 In areas such as business methods and software, the
availability of alternative appropriation mechanisms—such as first
mover advantage, trademark protection, copyright, trade secrecy, and
ancillary means of appropriation (e.g., advertising)—suggests that
we ought to be especially cautious about affording strong patent-
type protection for such forms of innovation.66
63. See Carroll, supra note 45; Menell, Tailoring Software Protection, supra note 14.
64. See Devlin, supra note 30.
65. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the
Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 493–501 (2007) [hereinafter Menell,
Reforming]; Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1 (1992).
66. See Menell, Reforming, supra note 65; Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Nonpat-
entability of Business Methods: Legal and Economic Analysis (Brief Amici Curiae of Professors
Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer in Support of Respondent at 30–32, 36–38, Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964)), UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No.
1482022, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1482022.
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2. External Perspectives
Although the complexities of understanding and assessing the
internal validity of the patent system have dominated academic dis-
course relating to the patent system, the search for the utilitarian holy
grail tends to crowd out other important social justice considerations.
Some of the most important of such considerations relate to access
to medicine.67 The patent system is built upon the granting of exclu-
sive rights. To the extent patent law achieves its utilitarian ends, it
means that patent-induced technological advances—such as faster
semiconductor chips and treatments for life-threatening diseases—
will be available to those capable of paying and willing to pay the
patent owner’s market price during the life of the patent and will be
available to all capable of paying and willing to pay marginal cost
upon expiration of the patent. While this system may be justifiable
to a strict utilitarian, it raises serious questions for those who use a
broader justice framework.
Even if one is not troubled by the use of prices to ration access
to faster computers, the rationing of access to treatments for life-
threatening diseases amounts to a death sentence to those who can-
not afford the patented treatment. The discoveries of such life-saving
treatments might not have come about absent the patent incentive,
but such a utilitarian position must be considered in conjunction
with other important justice considerations. Other philosophical per-
spectives recognize an inalienable set of rights or entitlements for
all citizens.68
The answer to this philosophical bind is not necessarily binary—
i.e., to reject the patent system or to emphasize the lives saved.
Rather, this dilemma highlights the opportunity to recognize that
other rules and institutions can potentially improve upon rigid
exclusive rights. Just as governments can establish patent protection,
67. See Kapczynski, New Politics of IP, supra note 13; Fisher & Syed, supra note 13;
MERGES, supra note 13, at 270–87.
68. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (postulating distribution of “primary
goods”—“things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants”—such that they are of
the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society); Eleanor Kinney, Recognition
of the International Human Right to Health and Health Care in the United States, 60 RUTGERS
L. REV. 335 (2008); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, art. 25, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services”).
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they can also provide health-care policies and remedial limits on
rationing of life-saving technologies that avoid such stark choices.
Thus, it is critical to think of the patent system within a broader
frame of public health policy. The internal utilitarian frame lacks
the breadth to address the full social justice ramifications of granting
time-limited exclusive rights for biomedical discoveries.
Beyond the concern over access to life-saving treatments, the
contemporary U.S. patent system has largely pushed moral and eth-
ical questions aside.69 Whereas absolute freedom of expression may
well be good social policy for a host of political, pragmatic, and insti-
tutional reasons, it is not obvious that the patent system should lack
any moral compass. After all, the government is needed to evaluate
and enforce patent rights. The choice to limit patent protection to
“technological” innovations—i.e., “useful Arts”—is one form of policy
lever, although it is typically justified on internal validity (utilitar-
ian) grounds.70
Patent systems can integrate moral considerations. In an earlier
era, the U.S. Patent Office screened out inventions relating to gam-
bling technologies and deception on the ground that such devices were
immoral.71 European nations today bar patents on “inventions the
publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public
or morality.”72 The America Invents Act of 2011, for the first time, ex-
pressly excludes patents on tax strategies and human organisms.73
69. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Ex parte
Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 803 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1977) (upholding claim for “one-
armed bandit”); cf. In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 474–76, 186 U.S.P.Q. 11, 19 (CCPA 1975)
(stating that it is not the province of the Patent Office to determine, under section 101, whether
drugs are safe).
70. See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the
Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent
Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1292–95 (2011).
71. See Schultz v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897); Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp.
640, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1936).
72. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, art. 53(a);
Laura A. Keay, Morality’s Move Within U.S. Patent Law: From Moral Utility to Subject Matter,
40 AIPLA Q.J. 409 (2012); Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003); Thomas A. Magnani, The
Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443 (1999); Benjamin D.
Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of the Moral Utility
Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2004); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law:
Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247 (2000).
73. See Pub. L. 112-29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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Even if the U.S. patent system does not engage these issues, other
societal institutions should.74 These issues can, however, be extremely
divisive, as reflected in debates over stem cell research,75 emer-
gency contraception technologies,76 genetically modified seeds,77 and
animal rights.78
The patent system also interacts with other market failures with
broader social justice ramifications, such as climate change.79 While
motivating the development of better environmental technologies,
the patent system potentially constrains the diffusion of technologi-
cal advances that seek to ameliorate environmental harms.80 Energy
technologies involve substantial infrastructure investments. Even
if advances in wind turbine and solar technologies dramatically low-
ered the cost of producing electricity, distributing that energy to con-
sumers depends critically upon a grid infrastructure that can move
decentralized sources of electricity to market. Moreover, such energy
must compete with harmful alternatives. Without fees to internalize
those harmful effects, renewable sources of energy face a competitive
disadvantage. Thus, government policies and industry coordination
play critical roles in the development and diffusion of renewable en-
ergy technologies. Prizes, subsidies, and externality-internalizing fees
on fossil fuels offer complementary tools for balancing the R&D
appropriability problem, the environmental externalities of fossil
fuel consumption, and the geopolitical distortions of reliance on oil.81
74. See Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 344, 347–48 (1880) (“Congress never intended
that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that term
those powers by which the health, good order, peace and general welfare of the community
are promoted.”).
75. See Edward A. Fallone, Funding Stem Cell Research: The Convergence of Science, Reli-
gion & Politics in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 12 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 247 (2011).
76. See HEATHER MUNRO PRESCOTT, THE MORNING AFTER: A HISTORY OF EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2011).
77. See Gary Gregory, What’s Immoral About Monsanto: Strengthening the Roots of the
Moral Utility Requirement by Amending the Patent Act, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
759 (2013).
78. See Biotechnology in European Patents—Threat or Promise?, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://legaltexts.arcdev.hu/news-issues/issues/biotechnology.html; Deborah MacKenzie, Activists
Join Forces Against the Onco-Mouse, NEWSCIENTIST (Jan. 16, 1993), https://www.newscientist
.com/article/mg13718560-900-activists-join-forces-against-the-onco-mouse/.
79. See PETER S. MENELL & SARAH M. TRAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (2014).
80. See Peter S. Menell, Sarah Tran’s Inspiring Optimism, 67 SMU L. REV. 473, 476 (2014).
81. See THOMAS FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT AND CROWDED (2008).
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Other important social justice ramifications of the patent system
arise in global trade and economic development.82
B. Trade Secret Protection
1. Internal Validity
Trade secret law also aims to promote innovation, although it
accomplishes this objective in a very different manner than pat-
ent protection.83 Notwithstanding the advantages of obtaining a
patent—which secures the exclusive right to practice an invention
for a designated period of time while disclosing technology to the
public—many innovators prefer to protect their innovation through
secrecy.84 They may believe that the cost and delay of seeking a pat-
ent are too great or that secrecy better protects their investment and
increases their profit. They might also believe that the invention can
best be exploited over a longer period of time than a patent would
allow. Without any special legal protection for trade secrets, however,
the secretive inventor risks that an employee or contractor will dis-
close the proprietary information. Once the idea is released, it will
be “free as the air” under the background norms of a free market
economy.85 Such a predicament would lead any inventor seeking to
rely upon secrecy to spend an inordinate amount of resources build-
ing high and impervious fences around their research facilities
and greatly limiting the number of people with access to the propri-
etary information.86
82. See infra Part III.C.
83. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 17, at 1479.
84. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (emphasizing “the
importance of trade secret protection to the subsidization of research and development and
to increased economic efficiency within large companies through the dispersion of responsi-
bilities for creative developments”).
85. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04[3] (2008) (noting that “the law relating to
trade secrets reflects a balance of public and private interests in the encouragement of innova-
tion, the preservation of ethics and the maintenance of a free marketplace of ideas and move-
ment of labor”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1, cmt a. (1993) (observing
that “[t]he freedom to engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective cus-
tomers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system. Competition in the marketing
of goods and services creates incentives to offer quality products at reasonable prices and
fosters the general welfare by promoting the efficient allocation of economic resources.”).
86. See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of
Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
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Under trade secret law, an inventor who takes reasonable steps
to maintain secrecy obtains potentially strong remedies against indi-
viduals within the enterprise and individuals subject to contractual
limitations who misappropriate proprietary information.87 Although
trade secret law does not limit the use of ideas once they have become
publicly known,88 it reduces the costs of protecting trade secrets.89
Trade secrets are the most pervasive form of intellectual property
in the modern economy.90 Nearly every enterprise—whether for-profit
or not—seeks to protect information about its operations, strategy,
technology, funding, personnel, and customers. Employers of all types
routinely require their employees and contractors to sign restrictive
non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) and return confidential informa-
tion upon their departure or completion of services. Without such re-
strictions, these enterprises would jeopardize trade secret protection
and risk violating privacy and other laws.
Although early courts routinely characterized trade secrets as
“property,”91 trade secret law, unlike patent protection, never con-
ferred exclusive rights against the public-at-large.92 Rather, it
87. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW, UNIFORM
TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–3 (1985) (as amended).
88. See id. § 1(2) (“misappropriation” of a “trade secret” limited to acquisition by improper
means and breach of confidence); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech:
Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1425 (2009); Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding public disclosure notwith-
standing extraordinary efforts to maintain secrecy).
89. See Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 86.
90. See James Pooley, Trade Secrets: The Other IP Right, WIPO MAGAZINE 2 (Issue 3,
June 2013), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article_0001.html.
91. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889) (holding that “independent
of copyright or letters patent, an inventor or author has, by the common law, an exclusive
property in his invention or composition, until by publication it becomes the property of the
general public”); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868) (recognizing a “property right”
in a trade secret).
92. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251–60 (1998); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. a (reporting that the
property conception “has been frequently advanced and rejected,” concluding that the prevail-
ing theory of liability rests on “a general duty of good faith”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder
Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (“[t]he word ‘property’ as applied to . . .
trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary
fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs
have any valuable secret or not, the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through
a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot 
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constrains disclosure of information by contract and confidential
relationship. For that reason, competitors may practice inventions
that they independently develop or learn through reverse engineer-
ing or other legal means.
The internal validity of trade secret protection has long been widely
accepted.93 In any case, it would be difficult to override contractual
arrangements to protect technological secrets without undermining
general contractual freedom.
2. External Perspectives
Notwithstanding that trade secrets work relatively well as a means
of promoting technological innovation, the widespread use of routine
blanket non-disclosure agreements to cover all proprietary informa-
tion within an enterprise—including information that goes beyond
the competitive sphere—raises serious social justice concerns. For
example, the tobacco industry’s effort to prevent Dr. Jeffrey Wigand
from disclosing the industry’s deception about the dangers of its prod-
ucts illustrates the societal risks of overbroad protection for corpo-
rate secrets.94 Dr. Wigand’s employer, Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corporation, persuaded a Kentucky court to issue a temporary re-
straining order barring Dr. Wigand from disclosing any information
relating to his work at Brown & Williamson in tort litigation. Al-
though the restraining order was eventually lifted as part of a land-
mark national tobacco settlement, Dr. Wigand risked tremendous
liability for reporting a serious public health threat. His courage led
to much-needed, far-reaching changes in public health policy and
compensation to states for tobacco-related health-care costs.
But for Dr. Wigand’s coming forward, the grave dangers posed by
the tobacco industry’s machinations would have remained under
wraps.95 We now know that asbestos manufacturers knew the causal
link between asbestos and lung disease well before the public, and
be. Therefore, the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs.”).
93. See Pooley, supra note 90.
94. See Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 170, 176.
95. In fact, Dr. Wigand was reluctant to come forward, and the unraveling of the tobacco
industry deception may have been delayed many more years if not decades without the persis-
tence of Lowell Bergman, the 60 Minutes producer who recognized the importance of bringing
Wigand’s story to light. See id.
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regulatory officials became aware of the serious health risk.96 Just
last year, evidence emerged that Volkswagen had programmed soft-
ware in its vehicles to mask pollution violations.97 And the New York
Times recently reported a massive environmental and public health
threat associated with the manufacturing of Teflon® products that
DuPont Corporation officials knew about for decades.98
While robust trade secret protection makes economic sense in a
contemporary business environment marked by high employee mo-
bility, cybercrime, and international espionage, uncritical protection
of all secret business information conflicts with effective law en-
forcement and protection of public health, safety, and welfare. Many
companies use trade secrecy as a blanket tool for hiding illegal
activity—from violations of civil rights, public health and workplace
safety protections, securities markets regulations, and tax reporting
to defrauding the government. Employees and contractors are often
in the best position to know of illegal activity, yet typical NDAs and
corporate onboarding practices99 discourage activities that might be
seen to subtract from the company’s bottom-line. This concern has
taken on greater significance as companies accused of illegal conduct
have filed lawsuits against whistleblowers and their counsel.100
The American civil and criminal justice systems rely on discovery
and evidence-gathering models consistent with Fourth Amendment
96. See Morris Greenberg, Knowledge of the Health Hazard of Asbestos Prior to the
Merewether and Price Report of 1930, 7 SOC. HIST. OF MED. 493, 501 (1994); Alan F. Westin,
Introduction to WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1, 11–12 (Alan
F. Westin et al. eds., 1981).
97. See Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 23, 2016, 4:39 AM), https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal.
98. See Nathaniel Rich, Poisoned Ground, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 10, 2016, at 36, 41–42
(reporting about the widespread release of the toxic chemical PFOA into drinking water).
99. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686565
[hereinafter Menell, Trade Secret Public Policy Exception].
100. See, e.g., J-M Manufacturing Co. v. Phillips & Cohen, LLP, and John Hendrix, Docket
No. A-5867-13T2 N.J. App. Div. (affirming dismissal of trade secret complaint against whis-
tleblower and its counsel on grounds that company should have pursued this matter in the
pending California whistleblower qui tam proceeding); Walsh et al. v. Amerisource Bergen
Corp., 2014 WL 2738215 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2014) (denying relator motion to dismiss counter-
claim for breach of confidentiality agreement); see also Carlton Fields, Employers Fight Back
Against Whistleblowers, LEXOLOGY (July 2, 2014) (noting that “[e]mployers may even have op-
tions against employees who have been successful in [false claims cases], but who have breached
their employment agreements or who have stolen documents”).
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Without
reporting of illegal activity and access to documentary evidence
supporting investigation, the government and the courts are severely




U.S. copyright protection derives from the same core economic
premise and constitutional authorization as patent protection—to
promote progress. The difference is that copyright protection focuses
on expressive creativity. Although expressive works differ signifi-
cantly from technology, they share a common economic problem: both
can require significant up-front effort that competitors can easily
copy or imitate. The Constitution authorizes Congress to address this
market failure by “securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the ex-
clusive Right to their . . . Writings.”102
At the nation’s founding, the printing press served as the primary
means of disseminating expressive works, and hence the Copyright
Act of 1790 protected books, maps, and charts (nautical maps). Like
England’s Statute of Anne,103 the term of protection was relatively
“limited”: fourteen years, plus an additional fourteen years if the au-
thor was still alive.104
In contrast to patent protection, copyright protection does not con-
fer monopoly power over ideas; rather it protects only the expression
of ideas.105 Patent law enables inventors to protect applications of in-
ventive ideas. When an inventor applies laws of nature to improve
101. See Menell, Trade Secret Public Policy Exception, supra note 99 (proposing a sealed
disclosure/trusted intermediary exception to trade secret protection that would safeguard
trade secrets while promoting effective law enforcement); see also Peter S. Menell, Deterring
Corporate Fraud from the Inside: Encouraging Whistleblowing Without Jeopardizing Trade
Secrecy, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 12, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01
/12/deterring-corporate-fraud-from-the-inside-encouraging-whistleblowing-without-jeopar
dizing-trade-secrecy/.
102. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
103. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710).
104. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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the functioning of a water pump, others may not practice that
invention for the life of the patent. But when an author scripts a
drama featuring young wizards, explores stories of intergalactic
adventure, or develops a police drama series with multi-episode
story arcs, others may write their own tales of wizardry,106 produce
their own space adventures,107 or create their own television crime
franchises.108 As Professor Paul Goldstein has eloquently captured:
Science and technology are centripetal, conducing toward a single
optimal result. One water pump can be better than another water
pump, and the role of patent and trade secret law is to direct in-
vestment toward such improvements. Literature and the arts are
centrifugal, aiming at a wide variety of audiences with different
tastes. We cannot say that one novel treating the theme, say, of
man’s continuing struggle with nature is in any ultimate sense
‘better’ than another novel—or musical composition or painting—
on the same subject. The aim of copyright is to direct investment
toward abundant rather than efficient expression. Bradley Efron,
of Stanford’s Statistics Department, captured this difference
wonderfully when he observed that, ‘If Shakespeare had died as
a child we should never have had Hamlet, but if Newton had died
as a child we should certainly have calculus today. Of course,
that is also the great advantage of science. Having seen the cal-
culus, one can improve on it, but it is hard to imagine an im-
proved Hamlet.’109
By excluding ideas from the scope of protection, copyright permits
other creators to learn from and build on both the ideas and the
106. See Amy Sachs, 10 Books for Adults That Are Just As Magical As the Harry Potter
Series, BUSTLE (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.bustle.com/articles/117092-10-books-for-adults-that
-are-just-as-magical-as-the-harry-potter-series; 62 Books to Read if You Love Harry Potter
Books (July 4, 2013), http://literatureyoungadultfiction.com/books-to-read-if-you-love-harry
-potter/; cf. Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17 (2006) (exploring the scope of the derivative work right).
107. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting claim that the
movie E.T. infringed a music play entitled Lokey from Maldemar); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983) (analyzing differences between Star
Wars and Battlestar: Galactica to identify plot similarities).
108. Steven Bochco’s success with police dramas (Hill Street Blues, NYPD Blue) spawned
others, such as Dick Wolf (Law and Order) and Jerry Bruckheimer (C.S.I.), to develop their
own successful crime investigation television series.
109. Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
1119, 1123 (1986) (citing Stan. U. Campus Rep., May 2, 1984, at 5–6).
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market response to works of authorship. As a result, copyright
protection has been less controversial than patent protection over
the centuries.110
There are important limits, however, to building on the works of
copyright owners. The right to prepare derivative works enables copy-
right owners to control their particularized expression. This even
extends to characters.111 Thus, other authors may not develop sequels
to the Rocky motion picture series or stories involving graphic char-
acters, such as Spiderman or Mickey Mouse, during the life span of
copyright protection without authorization. The fair use doctrine,
however, provides leeway for parodies and commentary.
Notwithstanding these fundamental limits on copyright protec-
tion, a confluence of factors have tarnished copyright’s internal va-
lidity, especially since the digital revolution. Advances in technology
have vastly expanded the potential for cumulative creativity, from
documentary projects to music mash-ups. Yet the extension of copy-
right duration (to life of the author plus seventy years) in conjunc-
tion with the dismantling of formalities makes the determination of
copyright subsistence and tracing of ownership difficult.112 The en-
largement of copyrightable subject matter to all forms of expressive
works, including architecture and computer programs, has strained
the idea/expression doctrine.113 Further, the strengthening of in-
fringement remedies to address concerns about Internet piracy114
110. See B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the
Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 844–50 (2014)
(discussing periods of patent abolition in Holland and Switzerland in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and early twentieth century).
111. See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
112. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Copyright Notice: Tracing and Scope in the
Digital Age, 96 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); Samuelson, supra note 46; Pallante,
supra note 46; U.S. Copyright Office, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006), http://www.copy
right.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
113. Courts have done a relatively good job of cabining copyright protection for computer
software; see Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Fea-
tures of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651 (1998); although concerns remain, see
David W. Hansen, Stuart D. Levi, James F. Brelsford, Jose A. Esteves & Anthony J. Dreyer,
Federal Circuit Overturns Oracle v. Google and Potentially Widens Debate over Copyright Pro-
tections, 9 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13 (2014).
114. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (raising the upper boundary for statutory damages to $150,000
per work for willful infringement).
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has instilled fear of crushing liability in technology developers,
cumulative creators, and fans.115
As technology for reproducing, remixing, and disseminating ex-
pressive works has advanced, the tension between strong copyright
protection to encourage creative expression on the one hand and tech-
nological progress, the ability to build cumulatively, and the free
flow of information though digital social networks on the other, has
mounted. New generations of creators find the traditional, permission-
based system stifling. Thanks to the Internet, artists no longer need
traditional publishers and media outlets, which has led to both a cre-
ativity explosion and consternation among traditional copyright own-
ers about piracy and unauthorized derivative works.116 Compliance
with copyright law has increasingly become optional. Unlike earlier
eras, in which intermediary gatekeepers—book stores, movie the-
aters, television broadcasters, and record stores—were the only access
points for copyrighted works, the Internet provides alternative means
of gaining access, some legal and some not. Many netizens, especially
younger generations, gain access to copyrighted works through tor-
rent sites and other unauthorized channels, which has escalated
enforcement efforts and created a vicious cycle that has undermined
copyright law’s public approval.
These forces have complicated the internal validity of the copyright
system. Traditional media companies have increasingly looked to
alternative revenue streams, such as embedded advertising, to appro-
priate a return on their investment. Scholars, policymakers, tradi-
tional content companies, technology companies, creative artists,
consumer organizations, and civil libertarian groups see the need to
reform copyright protection for the Internet age but are deeply di-
vided on how to get there.117
115. See INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES,
FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES: COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 70–81 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WHITE PAPER];
Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright for
the Internet Age, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 250–52 (2014) [hereinafter Menell, This
American Copyright Life].
116. See Menell, This American Copyright Life, supra note 115, at 271–98.
117. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013);
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 115; INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECON-
OMY (2013); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 162–97 (2002–2003) (discussing the political economy of copyright reform).
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2. External Perspectives
Adding to the growing dissatisfaction with copyright protection,
various non-utilitarian perspectives further cloud the path forward.
The rights and interests of authors and audiences clash in multiple
non-utilitarian dimensions.
In Europe and other parts of the world, copyright protection is seen
as a natural right of authors. This moral rights tradition traces back
to Jean Le Chapelier, a member of the French National Convention
and the reporter of the French Copyright Law of 1793, who pro-
claimed “fruit of a writer’s thoughts” to be “the most sacred, the most
legitimate, the most unassailable, and . . . the most personal of all
forms of all properties.”118 Yet even this tradition recognizes that
ideas, as opposed to their expression, must not be private property.119
The protection of authors’ moral rights—encompassing dignitary
interests and the integrity of works of authorship—conflicts with a
broad conception of freedom of expression.120 The United States, which
belatedly acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Lit-
erary and Artistic Works, has used the fair use doctrine to accommo-
date freedom of expression. This same freedom opens governmental
protection for all manner of speech, including offensive and disparag-
ing speech.121 Freedom of speech arguably extends beyond existing
118. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991, 1007 (1990). The great French author (Les
Miserables) and human rights activist Victor Hugo took up the cause of authors’ rights and
their relationship with the public domain, founding the Association littéraire internationale
(ALI) in 1878. See Daniel Gervais, The 1909 Copyright Act in International Context, 26 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 185, 187–88 (2010); Max M. Kampelman, The United States
and International Copyright, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 406, 410–11 (1947).
119. At ALI’s founding congress, Hugo proclaimed that while a book belongs to its author,
ideas expressed in the book belong to humankind. See VICTOR HUGO, DISCOURS D’OUVERTURE
DU CONGRÈS LITTÉRAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE 1878 (1878). The ALI was later renamed the Asso-
ciation littéraire et artistique internationale (ALAI) and played a key role in the establish-
ment of the Berne Convention. See RICHARD R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW
314 (1914).
120. See ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE
UNITED STATES (2009); Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and
Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79 (1996); cf. Alexandra Couto, Copyright and Freedom
of Expression: A Philosophical Map, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE
(Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano & Alain Strowel eds., 2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Lo-
cating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
121. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright
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fair use boundaries.122 The integrity and availability of works of
authorship also implicates important public and cultural interests.123
Copyright protection also affects distributive values, ranging from
providing economic security for authors and their descendants to
promoting education, access to knowledge, and career opportunities
for the public-at-large and new generations of creators. The modern
U.S. Copyright Act seeks to blunt the bargaining power of publish-
ers by affording authors an inalienable right to terminate transfers
of copyright interests thirty-five years after assignments.124 This pa-
rentalistic limitation of freedom of contract aims to enable authors,
their spouses, and their children to derive a larger return on works
that retain their value.
As emphasized by President Washington, the promotion and dif-
fusion of knowledge were recognized as essential to the American
republic.125 The Massachusetts Constitution stressed the importance
of education, access to knowledge, and encouragement of literature
and science as cornerstones for a democratic society and for so-
cial harmony:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally
among the body of the people, being necessary for the preserva-
tion of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spread-
ing the opportunities and advantages of education in the various
parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people,
it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future
periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of litera-
ture and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the
university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in
Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommuni-
cations Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).
122. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How the Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (criticizing existing fair use doctrine for
failing to recognize important self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation interests in unau-
thorized nontransformative reproduction of copyrighted works).
123. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999) (questioning the authority of private owners of great works
of art or cultural treasures, such as historic papers, to destroy these works or to deny public
access to them).
124. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable”
Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 799, 804–08 (2010) (tracing the history of
copyright’s recapture provisions).
125. See supra note 12.
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the towns; to encourage private societies and public institutions,
rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts,
sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history
of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of hu-
manity and general benevolence, public and private charity, in-
dustry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings;
sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and generous sen-
timents among the people.126
Thus, American copyright policy has long sought to promote access
to knowledge and preserve cultural heritage.127 The emergence and
development of public libraries—through both philanthropy and
copyright policy—have played a key role in educating the public and
providing public access to knowledge repositories.128
We can also see distributive values in the broadening of expres-
sive opportunities for authors and artists.129 Since expression often
builds on and reacts to prior expressive works, such distributive val-
ues can run counter to the provision of exclusive rights. Limiting
doctrines and the fair use privilege implicitly cross-subsidizes cumu-
lative creators.130 Such freedom to build on the work of others can,
however, adversely affect authors’ moral and dignitary interests.131
Copyright protection also promotes human flourishing as well as
cross-cultural understanding, both of which are vital to a free, inclu-
sive, respectful, harmonious, and democratic society. I have come to
see these virtues as possibly the most important purposes served by
a well-functioning copyright system. When I reflect on my own life,
it is difficult to imagine becoming the person I am today without the
creative and cultural influences of my formative years. I still vividly
remember seeing my first episode of the original Star Trek series
126. See MASS. CONST. art. III, § 2.
127. See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital
Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1022–40 (2007) (tracing the development of access and pres-
ervation policies).
128. See ABIGAIL A. VAN SLYCK, FREE TO ALL: CARNEGIE LIBRARIES & AMERICAN CULTURE,
1890–1920 (1995); JESSE HAUK SHERA, FOUNDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY: THE ORIGINS
OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY MOVEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND, 1629–1885 (1965); SIDNEY HERBERT
DITZION, ARSENALS OF A DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIBRARY MOVEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND AND THE MIDDLE STATES FROM 1850 TO 1900 (1947).
129. See Van Houweling, supra note 13; Peter S. Menell, Adapting Copyright for the Mashup
Generation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2016) [hereinafter Menell, Adapting Copyright for the
Mashup Generation].
130. See Van Houweling, supra note 13, at 1540.
131. See Menell, Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation, supra note 129, at 506–10.
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while at a sleep-over with my older cousins. Gene Roddenberry’s ex-
traordinary voyages of the Starship Enterprise—“to boldly go where
no man [or woman] has gone before”—had a profound influence on
my social values and interest in technology.132 Rebellious rock ‘n roll
and Bob Dylan’s forthright poetry spoke to “My Generation”133—
fueling our innate adolescent desire to question authority and
think independently.
The importance of adequately funded and well-produced film, art,
music, and literature is inestimable. As much as lawyers emphasize
the role of legal advocacy in shifting the law, the television series
Will and Grace likely had more influence in shifting the nation’s and
Supreme Court’s views on gay marriage than anything that lawyers
argued. Similarly, works such as To Kill a Mockingbird and The
Help powerfully communicated the indignity of the Jim Crow South.
The public’s gradual embrace of R&B, jazz, and gospel—what was
once referred to as “race music”—played a critical role in building
a more cohesive and inclusive nation.134
But just as copyrighted works can educate and inspire, they
can also inflame and provoke violence and subjugation of women.
Copyright protects pornography,135 violent video games,136 and hate
132. I was not alone. Martin Luther King, Jr., was himself a Trekkie, and he approved of his
daughters watching the show because of its diverse cast and harmonious portrayal of race and
geopolitical relations. When Dr. King became aware that Nichelle Nichols, the African-American
actress who played the third in command on the USS Enterprise, was leaving the show, he im-
plored her to remain:
I am the biggest Trekkie on the planet, and I am Lieutenant Uhura’s most
ardent fan. . . . Do you not understand what God has given you? . . . You have
the first important non-traditional role, non-stereotypical role. . . . You cannot
abdicate your position. You are changing the minds of people across the world,
because for the first time, through you, we see ourselves and what can be.
See Nichelle Nichols, Pioneers of Television, PBS KQED, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/pioneers-of
-television/pioneering-people/nichelle-nichols/; see also Abby Ohlheiser, How Martin Luther
King Jr. Convinced ‘Star Trek’s’ Lt. Uhura to Stay on the Show, WASH. POST (July 31, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2015/07/31/how-martin
-luther-king-jr-convinced-star-treks-uhura-to-stay-on-the-show/.
133. See My Generation, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Generation (referring
to The Who’s iconic song about finding one’s place in society).
134. This is not to say that the process has been fair to African-American artists. See K.J.
Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American Rep-
arations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1193 (2008) (“The fleecing of Black artists was
the basis of the success of the American music industry.”).
135. See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1 (2012).
136. See Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference
to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013); Paul E. Salamanca, Video
Games as a Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153 (2005).
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speech.137 First Amendment values obviously complicate these issues.
As with the role of morality concerns in assessing patentability, the
question arises whether these issues are best addressed within copy-
right law or through other public policies. As with patent protection,
the government’s imprimatur on these works through the granting
of protection at least indirectly encourages such works. But drawing
First Amendment distinctions between art and pornography or in-
citement of violence is especially challenging.138
The economic models supporting content creation and dissemina-
tion also have important social justice ramifications. For a variety
of technological and economic reasons, many content industries
came to rely on indirect forms of appropriability to support artistic
creativity.139 As one economist cynically remarked, “[p]rograms are
scheduled interruptions of marketing bulletins.”140 Thus, major media
channels and content producers worked symbiotically. But such a
business model comes at a cost. Those who pay for the content shape
its message. While consumer demand obviously drives content pro-
tection, advertising patrons influence artistic creativity. Glamoriz-
ing smoking cigarettes or drinking alcohol, both addictive products,
generated high returns. Public officials eventually came to see the
137. See LaShel Shaw, Hate Speech in Cyberspace: Bitterness Without Boundaries, 25 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 279 (2011); cf. Lieutenant Colonel Eric M. Johnson, Examining
Blasphemy: International Law, National Security and the U.S. Foreign Policy Regarding Free
Speech, 71 A.F. L. REV. 25 (2014).
138. See Lindsay E. Wuller, Losing the Game: An Analysis of the Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association Decision and Its Ramifications in the Area of “Interactive” Video Games,
57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 457 (2013) (discussing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011), which struck down a California law regulating the sale of violent video games to minors
as violative of the First Amendment); Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 169 (2012); Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU
L. REV. 259, 263 (contending that the original meaning of “Science” in the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause of the Constitution is “a system of knowledge comprising distinct branches of study”
that limits legislative power to grant copyright protection); Bartow, supra note 135 (arguing
that pornography lies “beyond the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause” on the grounds
that pornography is “non-progressive and non-useful”); cf. Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright
Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473 (2015) (contending that Congress could exclude some content areas
from copyright protection without running afoul of the First Amendment).
139. Early broadcasting technology had no direct way of charging those who received radio
and television signals. Advertising emerged as an indirect way of supporting these distribu-
tion outlets and those who produced the content.
140. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS 229 (6th ed. 2004).
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adverse social effects of such advertising and regulated it.141 But the
phenomenon remains. The advertising that supports content cre-
ation and dissemination had doubtlessly fueled rising obesity rates.142
Technological advances have altered the influence of advertising
in content markets in complex ways.143 With the advent of digital
video recording technology and commercial skipping, advertising has
been integrated within the content we view. This is far more insid-
ious than “scheduled interruptions of marketing bulletins.” The grow-
ing integration of advertising into mass media and Internet services
in the Digital Age represents a subtle but real and present threat to
expressive freedom, free will, and public well-being. What began as
a largely innocuous means of subsidizing print media and a solution
to funding broadcast media has increasingly distorted the integrity
of news reporting and creative expression. We see similar phenom-
ena in the social media space.144 What we perceive as “free” comes
at a significant human, cultural, public health and welfare cost.
D. Trademark Protection
1. Internal Validity
Trademark protection, like copyright, influences the flow of infor-
mation to the public. In contrast to patent, trade secret, and copyright
141. See Sandra J. Teel, Jesse E. Teel & William O. Bearden, Lessons Learned from the
Broadcast Cigarette Advertising Ban, 43 J. MARKETING 45, 45–46 (1979) (describing how the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 established a federal program dealing with
cigarette package labeling and advertising); but see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 507 n.12 (1996) (striking down a regulation prohibiting advertisement of alcohol
prices on First Amendment grounds, in part because “[i]t is perfectly obvious that alternative
forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to
achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance,” including taxation, direct regulation estab-
lishing minimum prices or maximum per capita purchases, or education).
142. See Product Placements Market Unhealthy Food to Children, YALE NEWS (Aug. 2,
2011), http://news.yale.edu/2011/08/02/product-placements-market-unhealthy-food-children-0
(“[T]he majority of exposure was for regular soft drinks from just one company, Coca-Cola,
which accounted for 71% of product-placement appearances viewed by children and approx-
imately 60% of adult and adolescent exposure.”); Mike Adams, Soft Drink Company Marketing
Tactics: The Experts Sound Off, NATURAL NEWS (Jan. 8, 2005), http://www.naturalnews.com
/003914_soft_drinks&uscore;food_politics.html (showing that Coca-Cola spent $1.6 billion in
the late 1990s for advertising purposes).
143. See Peter S. Menell, 2014: Brand Totalitarianism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 787 (2014).
144. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 13.
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protection, which aim principally to promote innovation and creativ-
ity, trademark law seeks primarily to safeguard the integrity of
the marketplace.145 Trademark law prohibits activities that create
a likelihood of confusion as to the source of goods and services. In
so doing, it reduces consumer confusion and enhances incentives
for firms to invest in activities (including R&D) that improve
brand reputation.
The efficiency of the marketplace depends critically upon the quality
of information available to consumers. Proliferation of unreliable in-
formation in the marketplace increases consumers’ costs of search
and distorts the provision of goods. Consumers will have to spend
more time and effort inspecting goods, researching the product
market, and actually testing products. Manufacturers will have less
incentive to produce quality goods because others will be able to
free-ride on such reputations. Like patent and copyright law, trade-
mark law operates by protecting information—words, symbols, or
other source-identifying indicia. Through such protection, product
manufacturers, service providers, and collective and certification or-
ganizations can more easily police information in the marketplace.
By supporting the reliability of source-identifying symbols, trademark
protection is closely intertwined with marketing and advertising.
These functions are part of a larger framework of laws and insti-
tutions that regulate the quality of information in the marketplace.
Just as institutions and policies other than patent and copyright law
promote innovation and creativity, a variety of mechanisms in addi-
tion to trademark protection are available to provide and regulate
market information: (1) common law causes of action protecting
against deceit and fraud and consumer protection statutes; (2) public
regulation and public enforcement of unfair competition laws; (3) false
advertising and deceptive practices/unfair competition laws; (4) indus-
try self-regulation and certification organizations; and (5) consumer
information institutions. These alternative policies work in conjunc-
tion with trademark protection to facilitate and improve consumer
decision-making.
At the level of internal validity, it is difficult to quarrel with trade-
mark law’s basic design and functioning. Unlike patent protection,
145. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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it does not confer market power over products and services.146 Like
copyright protection, trademarks pose some risk of monopolizing
communication, but various doctrines bar trademark protection
for generic terms147 and limit protection for descriptive terms.148
The expansion of trademark law for famous marks beyond source
identification—what is referred to as dilution protection149—risks
undue power of symbols,150 but these areas of law have been signifi-
cantly circumscribed.151
2. External Perspectives
Notwithstanding trademark law’s general desirability, such pro-
tection can conflict with other social justice concerns. As with copy-
right law, trademark law can interfere with freedom of expression.152
Similarly, trademark protection can undermine moral, dignitary, and
group interests. Creative artists, professional entertainers, and ath-
letes can have service marks associated with their works and perfor-
mances. Members of religious, ethnic, racial, and other communities
146. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (limiting trademark
protection in a product’s trade dress to the non-functional elements).
147. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Underlying the
genericness doctrine is the principle that some terms so directly signify the nature of the
product that interests of competition demand that other producers be able to use them even
if terms have or might become identified with a source and so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary
meaning.”); Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“Consumers will not benefit . . . if trademark law prevents competitors from using generic
or descriptive terms to inform the public of the nature of their product.”).
148. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)
(discussing the descriptiveness doctrine).
149. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927) (articulating dilution of a well-known mark as a form of trademark harm); see also
Jonathan Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 122 (1993).
150. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997).
151. See David S. Welkowitz, Famous Marks Under TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983 (2009);
Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year
of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
449 (2007–2008); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006).
152. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Par-
ody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979 (2004).
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have dignitary interests in words and symbols associated with their
faith, race, origin, and community.153
Several recent controversies highlight inherent tensions between
trademark protection, individual and group identity, and freedom
of expression.154 In contrast to patent155 and copyright law,156 federal
trademark law bars registration of marks that consist of or comprise
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt, or disrepute.”157 In a long-running dispute, Native Americans
have sought to cancel registration of the National Football League’s
“Washington Redskins” trademark on the ground that it is an offen-
sive and disparaging slur.158 That decision is currently being appealed,
with the American Civil Liberties Union—among others—raising
First Amendment concerns.
In another recent decision, the TTAB denied registration of the
mark “The Slants” by an Asian-American rock band.159 The Federal
Circuit overturned the TTAB’s decision on First Amendment grounds,
invalidating the Lanham Act’s Section 2(a) disparagement provi-
sion as unconstitutional.160 Applying strict scrutiny, the court rejected
the statute’s regulation of important legal rights to private speech
based on disapproval of the message content as violative of the
First Amendment.161
153. See Jon Keith Parsley, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An Analysis
of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487 (1993).
154. See Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and Justice, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 133, 158–65 (2011); K.J. Greene, Trademark Law and Racial Subordination: From Marketing
of Stereotypes to Norms of Authorship, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 431, 436, 444 (2008) (discussing the
role of trademarks in reinforcing racial stereotyping (noting the “Aunt Jemima” logo) and
pointing out how what is considered offensive and disparaging shifts over time).
155. See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); Lanham Act, § 2(a).
158. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp.3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015) (upholding
cancellation of trademark); Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (ultimately
dismissing challenge based on laches).
159. See In re Simon Shiao Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.).
160. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The court noted that the PTO has also
denied registration under Section 2(a) to “Stop the Islamisation of America,” “The Christian
Prostitute,” “Mormon Whiskey,” “Have You Heard that Satan Is a Republican?,” “Ride Hard
Retard,” “Abort the Republicans,” “Marriage is for Fags,” and “Squaw Valley,” among many
others. See id. at 1330.
161. See id. at 1334–55. The court did not, however, resolve the constitutionality of the
“immorality” and “scandalous” bars to registration. See id. at 1330 n.1.
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Trademarks also have important cultural and geographic signif-
icance.162 European nations and particular wine and food-producing
regions have long advocated protection of geographic designations
as both an authentic indicator of source and of product quality as
well as a form of regional identity.
Trademark law has taken on far greater significance in the Digi-
tal/Internet Age where trademarks serve as keyword triggers for
advertising. Such advertising has enabled Google, Facebook, and
other Internet companies to establish robust multi-sided markets.
These portals provide “free” services, such as search, email, and
social networking to consumers while auctioning advertising slots,
based on consumer search terms and other communications. As
noted earlier,163 however, such services come at a real human cost.
Advertisers, search engines, and other ad-driven services are seek-
ing to influence and shape their audience. As political activist Eli
Pariser recognized, “If you are not paying for the product, you are
the product.”164
III. THE MACRO SOCIAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE
As reflected in the prior discussion, much IP scholarship and policy
focuses on the efficacy of particular IP modalities. Such modal anal-
ysis is unquestionably important to better understand the particu-
larized operation of the different regimes. Expanding that analysis
to incorporate the broad range of social justice concerns is increas-
ingly important as intellectual property plays a growing role in the
Digital Age. But even this broader, bi-focal frame misses important
macro cross-modal issues, ranging from IP, poverty, and inequality
to gender and racial inclusion and larger global justice issues.
A. IP, Poverty, and Inequality
As a result of the digital revolution, information resources now
drive economic growth more than at any time in human history. In-
creasing the size of the economic pie, however, is only a part of so-
cial justice. As reflected in the scholarship of Professors Emmanuel
162. See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006).
163. See Part II.C.2.
164. See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011).
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Saez165 and Thomas Piketty,166 as well as in mounting political
mobilization questioning economic inequality in the United States
and other developed nations,167 there are, however, much larger soci-
etal interests at stake.168
The burgeoning economic literature on income equality reveals
significant tilting of income distribution toward the wealthy during
the past several decades. Many of the newest billionaires come from
the technology sector. Network economics partially explains the tre-
mendous wealth generated by a relatively few information industry
enterprises.169 And many of the wealthiest people in the world are
technology entrepreneurs.170 Bill Gates (Microsoft) still leads the way,
with his colleagues Paul Allen and Steven Ballmer among the upper
echelon. Others come from Oracle (Larry Ellison), Google (Sergey
Brin, Larry Page, and Eric Schmidt), Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg),
Apple (Laurene Powell Jobs), and Amazon (Jeff Bezos). The sports
and entertainment professions, which depend critically upon copy-
right, trademark, and publicity right protections, also contribute to
high wealth for a relatively small “superstar” class.171
The interplay among IP, poverty, and inequality more generally is
beginning to emerge as IP theory advances and the digital revolution
matures. At a basic level, the technological advance produces higher
standards of living. It enables society to accomplish more with fewer
resources and therefore increases productivity. Whether intellectual
165. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, QUARTERLY J. ECON. (forthcoming 2016);
Facundo Alvaredo, Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Top 1 Percent in
International and Historical Perspective, 27(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013); Tony Atkinson,
Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT.
3 (2011).
166. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013); Thomas Piketty
& Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 1 (2003).
167. See Bernie Sanders on Economic Inequality, FEELTHEBERN.ORG, http://feelthebern.org
/bernie-sanders-on-economic-inequality/.
168. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, How Intellectual Property Reinforces Inequality, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2013.
169. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994) (discussing the economics of network effects); Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985)
(describing economic circumstances leading to increasing return to the scale of demand).
170. See The World’s Billionaires, FORBES (2015), http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/.
171. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981).
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property optimally promotes innovation and creativity is a more dif-
ficult question as addressed in the internal analysis of IP modes.172
But to the extent that it does, it is Pareto-improving173 in at least a
limited sense. No one is required to purchase IP-protected goods.
Therefore, in an exchange economy, only those who value such goods
more than their cost will purchase the goods. Furthermore, patent
and copyright protection eventually expire (this framing, however,
affords little solace to those who can’t afford to purchase patented,
life-saving medicines). At a coarse level of granularity, modern so-
cieties have the benefit of all manner of innovation and creativity—
from sanitation technologies that support safe drinking water to
telecommunications and modern medicines. As such, innovation
tends to reduce poverty and raise standards of living in an absolute
sense over the long run (but as John Maynard Keynes famously
observed, “In the long run we are all dead”174).
The digital revolution has provided especially rapid advance due
to the scalability of information technologies. Fifty years ago, Intel
co-founder Gordon Moore predicted that the number of transistors
in an integrated circuit would double approximately every two years
due to advances in semiconductor and related technologies.175 This
projection—which has come to be known as Moore’s Law176—has
proven remarkably prescient and helps to explain important aspects
of the digital revolution. Given the high cost and risk of semiconduc-
tor research, patents undoubtedly played a significant role in this
remarkable trajectory. As a result, computer technology is now avail-
able to much of the population at relatively low and declining cost.
In some respects, patent and copyright protection parallel the
Jubilee, an Old Testament commandment that Professor Singer
uses to inject a broader conception of social justice into modern prop-
erty theory.177 According to the book of Leviticus, landowners are to
keep the land fallow in the seventh year—a sabbatical year to revive
172. See supra Part II.
173. See supra note 56 (describing the Pareto standard).
174. See ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOR, 1920–1937
62 (1992).
175. See Gordon W. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
ELECTRONICS 114 (2015).
176. See Moore’s Law, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 23, 2016, 4:50 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Moore%27s_law.
177. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP 50–51 (2000).
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the land’s productivity. The Jubilee year occurs following seven cy-
cles; it is the Sabbath’s Sabbath. The Jubilee “fiftieth year is sacred;
it is a time of freedom and of celebration when everyone will receive
back their original property, and slaves will return home to their
families.”178 Debts are forgiven, and society is returned to the pre-
debt state.
Similarly, the limited duration of patent and copyright serves as
a form of tzedakah ( justice or righteousness) in sharing the bounty
of intellectual creativity. One can question whether the duration of
either regime is optimal,179 but the major modes of intellectual prop-
erty liberate the informational bounty at fixed intervals.
Focusing on the consumption side of social welfare only partially
addresses poverty and inequality concerns. There is reason to worry
that the growing importance of information resources in the econ-
omy adversely affects the distribution of income and wealth. More-
over, even as the total social pie expands, shifts in the sources of
economic activity and employment patterns may well be worsening
the plight of the least well-off in absolute as well as relative terms.
We are far from a complete understanding of these phenomena
and patterns, but there are some telltale signs. As MIT Professor Erik
Brynjolfsson and research center director Andrew McAfee have re-
ported, we are in the midst of an unprecedented economic transfor-
mation in which productivity increases while wage rates stagnate.180
According to their research, advances in artificial intelligence (AI)
are profoundly restructuring the economy in ways that benefit a
small inventive and creative class to the relative, and possibly abso-
lute, detriment of the working class. Although the effects are com-
plex and sectoral,181 there is good reason to believe that the digital
178. See Leviticus 25:10; cf. Michael Hudson, “Proclaim liberty throughout the land”: The
Economic Roots of the Jubilee, 15 BIBLE REVIEW 26 (1999); MICHAEL HUDSON, THE LOST TRADI-
TION OF BIBLICAL DEBT CANCELLATIONS 28 (1993) (noting that the Rosetta Stone commemo-
rated a debt cancellation).
179. See, e.g., Menell, Tailoring Software Protection, supra note 14, at 1354–67, 1371–72
(recommending a short duration for software protection, far less than the life of patents or
copyrights); see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
180. See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY
TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY (2011); Steve Lohr, More Jobs Predicted for
Machines, Not People, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/tech
nology/economists-see-more-jobs-for-machines-not-people.html.
181. See Timothy Aeppel, Be Calm, Robots Aren’t About to Take Your Job, MIT Economist
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revolution is increasingly decoupling productivity and employment.182
One only needs to look at automotive manufacturing or travel agen-
cies to see stark shifts since the late 1990s. As Professor David Autor,
who is more sanguine about the effects of AI than his MIT colleagues,
notes, “[i]f we automate all the jobs, we’ll be rich—which means we’ll
have a distribution problem, not an income problem,”183—which is
precisely the point. And given Moore’s Law, the effects can be rapid
and intensify over time.
There may be some countervailing forces on the concentration of
wealth among Information Age industrialists. The same competitive
spirit that has driven Digital Age wealth has produced a new com-
petitive philanthropic age.184 Notwithstanding the benefits that can
flow from such philanthropy, we increasingly live in a new Gilded
Age in which a new breed of Information Age titans direct social
policy185 and distort the political process.
These profound societal changes open up a new set of policy chal-
lenges. Progressive taxation alone might not provide the best antidote
against structural sources of poverty and inequality in the Informa-
tion Age. More direct engagement with intellectual property and other
substantive policy interventions might be advisable. Nonetheless,
the need for rapid innovation to stem climate change and public
health threats grows ever more apparent, creating a tradeoff for
compromising IP policy. On the bright side, the increasing availability
of widely accessible information platforms, tools, and training prom-
ise to expand opportunity. Yet the forces of wealth concentration—
from network effects to advances in machine learning—raise concerns
for the plight of future generations.
B. Gender and Racial Inequality
The concentration of wealth and economic leverage that intellectual
property produces places vast power in the hands of a relatively
Says, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/02/25/be-calm-robots
-arent-about-to-take-your-job-mit-economist-says/?mod=ST1.
182. See David Rotman, How Technology Is Destroying Jobs, TECH REVIEW (June 12, 2013),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/515926/how-technology-is-destroying-jobs/.
183. See Aeppel, supra note 181.
184. See Fred Barbash, Zuckerberg, Gates, Buffett and the Triumph of Competitive Philan-
thropy, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015
/12/02/mark-zuckerberg-bill-gates-warren-buffett-and-triumph-of-competitive-philanthropy/.
185. See RUSSAKOFF, supra note 4 (presenting a cautionary tale about the squandering of
Mark Zuckerberg’s $100 million gift to transform failing Newark public schools).
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small group of entrepreneurs and their representatives. The class
of venture capitalists, corporate titans, Hollywood moguls, and tech-
nology and entertainment lawyers reflect historical gender and race
biases. These patterns persist in the Information Age.
To some extent, these issues reflect long-standing problems in the
workplace, such as gender/race discrimination and the difficulties of
achieving work/family balance.186 While cultural familiarity can pro-
mote teamwork and productivity, it also reinforces bias and limits ac-
cess by under-represented groups.187 These problems are compounded
in the technology sector, where the “STEM” fields of science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and mathematics have long been dominated by
white males.188 The so-called “brogrammer” culture in Silicon Valley
discourages greater integration across gender and racial lines.189 The
issue is gaining salience,190 but progress has been slow. Similar pat-
terns in the business and legal professions reinforce these patterns.191
186. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WOMEN MEN WORK FAMILY (2015);
JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR PATTERNS
WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNOW (2014); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAM-
ILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2001).
187. See Bonnie Marcus, The Lack Of Diversity In Tech Is A Cultural Issue, FORBES (Aug. 12,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2015/08/12/the-lack-of-diversity-in-tech-is-a
-cultural-issue/#429274483577 (citing a study reporting that top universities graduate black
and Hispanic computer science and computer engineering students at twice the rate that leading
technology companies hire them, indicating that the talent pool is not the primary problem).
188. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, KATHERINE W. PHILLIPS & ERIKA V. HALL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
GENDER BIAS AGAINST WOMEN OF COLOR IN SCIENCE (2014), http://www.uchastings.edu/news
/articles/2015/01/double-jeopardy-report.pdf; Jordan Weissmann, The Brogrammer Effect: Women
Are a Small (and Shrinking) Share of Computer Workers, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-brogrammer-effect-women-are-a-small
-and-shrinking-share-of-computer-workers/279611/.
189. See Kieran Snyder, Why Women Leave Tech: It’s the Culture, Not Because ‘Math Is Hard’,
FORTUNE (Oct. 2, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10/02/women-leave-tech-culture/ (reporting
on a survey of 716 women who left technology positions; finding that 27% of women cited work-
place culture as a reason for leaving jobs in the technology industry, whereas 68% cited mother-
hood as a reason); Weissmann, supra note 188.
190. See Joan C. Williams, Hacking Tech’s Diversity Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/10/hacking-techs-diversity-problem; SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN,
WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013).
191. See Deborah L. Rhode, Law Is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And Lawyers
Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That. Lawyers Are Leading the Push for Equality. But They
Need to Focus on Their Own Profession., WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-in-the-nation-and
-lawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/; DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA:
WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2001), http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/pdf/aba.unfinished
.agenda.pdf.
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Inequality and under-representation can distort scientific research
and public health policy.192
Hollywood has long been prone to gender and racial bias as reflected
in its products,193 employment practices,194 and awards.195 Beyond the
injustice of biased employment practices, these patterns have far-
reaching effects on cultural diversity and freedom of expression.
192. See Anita Holdcroft, Gender Bias in Research: How Does It Affect Evidence Based
Medicine?, 100 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 2 (Jan. 2007); NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women
and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research 59 FED. REG. 14508-14513 (1994).
193. On bias in music, see REEBEE GAROFALO & STEVE WAKSMAN, ROCKIN’ OUT: POPULAR
MUSIC IN THE U.S.A. (6th ed. 2013) (tracing the history of music and social history); K.J. Greene,
Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 365 (2008); Greene, supra note 134; SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY
117–48 (2001) (tracing the appropriation of blues by rock ‘n roll artists over time); K.J. Greene,
Copyright Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 339 (1999); On bias in film, see BRIAN LOCKE, RACIAL STIGMA ON THE HOLLYWOOD SCREEN:
THE ORIENTALIST BUDDY FILM (2009); DANIEL BERNARDI (ED.), THE PERSISTENCE OF WHITENESS:
RACE AND CONTEMPORARY HOLLYWOOD CINEMA (2007); VINCENT F. ROCCHIO, REEL RACISM:
CONFRONTING HOLLYWOOD’S CONSTRUCTION OF AFRO-AMERICAN CULTURE (2000); CLINT C.
WILSON II, FELIX GUTIERREZ & LENA CHAO, RACISM, SEXISM, AND THE MEDIA: THE RISE OF CLASS
COMMUNICATION IN MULTICULTURAL AMERICA (3rd ed. 2003); Denise B. Bielby & William T.
Bielby, Women and Men in Film: Gender Equality Among Writers in a Culture Industry, 10
GENDER & SOCIETY 248 (1996); EDWARD GUERRERO, FRAMING BLACKNESS: THE AFRICAN AMER-
ICAN IMAGE IN FILM (1993).
194. See Rebecca Keegan, The Hollywood Gender Discrimination Investigation Is On: EEOC
Contacts Women Directors, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment
/movies/moviesnow/la-et-mn-women-directors-discrimination-investigation-20151002-story
.html (citing a USC study finding that only 1.9% of directors of the top-grossing 100 films of
2013 and 2014 were women and a Directors Guild of America study finding that women rep-
resented just 14% of television directors in 2013 and 2014); Eithne Quinn, Closing Doors:
Hollywood, Affirmative Action, and the Revitalization of Conservative Racial Politics, 99 J. AM.
HIST. 466 (2012).
195. See Tim Gray, Academy Nominates All White Actors for Second Year in Row, VARIETY
(Jan. 14, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/oscar-nominations-2016-diversity-white-120
1674903/; Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Diversifying Film Academy Is a Tall Order, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2016, at A1 (reporting that the Academy of Motion Picture Arts, which picks
the Oscar nominees and winners, is 87% white and 58% male; and two-thirds of the members
are at least sixty years old). The numbers were more skewed just a few years earlier. See John
Horn, Nicole Sperling & Doug Smith, Unmasking Oscar: Academy Voters Are Overwhelmingly
White and Male, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope
/oscars/la-et-unmasking-oscar-academy-project-20120219-story.html (reporting that the mem-
bers of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences are 94% white, 2% African Amer-
ican, and less than 2% Latino; and 77% male); Esther Breger, The “Hollywood Blackout” at
the 1996 Academy Awards, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article
/128584/hollywood-blackout-1996-academy-awards (reporting that when People magazine
took aim at the lack of diversity among the nominees, celebrities were unwilling to join
the protest).
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Creative industries play a vital role in human development, cultural
understanding, and democracy.196
C. Global IP Justice
With the rise of information resources and global trade, intellectual
property has emerged as a central battleground in trade policy. The
current controversy over intellectual property rights unfolding in
the Trans-Pacific Partnership process197 is the latest in a struggle
dating back well over a century.198 With advances in global transpor-
tation infrastructure, policymakers and trade negotiators increas-
ingly focus on the protection of intangible resources.199 The Internet
has opened up a vast new frontier in information data flows and
services. Intellectual property is a growing part of the larger inter-
national development picture.
Multi-national corporations promote strengthening IP rights in
the developing world as a means for encouraging foreign direct invest-
ment. They advocate such development as essential to developing
new local industries that can lift these nations out of poverty and
nurture the creative arts.200 Skeptics see sweatshops, strip-mining,
196. See supra Part II.C.2.
197. See Sean M. Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal
for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 105 (2012).
198. See Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an American Perspective, 43 ARK.
L. REV. 373, 383 n. 49 (1990); Gerhard Joseph, Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and
the Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuzzlewit, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1992);
Edward G. Hudon, Literary Piracy, Charles Dickens and the American Copyright Law, 50 AM.
BAR. ASS’N J. 1157 (1964). At the time that the Berne Convention was being established, the
United States imported far more books than it exported. See The Manufacturing Clause, 4
(Study No. 35), reprinted in 2A OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George
S. Grossman ed., 2001). Leading American publishers favored retention of high tariffs on im-
ports. See id. at 5. Thus, the motivation for such protectionism was not merely to disadvan-
tage foreign authors.
199. See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND
THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998) (chronicling and analyzing how the infor-
mation revolution intensified efforts by multi-national corporations and developed nations to
establish stronger international IP protection).
200. See Keith E. Maskus, Economic Development and Intellectual Property Rights: Key
Analytical Results from Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: VOL-
UME II ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz eds., forthcoming 2016);
Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Devel-
opment of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 277 (2004); Keith E. Maskus,
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deforestation, pollution, threats to indigenous peoples, child labor,
and political corruption. They also see liberalization of trade with
nations lacking safe working conditions, environmental standards,
and fair wages as a threat to wage and employment levels in the de-
veloped nations. Like advances in AI and robotics, globalization has
contributed to stagnant wages in industrialized economies through
the loss of manufacturing jobs.
There is little question that shoring up of IP rights and trade
liberalization affects human and cultural rights, economic inequal-
ity, labor conditions, environmental protection, and a host of other
critical issues. The issues range from providing life-saving drugs to
the poorest people in the world to addressing environmental degra-
dation, protecting the global environment, combating unsafe working
conditions, and eradicating abusive child labor practices. As with the
interplay of IP and inequality more generally, the policy matrix is
replete with paradoxes and inherent conflicts. Innovation and ex-
pressive creativity promise to help developing nations to address the
often dire plight of their citizens. Yet this vision conflicts with var-
ious non-utilitarian perspectives as well as the distorting influences
of corporate interests and geopolitics.
CONCLUSION
Professor Singer’s scholarship emphasizes the need to view prop-
erty and property institutions through a broader lens that integrates
social justice dimensions. Given the growing importance of intangi-
ble resources in the economic, the social, and the political spheres,
intellectual property scholars must widen our lens as well. Several
IP scholars have pointed the way.201 This Article has sought to sketch
a more capacious framework.
Within each mode of intellectual property protection, we need to
use a bi-focal lens. In addition to the conventional issues involved
Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 457; Sean A. Pager, Accentuating the Positive: Building Capacity for Creative Indus-
tries into the Development Agenda for Global Intellectual Property Law, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
223 (2012); see also Laura Bradford, A Closer Look at the Public Domain, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 343,
344–45 (2010) (reporting that despite Ghana’s vibrant musical tradition, many of the country’s
artists operate from outside the country due to the lack of enforceable copyright protections,
and indigenous music is being displaced by non-native, principally American, pop music).
201. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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in assessing the internal validity of intellectual property regimes
(for example, does patent law, trade secret law, and copyright pro-
mote progress as judged by the conventional utilitarian lens? Does
trademark law effectively safeguard the integrity of the consumer
marketplace?), scholars must also explore the broader range of social
justice concerns bearing on the particular intellectual property mo-
dality: human rights, moral rights, cultural and group interests, indig-
enous people’s rights, distributive concerns, and other externalities,
such as environmental degradation and climate change.
Beyond this dual mode-specific focus, intellectual property has
important ramifications for larger questions of income, wealth, power,
race, and gender inequality as well as global justice. Any legal and
policy regime that concentrates economic power and wealth to the
extent that intellectual property protection does has far-reaching
effects on economic and social justice. The technology and culture in-
dustries, grounded in intellectual property, are especially important
in driving economic growth, providing telecommunication infrastruc-
ture and filling the airwaves, influencing the functioning of political
institutions, educating future generations, and addressing public
health, food supply, and climate-change challenges on a global scale.

